Berashit Questions

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Answers to Vezot Habracha

VeZot HaBeracha  5728

Alef.

1.   Even though the verse begins" "ולזבולן, when the object shifts to his brother, the text states, "ויששכר", without repeating the preposition “ל”, suggesting that when you speak about one, you are speaking about the other as well, as a result of some sort of partnership between them.

2.    The classical interpretation of the relationship between Yisachar and Zevulun, as reflected for example in RaShI’s commentary, is that whereas Zvulun engaged in business in order to accumulate capital, Yisachar dedicated himself to the study of Tora. Then each would benefit from the other, i.e., by Zevulun’s supporting his brother, he would indirectly get credit for studying Tora, and Yisachar, by exempting Zevulun from spending significant time in Tora study, was enabling him and getting indirect credit for being engaged with the general world.

   Abrabanel understands the Moshe’s blessings to the two brothers as  reminding and hoping them that even though each will be engaged in a very different activity, they should not be guilty of thinking that “the grass is greener on the other side” but rather should each be deeply satisfied with his own individual lot in life.

Beit.

1.    When Yaakov was blessing his sons, everything was in the future, and the actual tendencies of not only the individual, but also his offspring, were not at all as yet in evidence. However, by the time of Moshe’s blessings to the tribes that had descended from each of their original ancestors, patterns of behavior were clear, retroactively lending credence to Yaakov’s prophetic pronouncements at the end of Beraishit.

2.    In Beraishit, both Zevulun and Yisachar are given separate verses. Furthermore, Yisachar has two verses in contrast to Zevulun’s single verse. If anything, one could say that they are not to be compared at all, or if they are to be compared, then Yisachar to whom is devoted two verses, is more significant than his brother. However, in Devarim, both are in the same verse, and the birth order is reversed, i.e., Yisachar is listed before Zevulun (see Parashat VaYetze), leading to the conclusion that Zevulun is being preferred.

3.    In the original comment, RaShI simply describes the relationship between the two brothers, but he does not account for the word “Semach” which is the essence of the blessing. Consequently, RaShI adds two more comments explaining how the “Semach” will be translated into actuality, i.e., that not only will there be a symbiotic relationship between the two tribes, but that each of them respectively will rejoice, since they will be successful  in their particular pursuits, one in the business world, the other in the world of Tora.

Gimel.

1.    “Amim”:  Siphre: the nations of the world

               Megilla 6a: the tribes of Israel.

2.    “Har”: Siphre: Har HaBayit, Yerushalayim

               Megilla 6a: the mountains where Zevulun and Yisachar live.

3.    RaShI interprets Zevulun’s complaint not so much the type of land that he was allotted, but rather the “Mazal” (fate, planet, ???) that he was given to supervise what will happen to his tribe.

4.    In order to answer the two questions posed by the Mizrachi, i.e., why would Yisachar call the rest of the Jewish people to Har HaBayit; why should Har HaBayit be mentioned within the context of the blessings of Yisachar and Zevulun, one can call upon I Divrei HaYamim 12:33. The Biblical reference describes Yisachar as serving as the resource of “knowing times”, i.e., they will determine when Rosh Chodesh takes place, and in turn the various Yamim Tovim. If Yisachar will be determining the Jewish calendar, which will include when everyone will have to go on the pilgrimage festivals to Yerushalayim, they will be calling the rest of the Jews to respond.

5.    Even though the juxtaposition between the end of v. 18 (Yisachar in their tents) and the beginning of v. 19 (they shall call the people to the mountain) suggests the particular contribution of Yisachar re the Jewish calendar, when the end of v. 19 is taken into consideration (such the abundance of the seas, the treasures hidden in the sand) it would appear to relate to the types of commerce in which Zevulun will engage.

6.    The literal context of Shoftim 5:18 is that Devora is praising the tribes of Yisachar and Zevulun for having volunteered to participate in the Canaanite wars that ultimately proved victorious for the Jewish side, despite the unwillingness of a number of other tribes to similarly do so. The Gemora interprets the verse that the Y. and Z. were sorely irked regarding the quality and location of the land which was apportioned to them in comparison to what other tribes received.

7.    Even if RaShI posits that we are talking about Y. and Z. when the text states “they will suck the abundance of the seas”, (in contrast to the Gemora, which implies that it is the other nations  who will do so by first coming to Y. and Z. to purchase the sea creatures and glass that they have to offer, and then proceeding to Yerushalayim where they eventually convert), nevertheless, what is the nature of that “Shefa” (abundance)? Either Y. and Z. are being described as benefiting spiritually since they will not have to engage in all-consuming agriculture, but rather as middlemen in selling animals and glass, thereby allowing them more time for spiritual pursuits, or simply that the trade in Chilazon, Tunina and white glass will prove so lucrative that they will become materially wealthy, without stating what they will do with that wealth. The practical difference between these two interpretations is the degree to which we assume that not only Y. but also Z. engaged in Tora study. According to the first interpretation, they did so on a level comparable to that of Y.; according to the second both tribes made money, but perhaps only Y. utilized their wealth to finance a life of Tora study.

8.    The Gemora attributes to Y. and Z. the fear that their fellow Jewish tribesmen might attempt to cheat them by taking their natural resources without compensating them. Perhaps RaShI felt that such an instance of “Chosheid B’Kesheirim” was unflattering to Y. and Z. and therefore sought out alternative interpretations.

Daled.

1.    Ibn Ezra cites Daniel to illustrate the use of two words consecutively that mean the same thing. “Admat Afar” in his view parallels “U’Sefunai Temunai”.

2.    If Ibn Ezra was making the point that the “Sin” of “Sefunai” should be understood as equivalent to a “Tzadi”, then the additional proof text that he brings from Daniel, should also illustrate such a phenomenon.

3.    If both Y. and Z. became wealthy, why is only Z. described as burying and thereby protecting their wealth as opposed to Y. about whom no such action is stated?

Answers to Sukkot

Emor 5730
Alef.

I think that the reason why RaShI chose R. Akiva’s view over that of R. Eliezer re the nature of the Sukkot being referred to in VaYikra 23:43 is because of the word “VeHoshavti” (I Caused them to dwell.) Whereas if actual Sukkot were being referenced, then God didn’t Cause them to dwell in such structures—the people built them themselves. The fact that such flimsy structures were sufficient to provide shelter for the people during their forty years of wandering was certainly a miracle; however, God at best could Take only indirect credit for causing them to dwell in these shacks. On the other hand, if the Tora is referring to the Clouds of Glory that protected the people on six sides, as well as smoothed out the roads and eliminated dangers as snakes and scorpions, for this God could certainly Take credit. (See BaMidbar Rabba 1:2).

Beit.

1. Both RaShI and the Beiur, rather that seeing the word “Ach” as contrasting Sukkot with Yom Hakippurim, as do Ibn Ezra and RaShBaM, derive something about Sukkot in terms of itself from this extra word, usually associated with excluding something.

תלמוד ירושלמי מסכת ברכות פרק ט דף יד טור ב /ה"ה

נחמיה עימסוני שימש את רבי עקיבא עשרים ושתים שנה ולמדו אתים וגמים ריבויין אכין ורקין מיעוטין.

2.  RaShBaM and Ibn Ezra are similar in terms of their seeing “Ach” as contrasting Sukkot with Yom HaKippurim, RaShBaM in terms of how differing from the themes of remembrance and atonement that lie at the heart of the other two Tishrei holidays, the theme associated with Sukkot is Simcha and thanksgiving due to the harvest, and Ibn Ezra with respect to how whereas Yom HaKippurim is about afflicting oneself, Sukkot is about rejoicing. RaShBaM would seem to account for the mention in the text of the harvest—that there should be rejoicing and thanksgiving—more so than Ibn Ezra who merely points out the difference in mood from Rosh Hashana and Yom HaKippurim, but not a reason for it.

ויקרא פרק כג

(לט) אך בחמשה עשר יום לחדש השביעי באספכם את תבואת הארץ תחגו את חג יקוק שבעת ימים

 ביום הראשון שבתון וביום השמיני שבתון:

3.  The two questions that RaShI wishes to address are:

         a. Why does the word “Ach” appear within the context of Sukkot?

b. To what extent is the Korban Shelamim brought on the Yom Tov a Chovat HaYom (i.e., how intrinsic is it to the Yom Tov celebration?) The litmus test is whether it would push aside the restrictions of Shabbat were Yom Tov to coincide with Shabbat. By virture of the fact that it does not push aside Shabbat, and to this is what the addition of the word “Ach” is drawing attention according to RaShI, it is shown that while the sacrifice has to be offered up at some point during the Sukkot festival, this is not a sufficiently urgent requirement that it would push aside Shabbat restrictions.

Gimel.

1.  Whereas RaShBaM wishes that the Jew contrast the “Wandering in the desert” experience with the sensibility that one has when he owns land and can harvest his crops, MaLBIM points to the more existential issue of being comfortable in a This-Worldly existence when there is a spiritual aspect to the human being which suggests that the World-to-Come is where true existence takes place.

2.  Sefer HaChinuch, in contrast to RaShBaM and MaLBIM who explain the Sukkot experience in light of man’s thoughts about his personal existence, places emphasis upon man’s appreciation of the Kindnesses Extended to him by God during the forty years of wandering in the desert.

3.  As in the answer to Beit 2) above, only RaShBaM takes into account the context of the harvest as an informing element in the reason for the Chag, i.e., now that you have a harvest, in contrast to when you had neither land nor harvest—in the desert—there is a danger that you will not be appreciative of God’s Being behind all of your good fortune. The festival of Sukkot, specifically the need to celebrate our appreciation of God’s Kindness, not so much in what He Did for us in the desert, as what He is Doing for us now, is of great importance.

Sukkot

Answers to Vezot Habracha will be put up next week

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Parshat Vezot Habracha

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Answers to Haazinu

Ha’azinu 5728
Alef.

Ibn Kaspin understands the poem in the Parasha as essentially focusing upon what will occur during our involvement with Bavel, i.e., the destruction of the First Temple, Israel’s going into exile and Bavel eventual punishment at the hands of the Persians for having gone beyond their mandate with respect to mistreating the Jewish people. (This latter point is also made by commentators in order to explain why the Egyptians should be punished for having enslaved the Jews when the Brit Bein HaBetarim [Beraishit 15:13] explicitly stated that this would happen. Furthermore, minorities typically had to pay a work tax when taking up residence in another country—in the case of the Givonim who were decreed to be woodcutters and water drawers, it was the Jews who insisted on their work in exchange for being able to live in Canaan. So when in the next verse Beraishit 15:14, the Tora states that God will Judge the enslavers, this is explained as coming about because the Egyptians went further, e.g., throwing male children into the Nile, than was included in the Divine Plan.)

RaMBaN does not confine the poem in Ha’azinu to the painful experience that the Jews had with the Babylonians, but rather understands the text as not only describing what has happened in the past as well as the events of the present, but also presenting a picture of the far-off future, events that as yet have not taken place. In addition, as opposed to claiming that the non-Jews were punished for having gone beyond the Divine Authorization to only punish the Jews, RaMBaN posits that the punishment that these nations will receive is due to the attitude that inspired their readiness to inflict harm upon the Jews, i.e., their hatred for God and therefore the people associated with Him.

Beit.

1.    In both cases, Devarim 30 and 32, a point will be reached where God will no longer Persecute and Punish His People, but will Restore them to their former status. However, Devarim 30:1-2 states that any Divine Restoration will be preceded by the Jewish people repenting. No such mention is made in 32:36, where the implication is that God will Reach the limit of what He has Decided to Do to the People, and then will Begin a reconciliation process independent of any realizations on their parts.

2.    The verb to “judge” ordinarily means that an evaluation will be made without any predisposition to guilt or innocence. And if guilt is the verdict, than an appropriate punishment will be meted out. In Beraishit 15:14, since the nation that will enslave the Jews will be considered culpable, an appropriate punishment will be decided upon. In Beraishit 30:6, when Rachel says that God has Judged her, if anything, this is a finding of innocence and it is for this reason that her handmaiden Bilha gave birth to a son, Dan, a reward. In the case of Devarim 32:36, RaShI interprets that rather than lawful punishment, afflictions are imposed. Consequently, this will be more in keeping with Iyov and his accusations against God for unfairly applying afflictions rather than justifiable punishments to various individuals.

3.    In the case of Beraishit 49:47, it is predicted that Dan will avenge Jewish suffering at the hands of the Philistines. But vengeance has the quality of Mida KeNeged Mida, i.e., a fair repayment in kind for past improprieties. RaShI on 32:36 is associating afflictions and torture with the term “judging.” Pehaps a way of reconciling these two sources is to say that when man is applying punishments, he must be careful to be as just as possible because he is incapable of fine-tuning the punishments to exactly match the crime. (This is an explanation why despite the Tora stating, “An eye for an eye” the Rabbinic interpretation is that a monetary settlement will be made. While technically, the perpetrator deserves to lose his eye if he caused the loss of another’s eye, the Talmud in Bava Kama, in one of its rationales for why money is given in place of a literal loss of a limb or organ, states that since man is not able to be precise in his carrying out of such punishments, i.e., who says that during the course of taking out the perpetrator’s eye, he will become sickened and even die, therefore money which is less potentially lethal and more subject to “fine-tuning” is used.) However, when God is the One determining punishments, even if some form of torture is to be applied, He can Act with the type of precision that makes this type of action even legally acceptable.

4.    The problem is the possibility of misconstruing what the prepositional phrase “ועל עבדיו” is modifying. Whose servants are we talking about? If the order is left as the verse has it, then it is possible that the servants are those of “His People”, the servants of the Jewish People. But by reversing the word order, it is clear that the verb is connected to the same subject as was the verb in the first phrase, i.e., God. And if that is so,  the possessive pronoun in “עמו” clearly relates to God, and not the Jewish people.

5.    Perhaps by changing the term used for God from Hashem to HaKadosh Baruch Huh, RaShI is indicating that a change overcomes the Divine when He Moves from the throne of judgment to the throne of mercy. The One, Unchanging Deity, at least from our vantage point, appears to Change and Sets off to treat Israel differently than He has to this point.

Gimel.

1.    RaShI interprets “Azlat Yad” as the hand of the enemy that becomes increasingly oppressive vis-à-vis the Jewish people.

       Ibn Ezra interprets the term to refer to the ebbing away of the strength of Israel .

       From the context of the verse in Devarim 32, it would appear to support Ibn Ezra. The beginning of the verse talks about God afflicting his people. A way in which one can measure when that affliction has reached its maximum effectiveness is not so much the power of the oppressor as the condition of the oppressed. When they have no more strength, God no longer has to Send afflictions to them.

2.    RaShI understands “Azuv” to refer to a type of leader for the Jews who could rally and organize them.

       Other commentators explain “Azuv” as (Ibn Ezra) Jewish captives that have either been taken or abandoned, or (R. S.R. Hirsch) the property of the Jews that they no longer care about due to the oppressions.

3.    While RaShI in Devarim sees the phrase “Atzur VeAzuv” as a function of the inability of the Jews to resist the inroads of the oppressors who have become increasingly powerful, since in Melachim Alef, the phrase is preceded by a derogatory comment to the effect of how weak the descendents of Yiravam are going to be not within the context of military action, but rather that they simply will be “cut off”, i.e., their line will end, it is not necessary to introduce the concept of national or military leadership. 

Daled.

1.    The syntactical problem in the verse is how does “Amo” relate to the opening phrase “Harninu Goyim”? There seems to be a preposition missing. As for the ideational issue, if “Goyim” relates to the nations of the world, why will they rejoice or give praise when God will avenge what has happened to the Jews? Either they are the ones who will be suffering judgment for what they personally did to the Jews, and they would hardly be rejoicing over that. If it is referring to other nations who are third parties to the entire sequence of events, why would they necessarily rejoice or give praise when they see these things?

2.    RaShI: The idolaters (“Goyim”) will praise (“Yeranenu) the Jews (“Amo”, i.e., His—HaShem’s—Nation) for their commitment and loyalty to God despite all of the years of suffering at the hands of their enemies.

        Bechor Shor: “Goyim” = the Jews, when they are scattered in different countries, as opposed to being unified in a single country. Therefore despite their being scattered, they are still considered “Amo” (God’s Singular people). And they will (“Yeranenu”) rejoice when they are avenged.

        ShaDaL (quoted by Bechor Shor): The other nations will rejoice (as opposed to RaShI’s interpretation that they will praise Israel for their steadfastness) when the Jews are avenged. (Bechor Shor opposes this latter interpretation when he states that we, the Jews, would be satisfied if other peoples would simply be nice to us, even if they don’t rejoice on our behalves. And furthermore, why should they rejoice at all when the enemies of the Jews are being punished?

3.    Tehillim 117 would appear to assume that the nations would “praise” HaShem in the event that they become convinced that worshipping Him is the proper religion and they consider converting or at least rejecting their idolatry. However, for them simply to praise God or for that matter His People simply because the Jews are avenged and their enemies are punished, does not logically follow that this should elicit praise on the part of either the enemies themselves or outside onlookers. (I think that while ShaDaL’s view is the weakest of the three presented, RaShI’s interpretation is not much better. Then again, Bechor Shor’s leap to assume that “Goyim” really is a reference to the Jews is quite radical as well.)

questions on haazinu

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Nitzavim answers

Nitzavim 5721
Alef.

1. The reflexive verb form for B-R-Ch is difficult to understand. Usually the Bless-er, and the Bless-ee are two different entities. It is difficult to understand how they can be one and the same. Consequently, the first Dibur HaMatchil is devoted to simply explaining what such a self-blessing could mean, whereas the second is establishing that in fact this is a case of the reflexive and not something else.

2.  The earlier examples of B-R-Ch in the reflexive form involve someone seeing someone else whom he thinks has done well, and wishing similar things for his own offspring. However in the case at hand, the individual is not trying to apply to himself what is transpiring for someone else; rather he is wishing that dire predictions for someone who is doing what he is doing, i.e., worshiping a different deity, will not apply to him. Consequently, the case has to be newly defined by RaShI. 

3.  R. Wolf Heidenheim compares our verse 29:18 with an earlier verse in the Tochecha 28:68, claiming that the reflexive in these two instances indicates an interior feeling that will either be or not be borne out in terms of external reality. In the earlier case, the captive Jews will hope to be purchased by someone who will enslave them, but apparently treat them better than they are being treated while up for sale in the slave market. Similarly, the individual who is worshipping other gods internally hopes that nothing bad will happen to him, but whether or not this will be the case obviously remains to be seen. (However the reflexive forms for shaving and praying that RaShI cites in his commentary on 29:18 do not represent cases of this commentator’s rule. Both examples are fully external, with the reflexive connoting that rather than the subject doing these acts to some other object, he is doing them to himself, i.e., shaving himself, “judging”¹ himself.

4.  Siftei Chachamim #80 notes that even when someone thinks that a certain curse will not apply to him, that doesn’t necessarily entail a “blessing.” Rather it’s simply a matter of not being included in the object of the curse. Consequently, RaShI explains that believing that all will be well with himself in effect is wishing himself something positive in addition to being spared that which is negative, i.e., a blessing of peace and wellbeing.

Beit.

The prooftext from BaMidbar demonstrates via parallelism that Sh-R-R connotes “seeing.” However, why should what one’s heart “sees” be considered a sin? Consequently RaShI adds the word “La’Asot” to clarify that what the heart “sees” is in effect what it “wishes to do,” in this case continue to worship other gods, which of course is a serious transgression. 

Gimel.

1. The three interpretations that are presented by Ibn Ezra all define “Rava” as referring to a Tzaddik, whereas according to RaShBaM, “Rava” also refers to a sinner, one that is more reprehensible than the type of sinner suggested by “Tzeme’ah.”

2. Ibn Ezra objects to R. Yona’s interpretation that the reason why the evildoer takes the position that he does is because it appears that sinners and the righteous all eventually suffer the same fate, i.e., death, leading to the conclusion that there is no difference between them and no need to strive to do good,² by drawing attention to the phrase in Devarim 29:18 “Shalom Yihyeh Li”, i.e., “nothing will happen to me.” According to R. Yona, the theological justification for transgression on the part of the sinner is not that the same thing will happen to both the righteous and the evildoer, but rather that there will be no accountability for the evildoer independent of whatever might or might not happen to the Tzaddik. 

3.  According to R. Yehuda HaLevi, the phrase “למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה” explains what the evildoer is trying to accomplish with his self-blessing, i.e., to negate the implications of the words of the righteous who claim that there is accountability for transgressions.

     According to R. Yona, the phrase “למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה” reflects the thinking that led to the evildoer thinking as he does, i.e., since he has not seen a distinction between how the righteous and the evil end up, therefore he does not feel that there is any point in not sinning since in his mind there are no negative consequences for doing so.

     According to Ibn Ezra, the phrase “למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה” is part of the evildoer’s self-justification, i.e., I have a right to say that nothing will happen to me because since the majority of people are not doing what I am doing, I will be included with them when they are rewarded for doing the right thing, and will not suffer any individual consequences as the result of my sinning.

4.  It would appear that RaShBaM is understanding “ספות” in the same manner as R. Yehuda HaLevi and R. Yona, i.e., a language of “being cut off. “ Consequently, he interprets that thinking that nothing will happen as a consequence of his sinning will lead to his destruction, whether the sin is due to spiteful behavior, or actions brought on by passionate temptations.

Daled.

1.  R. Yitzchak Arama understands “שלום” external conditions of persecution, starvation, physical deprivation.

   R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg (HaKetav VeHaKabbala) interprets “שלום” as an internal state of mind, looking for a diminution, if not elimination, of cognitive dissonance that comes about when one has to comply with a Commandment regarding which he does not understand the reason.

2.  R. Yitzchak Arama—a) Punishments will only be meted out to those who first accept the Tora and its Covenant and then violate it. If I never accept the Covenant, then I should be immune from the consequences of violating it. b) Furthermore, if I dwell among people who both accepted and now comply with the Covenant, then I will benefit from the Divine Protection that will be Afforded them.

     R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg—An internal “war” takes place when I try to comply with Mitzvot that I don’t understand. In order to achieve a modicum of peace within myself, I will only fulfill those Commandments that I understand, ignoring those that are alien to my sensibilities.

3.  R. Yitzchak Arama—“כי” would be interpreted “despite”, i.e., although I will not comply with the Covenant, nevertheless all will be well with me since I will benefit from the treatment of the general community.

   R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg--“כי” would be interpreted “when”, i.e., on condition that I only fulfill those Mitzvot that make sense to me, I will finally achieve a modicum of inner peace.

   Ibn Ezra—“כי” would be interpreted in the same manner that R. Yitzchak Arama explains the word.

4.  It would seem to me that the interpretation of Ibn Ezra and R. Yitzchak Arama make more sense in terms of context. The individual realizes that he is not complying with the expectations of the Tora. So he has to rationalize why despite the fact that he is following his heart rather than the dictates of the Tora, all will still be well with him.

5.  The weakness of R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg’s interpretation is that since the context is a person who is worshipping idolatry (see 29:17), why is such worship more logical and understandable than following the guidelines of the Tora. If we were discussing certain Chukim, e.g., the classical cases of Sha’atnez, Para Aduma and Kashrut are always referenced when looking for examples of Mitzvot that are difficult to fathom, then we could understand why a distinction might be made between Chukim and Mishpatim in some people’s minds. But Avoda Zora is as much of a Chok as Jewish Chukim. Consequently, the argument that there are logical objections causing internal tension if idolatry were not worshipped, does not seem to make sense within the context of the verses of this section of the Tora. Nevertheless, his insight about the mentality of someone who chooses not to observe Mitzvot is compelling and relevant, particularly in a time of Hester Panim when it is not so obvious that there is clear reward and punishment resulting from compliance or non-compliance with the Commandments of the Tora.