Answers to Emor

Emor  5715
Alef.

1. The various approaches of ChaZaL to demonstrate that “Ayin Tachat Ayin” is not to be interpreted literally, but rather as indicative of a monetary settlement/fine:

    Bava Kama 83b:

a.  From the language of the Gemora (Makeh Adam U’Makeh Beheima) it appears that we are dealing with a Hekesh (two elements in same verse demonstrating relationship.) Yet when we look in VaYikra 24, the chapter referenced, we find no such verse:

ויקרא פרק כד

(יז) ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות יומת:

(יח) ומכה נפש בהמה ישלמנה נפש תחת נפש:

(יט) ואיש כי יתן מום בעמיתו כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו:

(כ) שבר תחת שבר עין תחת עין שן תחת שן כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו:

(כא) ומכה בהמה ישלמנה ומכה אדם יומת:

(כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם כגר כאזרח יהיה כי אני יקוק אלקיכם:

Consequently, the verses need to be interpreted as follows:

17- Murder of another human being

18- Murder of an animal

19- Injuring another human being, the implication that the principle of Lex Talionis is followed.

20- Examples of L.T.

21-There appears to be a difference in approach to compensating the injury to a person as opposed to the injury to an animal.

22- There should be consistency with respect to how perpetrators, victims are treated before the law.

The Derasha of the Talmud appears to key on 21, asserting that despite the fact that the verbs in the respective cases are different, Yeshalmena, Yumat, they are to be interpreted comparably since they appear within the same verse. Consequently the word “Yumat” should be understood figuratively in light of the term “Yeshalmena” in the first clause of the verse, i.e., “death” in terms of payment rather than literal punishment.

b.  Inference—From a murderer, no monetary compensation (Kofer) can atone for his crime, implying that for a lesser crime, i.e., causing injury, monetary compensation would be not only acceptable, but expected.

c. Logic—If the perpetrator already has the infirmity that he is causing to another, i.e., he is blind and he blinds another, it would be impossible to apply any punishment to him. In light of v. 22 above, i.e., all perpetrators should be treated equally, this is possible only if a monetary punishment is assessed.

d. Gezeira Shava—One of the 13 hermeneutic principles of R. Yishmael states that if a similar word appears in verses dealing with two disparate contexts, there is a connection between the two contexts. In this case, because “Tachat” appears both with regard to injuries to people (VaYikra 24:20) “Ayin Tachat Ayin”, as well as where animals are injured (Shemot 21:36) “Shalem Yeshalem Shor Tachat Shor”, the linkage is to be interpreted as there is to be payment in both instances.

e.  Logic—It is impossible to assure that were the perpetrator’s eye to be taken out, that is all the damage that will be done to him. Consequently, he would be punished beyond what he originally did were he to suffer not only e.g., his eye to be taken out, but him dying as a result of the operation. The only way to assure that this type of “collateral punishment” not take place is to reserve the punishment to monetary payment.

RaMBaM

f. Ta’amei HaMitzvot—Ayin Tachat Ayin was never meant to be taken literally, but rather delineates how the perpetrator should feel about what he has done, even though he only has to make a monetary payment.

g.  Binyan Av (paradigm)—From Shemot 21:18-9, where the Tora speaks of the consequences for someone who has struck another with his fist or with a stone—the payments of minimum wage as long as he cannot work and compensation for all medical bills associated with the injury until the victim is completely recovered—this establishes the frame of reference by which to understand all subsequent references to injuries that men cause to other men.

h. Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai—Despite the fact that there appears to be a disconnect between Tora SheB’Ktav and SheB’Al Peh, nevertheless there never was a moment from the time that the Tora was given at Sinai when the interpretation of these verses was anything other than monetary compensation. 

2. Assuming that RaMBaM is working off the proofs that the Gemora presents, as is pointed out in 1a, the ostensible Hekesh does not really exist. Therefore RaMBaM skips the first proof and begins with the second. Yet if there is a Masoret that a Gezeira Shava exists focusing on the word “Tachat”, a derivation that is not subject to logical analysis, but rather something that either you receive as a tradition, or you don’t, in addition to claiming that one has not received that particular tradition, it is helpful to also demonstrate that the word involved “Tachat” has a different purpose and is therefore not available, from your perspective for a Gezeira Shava derivation. 

3.  The last proof is one of Masoret, i.e., if throughout history a particular interpretation of the terms similar to Ayin Tachat Ayin was followed, then we must per force assume that this was the intended interpretation from the moment that the Halacha was revealed to Moshe on Sinai.

Beit.

Gur Aryeh is emphasizing that even if in the instances of both injuring an animal and injuring a person, there is a financial settlement, they are still qualitatively different actions. In the former instance, all that was harmed was an object’s value, and once that value has been replaced, everyone can get on with their lives. However, with respect to an injury suffered by another human being, in addition to any monetary loss, there is also an attack upon the individual’s dignity. The fact that Boshet (the payment for embarrassment) is one of the five standard payments, it is obvious that one’s psychological state is included in the evaluation of any injury. Consequently, to simply hand the money over without expressions of apology and requests for forgiveness suggests that the perpetrator is not really penitent regarding what he has done. (However, I don’t understand why the same is not the case when someone damages another’s property. The inconvenience, emotional disruption, sense of being attacked even if only indirectly, would seem to me sufficient reason to require forgiveness also where one damages or destroys another’s property. Ve Tzorech Iyun.) 

Gimel.

1. ויותר קשה הכווי' והפצע והחבורה כי אם היו במקום מסוכן אולי ימות ואין הדעת סובלת Ibn Ezra distinguishes harm to one’s eye from harm that is inflicted in the form of a wound or burn. (Apparently the Ibn Ezra did not believe that the eye is an area of the body that is necessarily Mesukan (dangerous) for the health of the entire body. That certainly could be disputed.) Whereas acc. to Ibn Ezra the eye is a finite organ, independent of the rest of the body’s functions, inflicting a wound or burn on a particular part of the body that could ultimately result in the death of the person, would be much more difficult to carry out with precision and the absence of side-effects.

      הראשון בא בלא כוונה ואיך ייתכן לעשות שבר כמוהו The initiation injury was done without specific knowledge of the precise results of the attack. But now that the court might want to replicate exactly on the body of the perpetrator what had been done to the victim, it should be impossible to do so given the tremendous number of variables involved.

      דברי קבלה The Rabbinic tradition that defines Ayin Tachat Ayin as an indication that there is to be a financial settlement.

      כי על הרוב דבר הכתוב (what could be said on behalf of those who wish to take the verse in the Tora literally.) While there might be cases whereby the perpetrator will get off scot free because of his disabilities, e.g., a blind person blinding a sighted person, whereby Ayin Tachat Ayin cannot be carried out, the law is created to apply to people of normal circumstances. Consequently, even if individuals might fall between the cracks, for the most part the law will discourage the average person from injuring another, and in the case where an injury does occur, there will be compensation for the victim. (The argument is rendered moot when the Rabbinic Tradition asserts that there is always monetary compensation, precluding, or at least diminishing someone “falling through the cracks.”

2.  The first two challenges of Ben Zuta involve reading verses, i.e., what is the implication of the phrase “Kein Yinatein Bo”; how is Shimshon’s prediction of “Kein Asiti Lahem” to be understood? The third challenge is a logical one, i.e., there are situations where the perpetrator will get away with what he has done without penalty, e.g., a poor person who injures another and will not be able to pay one or more of the five requisite payments. (Isn’t this a situation where one would have to become an Eved Ivri?) 

3. R. Saadia uses a grammatical inference (“Al” replacing “B”,) a proof from a biblical story (although Shimshon used a language that implied that he literally would do to the Philistines that which had been done by them to him, in fact the punishments that he brought to bear upon them were different from the ones that he and his family had suffered,) and then a logical proof from a situation that would not lend itself to a literally rendering of “Ayin Tachat Ayin,” i.e., a blind person blinding another.

   The utilization of the verb “Oseh” and the structure of the verse in Shoftim 15:11) is parallel to the verse in VaYikra 24:19 (see 1a above.)

Emor questions

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/608.html

Answers to Achrei Mot Kedoshim

Kedoshim 5709
Alef.

1.  Usually the introduction for a topic which HaShem Wishes Moshe to communicate to the Jewish people is: דבר אל בני ישראל, as in e.g., Shemot 14:15; 25:2; 31:13; VaYikra 1:2; 4:2; 7:21; BaMidbar 5:6; 6:2; 15:2. (Obviously there will be no instance in Beraishit since the Jewish people per se had not as yet been formed, as well as in Devarim since at this juncture, Moshe is giving his last speech to all members of the Jewish people, without God Dictating to him as to what to say (see Abravanel at the beginning of Devarim.)

2.  Even if Parashat Kedoshim was said BeHakhel, why was this necessary?

3.  Mizrachi: Since these matters are of great importance, it is necessary that there should not be created excuses for not comprehending what is being transmitted, i.e., people shouldn’t be able to say in the version with which they were presented certain elements were either missing or added, and people should be able to clarify for one another exactly was said, this being possible only if everyone is taught the same thing word for word.

   Korban Aharon: Whereas with respect to other aspects of the Tora, it was appropriate for each group to be able to understand what was being presented on their own levels, either deeper or less deep. However with respect to this Parasha, since the Peshat is so important, everyone needed to be exposed to the same material at the same time.

   Alshich: In order to preclude the excuse that only certain individuals are capable of observing certain Mitzvot, these are all given in the presence of everyone to symbolize that all people should see themselves as able to comply with these rules.

4.  Mizrachi implies that there are potential ambiguities that might be misunderstood. This appears to be in stark contrast with Korban Aharon who contends that there is a basic understanding that should be accessible to all, suggesting that misunderstandings will be minimal. Alshich does not appear as concerned with the understanding of the material as the readiness of the listeners to accept upon themselves the responsibility of carrying out what they are hearing.

5.  It would appear from Mizrachi’s interpretation that it will be insufficient for Moshe to simply present the material to the people, but rather it is his responsibility to explain what has been said in different ways and a number of times to assure that all has been clearly understood.  

Beit.

1.  RaShI defines Kedusha by the manner in which an individual avoids that which is prohibited to him, sins in general and prohibited sexual relationships in particular. (The latter comment is precipitated with the Semichat HaParshiot of the end of Acharei Mot.)

2.  The concept of “Naval B’Reshut HaTora” connotes where individuals have not actually violated a specific prohibition, but have nevertheless acted in a manner that is repulsive and anti-spiritual, e.g., a glutton who consumes only glatt Kosher or an individual who is intimate with only his wife, but does so in a repulsive and/or brutal manner. These individuals have abused that which is permitted to them.

3.  R. Yonatan defines proper asceticism as something that even if everyone would act in this manner, the world would be able to continue to function. (Kant has a similar test for whether something is ethical or not—if it becomes a universal practice, would the world be able to continue to exist. Consequently, e.g., if everyone would murder, society would be impossible to be maintained, we can determine what is truly moral and what is not.) RaMBaN did not apply a criteria of quantity, i.e., what would happen if everyone would act in this manner. On the other hand, if everyone would sanctify themselves only within the contexts of that which is permitted to them and in a manner that is middle-of-the-road rather than extreme, it does not seem that this would necessarily result in the destruction of civilization. While R. Yonatan criticizes “Nezirim” it is only those who prohibit everything upon themselves; if they would only distance themselves from wine and grape products, not cut their hair and strive not to become ritually impure, even if everyone would follow such a regimen, would this necessarily harm society?

4.   In light of the fact that Mizrachi emphasized the need for everyone to be together due to the necessity that all would hear the same instruction and be able to understand it and explain it to others cognitively; Korban Aharon stressed how the contents of the Parasha were   understandable to everyone even on the simplest of levels; and Alshich advocated the idea that all people were equally capable of carrying out the directives in the Parasha; it could be said that in contrast to these three positions, R. Yonatan interprets the insistence that everyone be present when these Commandments are conveyed to the people to demonstrate that holiness and self-sacrifice are considered appropriate only when they are the types of things that everyone would be able to do simultaneously without an overly adverse affect upon human civilization.

5.  Perhaps Yosifun is referring to early Christain ascetics, who emphasized the ideal of the World to Come as opposed to this world.

Parshat Achrei/kedoshim

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/1207.html

Answers to Tazria Metzora

(Tazria-)Metzora 5722

Alef.

1. a) The afflictions of the houses that lead to their being deconstructed is a means by which the new Jewish owners can discover the hidden treasures left there by the Canaanim who abandoned their homes.

b) The afflictions become a means of punishing anti-social individuals who deny having various articles when others ask to borrow them; before the house is declared impure, the contents are brought outside and everyone can then see how the owner really did possess the things that he had previously denied having.

2.    The beginning of 14:34 where there is an emphasis upon God Giving the Jews the land of Canaan as an inheritance would be more in keeping with an interpretation that the houses that they will come to possess will further strengthen their inheritance when they discover hidden treasures within, than to warn them that their sins are going to result in the houses being condemned and their property exposed. Therefore not only will HaShem Give them the land, He will also Give them treasure.

3.    By the other forms of skin conditions, the phrases “Ki Yihyeh” or “Ki Tihyeh” (when it will be) are used: 13:2, 9, 18, 24, 29, 38, Similarly with regard to clothing and furniture, the Tora states, (v. 47-8) “Ki Yihyeh” However, by the plague affecting the house, the language is “VeNatati Nega Tzora’at” (and I will Cause a plague of Tzora’at). The more personal nature and the inevitability of the language is what R. Yehuda might be picking up on.

4.    MaLBIM explains that when the verb “N-T-N” is used in connection with a Divine Decree, it always has a good purpose, even if in the short term it appears like a plague and therefore a punishment. The verse in II Shmuel 7:14, albeit mentioning plagues, says at the outset that the relationship between God and His People is that of a father and son. Even if a father punishes a son, it is out of a sense of love and desire to correct the shortcomings of the son for the long-term.

Beit.

1.    V. 35 could have simply served the purpose of stating that the Kohen must be summoned in order to inspect the house and determine if Tzora’at has broken out or not. And such a summons could have been carried out by anyone. Since the Tora goes out of its way to state that the owner of the house must go to  make the request, it implies that there is some special reason why specifically he must interact with the Kohen even before the latter comes to inspect the house’s walls. The second citation in the Sifra provides the rationale, i.e., that the Kohen, in addition to technically inspecting the house, is to give Mussar to the house’s owner from the perspective that the existence of Tzora’at implies some sort of sinful behavior has taken place, specifically Lashon HaRa, as derived from the case of Miriam in BaMidbar 12,  and ought to be rectified.

2.    The language of “U’Ba” (and he will come) implies that he has to be able to traverse the distance between the house and the Kohen. Someone who is elderly or infirm will not be able to do so and therefore would be precluded from such a requirement. (The Kohen could still give such individuals Mussar once he arrives at the house. However, someone might be more vulnerable and open to rebuke when given it in unfamiliar surroundings, particular on the Kohen’s home turf.)

3.    “H-G-I-D” appears to deal with technical information, i.e., how exactly did this condition develop, where is it, what does it look like, etc. “A-M-R” is associated with a personal discussion, where instead of the question “how,” what is not being discussed is “why”? What caused this condition to develop?

4.    It would appear that “Leimor” (saying) is completely superfluous in this verse and therefore must be accounted for in some other way, as the MaLBIM states should be done for other verses in which “Leimor” is superfluous. Consequently, it would appear that the principle, “Im Eino Inyan LeInyano, Tenaihu LeInyan Acher” (if it does not seem to serve its own immediate purpose, apply it to some other purpose) should be invoked, leading to the conclusion that “Leimor” is not referring to something that is said to the Kohen, but rather something that the Kohen says in response to what he has just been told.

5.    Not only is the story of Miriam a paradigm for Tzora’at being associated with Lashon HaRa (BaMidbar 12 along with Devarim 24:9), but also the story of the signs Given to Moshe in order to convince the people that he has been sent by God. In Shemot 4:6-7 whereby Moshe gets Tzora’at temporarily, this is understood by one approach in the Midrash as a result of what he said in Shemot 4:1, “And they (the Jewish people) will not believe me…” thus casting aspersions on their level of belief and trust in HaShem.

6.    One might claim that as long as the subject of the evil speech is not aware of what has been said, it is relatively less harmful and injurious; consequently, to say something directly in the presence of the party being discussed will by definition cause more hurt and pain.

Gimel.
        It would seem that the imagery of having one’s house threatened first with partial and then with full destruction leading to homelessness and disorientation is a situation so disconcerting that it inspires thoughts of various aspects of Jewish history past, present and future

Tazria/Metzora Qs

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/421.html

Answers to Shmini

Shmini 5725 

Alef.

1.  Although the “Ziknei Yisrael” are included in Moshe’s invitation, only Aharon is addressed in verses 2 and 3, begging the question why “Ziknei Yisrael were originally included.

2. In verse 3 the verb “Tedaber” appears, which is second person singular, implying that a single person, i.e., Aharon, is expected to carry out this Commandment.

Beit.

1. The difficulty with which Ibn Ezra and RaMBaN are grappling is the order of the verses. V. 23 reflects the fulfillment of Moshe’s promise that once the sacrifices have been properly offered, the Glory of HaShem will Appear.  If starting with v. 7 the instructions that were given starting in v. 2 were carried out, it is unclear why v. 6 is located where it is. It appears to be more of an introductory verse, than one that should appear at the end of the instructions given by Moshe.

2. + 3.  Ibn Ezra’s approach to the following biblical texts, understanding the verb forms as “past perfect”:

a) VaYikra 9:6

         Moshe had already told Aharon, “approach the altar…”

b) Shemot 4:19

  HaShem had towards the beginning of His Discussion with Moshe (3:10), already Informed him that his mission was to return to Egypt to lead the Jewish people into freedom. Consequently, 4:19 would appear redundant. (However, there is a new piece of information in the verse which could justify its repetition at this point as a means of further encouraging and reassuring Moshe regarding his mission—those who were our to kill Moshe, have “died.” ChaZaL interpret this as a reference to Nadav and Avihu who were supposed to have been the protagonists in the fight that Moshe broke up in 2:13-14, and who were reputed to be the informants to Pharoah [2:15]. However their “deaths” are only metaphorical, since they explicitly show up again in the Korach rebellion [BaMidbar 16:1 ff.] Consequently, ChaZaL [Nedarim 64b] make the general statement about how impoverished people, among others, are considered “dead” in the sense that they have markedly diminished influence as a result of their lack of wealth.)

c) Ibid., 33:4

The proper place for v. 4 is between v. 5 and 6. Ibn Ezra is not bothered when verses are out of sequence.

d) Beraishit 24:14 (even though it is dealing with a problem on 24:23)

In v. 23 the servant asks about Rivka’s geneology after acting towards her in v. 22 as if she was the designated bride-to-be, his having given her gifts of jewelry. Ibn Ezra will claim that v. 23 takes place before v. 22, i.e., he had already asked her about her family.

e) Tehillim 78:23

This Psalm presents a poetic summary of Jewish history. V. 18-20 describes their complaints re food. V. 23 describes God Causing Manna to rain down. However the complaints about food (BaMidbar 11:4 ff)  come after the Manna has been given (Shemot 16). Therefore Ibn Ezra says that v. 23 is to be understood as something that has already happened, rather than an event that takes place at this point of the Psalm.

4. RaMBaN explains Ibn Ezra on VaYikra 9:2 as understanding the verses as originally stating what the people have to do without revealing to them what will occur at the end, i.e., God will Reveal Himself as a result of these sacrifices. Only upon the completion of the instructions does Moshe include this piece of information.

5. RaMBaN has difficulty in assuming that information already known would be repeated a second time. Therefore he interprets 9:6 as emphasizing not only the bringing of these sacrifices, but also their being offered up in the particular order that was mentioned.

6. RaMBaN explains the new information in v. 6 (see 5 above). The overall approach is consistent with his opposition to the employment of the principle “Ein Mukdam U’Me’uchar BaTora”, i.e., he rejects the reliance upon looking at the Tora in a non-chronological manner with respect to the order of the verses.  

Gimel.

1.   Ohr HaChayim is bothered by the fact that instead of identifying the location where the people were standing as the Ohel Moed, the text states that they are standing “Lifnai HaShem.” When earlier Moshe told them to bring sacrifices that were to be offered “Lifnai HaShem”, this is understandable because the purpose of sacrifices (Korbanot—root K-R-V, close) is to come closer to, stand before HaShem. However, this is more a metaphysical value than an empirical location. When the text states that they stood “Lifnai HaShem” this appears to this commentator to be more of a matter of a state of mind than an actual place, particularly since in the immediately preceding phrase it says that they already were “ Lifnai Ohel Moed.” (My difficulty with such an interpretation is the means by which Moshe was able to tell what their state of mind was. Is this part of his prophetic powers? Was there  some tangible evidence upon which Moshe could base such a conclusion?)

2.    Ohr HaChayim is at variance with Ibn Ezra and RaMBaN in terms of what the antecedent of “Zeh HaDavar” (this is the thing) to which Moshe is referring when he says that it will bring about the Divine Revelation.  Ibn Ezra, by reversing the chronology of the verses, interprets the phrase as referring to the series of sacrifices that have already been listed. RaMBaN preserves the order of the verses, and explains that “Zeh HaDavar” is a reference to not only the sacrifices, but their sequence that must be specifically followed. Ohr HaChayim suggests that the catalyst for the Revelation is the attitude of the people, i.e., that they sense that they are standing in God’s Presence.

Daled.

RaMBaN on VaYikra 9:7

   The commentator, rather than accepting a literal understanding of the Midrash which would have stated that Aharon, when he looked at the altar, saw a calf, reminding him of the sin of the Golden Calf in which he at least indirectly participated, says instead that since the sin of the Calf was on Aharon’s mind and he felt guilty about it, the act of offering sacrifices on any altar was causing him concern and guilt. Consequently Aharon did not see the altar as a calf, but rather was reminded of the Calf by the altar. This led him to wonder how would he ever be able to achieve atonement for himself and others (in his role as Kohen Gadol) when he had this major blotch on his record and soul? His hesitancy and sense of inadequacy consequently requires encouragement from Moshe to proceed as God has Instructed Aharon to do.  

RaMbaN on Beraishit 11:28

רמב"ן בראשית פרק יא פסוק כח

...כי אברם אשר נולד בכותא חלק על דעת ההמון שהיו עובדים השמש, ונתן המלך אותו בבית הסוהר והיה עמהם בתוכחות ימים רבים שם, אחר כך פחד המלך שישחית עליו ארצו ויסיר בני האדם מאמונתם וגרש אותו אל קצה ארץ כנען אחר שלקח כל הונו. והנה על כל פנים במקום ההוא בארץ כשדים נעשה נס לאברהם אבינו, או נס נסתר, שנתן בלב אותו המלך להצילו ושלא ימיתנו והוציא אותו מבית הסוהר שילך לנפשו, או נס מפורסם שהשליכו לכבשן האש וניצל כדברי רבותינו:...

While RaMBaN is not ready to present  the Midrashic version for why Avraham was exiled from Ur Kasdim as does RaShI,

רש"י בראשית פרק יא

(כח) על פני תרח אביו - בחיי אביו. ומדרש אגדה יש אומרים שעל ידי אביו מת, שקבל תרח על אברם בנו לפני נמרוד על שכתת את צלמיו והשליכו לכבשן האש, והרן יושב ואומר בלבו אם אברם נוצח, אני משלו, ואם נמרוד נוצח, אני משלו. וכשניצל אברם אמרו לו להרן משל מי אתה, אמר להם הרן משל אברם אני. השליכוהו לכבשן האש ונשרף, וזהו אור כשדים. ומנחם בן סרוק פירש אור בקעה, וכן (ישעיה כד טו) באורים כבדו ה', וכן (שם יא ח) מאורת צפעוני. כל חור ובקע עמוק קרוי אור:

he doesn’t completely discount it either. After giving a rational explanation about what might have led to his being thrown out of the country, RaMBaN does reference the ChaZaL as a possible, but not the exclusive, explanation. The common denominator in these first two RaMBaN’s is that while cognizant of the Rabbinic perspective, RaMBaN retains his own objectivity and either modifies (guilty conscience vs. vision) or relegates the Rabbinic tradition, even a well-known and ubiquitous one, to the status of a mere possibility among others.  

RaMBaN on Beraishit 37:15

רמב"ן בראשית פרק לז

(טו) וימצאהו איש והנה תעה בשדה - יאמר כי הוא תועה מן הדרך ולא היה יודע אנה ילך, ונכנס בשדה כי במקום המרעה היה מבקש אותם. ויאריך הכתוב בזה, להגיד כי סיבות רבות באו אליו שהיה ראוי לחזור לו, אבל הכל סבל לכבוד אביו. ולהודיענו עוד, כי הגזרה אמת והחריצות שקר, כי זמן לו הקב"ה מורה דרך שלא מדעתו להביאו בידם. ולזה נתכוונו רבותינו (ב"ר פד יד) באמרם כי האישים האלה הם מלאכים, שלא על חנם היה כל הסיפור הזה, להודיענו כי עצת ה' היא תקום:

While RaMBaN acknowledges the ChaZaL that identifies the individual who guided Yosef to the location of his brothers as an Angel, he nevertheless does not go that far and simply explains that HaShem Orchestrated a “guide” to assure Yosef’s falling into his brother’s hands, but such a “guide” does not have to be supernatural per se.  

RaMBaN on Beraishit 37:17

רמב"ן בראשית פרק לז

יז) נסעו מזה - הסיעו עצמן מן האחוה. נלכה דותינה, לבקש לך נכלי דתות שימיתוך בהם. ולפי פשוטו שם מקום הוא, ואין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו, לשון ר' שלמה. ואין הכונה לרבותינו שיפרש לו האיש נסעו מזה מן האחוה והלכו לעורר עליך דינין ותרעומות, שאם כן היה נמנע ללכת ולא היה מסכן בעצמו. אבל הכונה להם כי האיש גבריאל אשר הגיד לו הגיד אמת, ואמר לשון משמש לשני פנים, ושניהם אמת, והוא לא הבין הנסתר בו, והלך אחר הנגלה ממנו, וילך אחר אחיו וימצאם בדותן כאשר אמר לו. ודרשו זה, מפני שהאיש הזה הוא מלאך ואם כן יודע הוא אנה הם, ולמה לא אמר הנם בדותן, ואמר כמסתפק ששמע מהם שילכו שם ואינו יודע אנה הם עתה, ולכן יעשו מדרש במאמרו:

RaMBaN thinks that there is a disconnect between positing that the “guide” that directs Yosef is an Angel, and the fact that he does not tell Yosef exactly what his brothers are planning. Consequently, RaMBaN claims that were the “guide” to do so, Yosef would have aborted his mission. Therefore, the “guide” tells Yosef, but only in the form of a “double entendre”, which Yosef and the reader will come to appreciate only in retrospect, after the dastardly deed is done. The Midrash goes too far for RaMBaN, and therefore he interprets it in a more rationally accessible manner.

Heh.

1.  It would appear that some Rabbanim counted verses and letters to assure that the Tora was accurate, and in fact in the same form as the Tora that was received by Moshe and passed down throughout the generations. (See articles, e.g., http://www.aishdas.org/toratemet/en_text.html )

2.  R. Epstein suggests that outsized letters hint at various significant points in the Tora text, e.g., the midway point in the Tora.)

3.  They are alluding to the inconsistencies between the claim of the Talmud regarding the spellings of certain words and what we have in the Tora’s in our synagogues.

Parshat Shmini

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/178.html