Parshat Toldot

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/17.html

Parshat Vayera Answers (chayei sara answers below)

VaYera 5722.
Alef.
      As per Nechama’s directions, these questions will be addressed at the end of the study of the  Gilayan, after section Zayin.

Beit.

The problem in the text that precipitates ShaDaL’s comment is that in verses 26, 28 and 30, the language implies that God “Will Try to Find” the requisite number of Tzaddikim, implying that He “doesn’t Know” whether they are there or not. This can only be due to absolute freedom of choice as well as the ability of an individual by means of a test to demonstrate where s/he stands morally. This indeterminacy parallels v. 21 in which God States that He has to See whether the state of affairs in Sodom and Amora is actually in accordance with the scream that He has Heard arising from the cities.

Gimel.

1.  “LeMa’an” usually means “for the sake of.” However, if God were Concerned with Saving this small group, He could have Extracted them as He ultimately Does for Lot and his daughters, and Proceeded to destroy Sodom and Amora as He originally Intended. Consequently, “LeMa’an” should be interpreted acc. to Ibn Kaspi, as “because of, in order to” i.e., because of the continued existence of the 50, 40, etc., I will not destroy the rest of the city.

2.  Beraishit 18:19

         I Knew him in order that he command his offspring…

   I Melachim 11:34

         For the sake of David My Servant that I Chose him…

   II Melachim 19:34

         For My Sake and for the sake of David My Servant…

   Yeshayahu 62:1

         For the sake of Zion I will not remain silent…

   Tehillim 8:3

         You have Founded strength because of Your Enemies, that You might Still the enemy  and the avenger.

   Ibid. 122:8

         For the sakes of my  brothers and my friends I will now say, “Peace be within you.”

Daled.

1. RaMBaN is explaining why Avraham said twice “Chalila Lach.” Either it is reprehensible or it is not; why is it doubly reprehensible? RaMBaN therefore sees verse 25 as two separate arguments, each relating to a different Divine Attribute. “Chalila” were you to apply Midat HaDin; “Chalila” were you to apply Midat HaRachamim. Firstly, the Tzaddikim cannot meet the same end as the Reshai’m from the point of view of Midat HaDin. Secondly, since God Judges the world according to Midat HaRachamim, therefore not only should the Tzaddikim be spared, but everyone else as well.

2.   As opposed to the inhabitants of the cities upon which RaMBaN concentrates, RaDaK understands God’s Reluctance to destroy the area which has been inhabited, and which finally happens to Sodom and Amora when the requisite number of Tzaddikim cannot be identified. This is probably a function of the value of inhabiting the world stated in Yeshayahu 45:18--

“For thus saith the LORD that created the heavens, He is God; that formed the earth and made it, He established it, He created it not a waste, He formed it to be inhabited: I am the LORD, and there is none else.” 

   Apparently people are replaceable, while civilization is not.

   RaDaK additionally cites Yechezkel 22:29-30--

“The people of the land have used oppression, and exercised robbery, and have wronged the poor and needy, and have oppressed the stranger unlawfully.

         “And I sought for a man among them, that should make up the hedge, and stand in the  breach before Me for the land, that I should not destroy it; but I found none.”

     The commentator explains that HaShem would prefer to maintain the inhabited area, and either punish or exile only the transgressors, even if that would also mean that some of the Tzaddikim would be hurt as well, as long as the habitation can be preserved.

3.  Re the “LeMa’an” in verse 24, RaMBaN would interpret from the standpoint of Midat HaDin, that destruction should not happen for the sake of the 50 Tzaddikim in the place that do not deserve to be destroyed.

   RaDaK on the other hand could interpret the word “because” in the sense that the place does not deserve to be destroyed because of the presence of the 50 Tzaddikim.

4.  The verses in Yechezkel seem to imply that a single person who is proactive in the sense of trying to change the criminal culture of the community in question could have justified saving it. But since there was no one like that, not only the people, but even the place had to be destroyed, implying no special consideration of saving the community.

    However, RaDaK interprets the verses as follows: Either God was not threatening to destroy the place completely, only partially. Or, even if what was being justified was complete destruction of the community, that was only because of the nature of the transgressions that were taking place, i.e., “Chamas”—oppression, robbery, economic crimes. This is the same type of crime that was used to justify the bringing a Flood to destroy everyone but Noach, his family, and representatives of various animal species:

בראשית פרק ו

(יא) ותשחת הארץ לפני האלקים ותמלא הארץ חמס:

רש"י

ותמלא הארץ חמס - גזל:

   When the description of Sodom’s inhabitants appears in the Tora, the crimes of which they were guilty were not necessarily economic ones:

בראשית פרק יג

(יג) ואנשי סדם רעים וחטאים ליקוק מאד:

רש"י

רעים - בגופם:

וחטאים - בממונם:

לה' מאוד - יודעים רבונם ומתכוונים למרוד בו:

   While “VeChata’im BeMamonam” could refer to monetary crimes such as thievery, it could also refer to sinful behavior with their property, i.e., what they do with their possessions, using them for idolatry, wasting and destroying the property needlessly, not being careful to guard their herds from doing harm to others, etc. If the sins of Sodom and Amora were not the same as those indicated in Yechezkel, then there is no need to compare the two sources.

5+6.   Tehillim 79:2

   “Lift up Thyself, Thou Judge of the earth; render to the proud their recompense.

   They have given the dead bodies of Thy servants to be food unto the fowls of the heaven, the flesh of Thy saints unto the beasts of the earth.”

   If the RaDaK believes that unless the sin is a monetary sin like thievery, the place should essentially be spared and only the evil doers destroyed, then why in Tehillim above is the implication that the Tzaddikim will also be punished? RaDaK answers that it is inevitable that when the evildoers are destroyed, there will be some collateral damage, some of the Tzaddikim will also be harmed; however, the majority of the Tzaddikim will be spared. Furthermore, based upon Yirmiyahu 5:1 “Run ye to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem, and see now, and know, and seek in the broad places thereof, if ye can find a man, if there be any that doeth justly, that seeketh truth; and I will pardon her,” RaDaK suggests that while Tzaddikim who attempt to positively influence the rest of society by going out and interacting with the Reshaim will be spared (if they are interacting with them, won’t they be susceptible to suffering the same punishments when time for judgment arrives?), those who are interested in only preserving their personal righteousness will be subject to destruction. (This begs the question regarding Noach who is depicted as the “poster boy” for worrying only about himself and not the rest of his generation, a “Tzaddik Im Peltz.”¹)

7.  At the end of v. 24 Avraham describes the Tzaddikim as “Asher BeKirbah” (that are in its [the cities] midst), while in v. 26 HaShem Agrees that if these people are “BeToch HaIhr” (in the midst of the cities), then he will spare the cities, suggesting that only Tzaddikim that are interacting with the rest of society and thereby serving as models, rebukers, etc., justify the cities’ continued existence as opposed to those who keep to themselves.

Heh.

1.  Abrabanel takes a third approach, different from RaMBaN and RaDaK. RaMBaN cited the Middot of Din and Rachamim that should at least protect the Tzaddikim from destruction and perhaps even the entire city. RaDaK was concerned about the city itself rather than a particular portion of its population, unless the crimes were so severe that it merited total destruction. Abrabanel claims that even if there was a surgical elimination of only the Resha’im, this would still adversely affect the Tzaddikim who depend upon their presence for basic necessities of life. Consequently punishing the Resha’im in the short term would mean hardship and even destruction of the Tzaddikim in the long term and that is not appropriate for God to Bring about.

2.  The verse from Yona 4:11 “And should not I have pity on Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle?” suggests that there are many inhabitants that have no developed intelligence or perhaps moral compass (knowing the difference between right and left), and that such people are hardly differentiated from animals. Yet like the Kikayon plant that provided Yona with shade (4:6) and whose demise caused Yona to be terribly affected by the son (v. 8), so too the people in Ninveh and the animals serve a purpose in their existence, at the very least for other people who have developed their human traits properly. Consequently, HaShem is not determined to destroy them from the perspective of what such an act would do to those who would be left behind.

3.  In the first Mishna in Pirkei Avot, one of the directives of the Men of the Great Assembly is that one should be “Metunim BaDin”, deliberate before reaching a judgment. As RaMBaM explains on the Mishna, further details or developments might come to light that will affect the ultimate decision. Consequently, Avraham is not necessarily saying that carrying out the destruction of Sodom and Amora is an impossibility for God. HaShem is certainly Capable of Doing what He Wishes. However, a rush to judgment would not be appropriate and therefore the evaluation should not only include whether (v. 21) the “cry” that HaShem “Heard” reflects the immorality of the place, but are there any additional considerations, such as the presence and influence of a cadre of people working to change the adverse culture in Sodom and Amora.

Vav.

   V. 24 in which “LeMa’an” appears suggests that if the 50 Tzaddikim are in the cities, then for that reason, the cities should be spared, not so much for the a benefit to these people, but rather the cities by containing such people are entitled to a pass. V. 26 in which “Ba’Avuram” is used, suggests that God States that He is not Moved by the appeal to spare the cities full of evildoers; however, if this will create problems and/or hardship for the Tzaddikim then for the sake of these people, He will Spare the cities.

Zayin.

1.  R. Nachman, in Sanhedrin 99b, by citing Beraishit 18:26, suggests that Tora scholars by virtue of their existence, deflect punishment from human civilization.

2.  It would appear that R. Nachman is thinking similarly to the approach of  RaMBaN, who claimed that from the perspective of Midat HaRachamim, the mere presence of Tzaddikim should be enough to spare Sodom and Amora.

Alef.

1.  What does Avraham think about collective punishment?

   While on the one hand, Avraham rails against the idea that the same fate should befall both the Tzaddik and the Rasha, he stops arguing once the number ten is reached, implying that if there are less than ten righteous people in the place, then he would understand if the entire place was destroyed, including those few Tzaddikim. He was never told that God would extract Lot, his wife and daughters should the requisite number of people not be found.  When something happens to a particular individual independent of the rest of his community or society, one seems to be able to wonder about theodicy; however, when something happens to an entire community, e.g., a natural disaster, a man-made disaster, an epidemic, to assume that there is no overlap on any level and that some Tzaddikim are not caught up with Reshaim in these catastrophes, is difficult to imagine. Furthermore, to have to draw the conclusion that if something terrible happens to someone, it is due to their being an evildoer whether they know it or not, is also very difficult to accept. While all people are sinners to one degree or another according to Kohelet 7:20 “For there is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not,” to correlate a specific form of suffering or even death with a particular sin can be cruel and inappropriate. There are also such things as trials and “Yisurin Shel Ahava” (afflictions that emanate from love. )

2.  Comparing Avraham’s pleadings re Sodom and Amora with those of Moshe following the third major sin of the Jewish people (the first was the Golden Calf, the second the Spies) i.e., (BaMidbar 16:22) Korach’s rebellion, raises the possibility of comparing their arguments. Moshe appears to be accepting the idea that the guilty party should be punished. The question that he raises is why can’t the sinner be isolate and published alone, in this case the ringleader Korach, without anyone else  suffering? Another difference between the two cases is that whereas re Sodom and Amora the overwhelming majority of people were sinful with only a tiny minority not transgressing, with respect to Korach, while there were several hundred followers, they still did not constitute the majority of the Jewish people, as had been the case in the sins of the Golden Calf and the Spies. So while Moshe does distinguish between the leader and his followers, the numbers of people at risk is far smaller than what Avraham was dealing with. 

Parshat Chayei Sara

Chaye Sara 5723
Alef.

1. It’s one thing for Rivka’s family to say that they cannot refuse (Davar Ra; [an evil thing]) to allow Rivka to go once HaShem has Given a sign (Eliezer’s test of the first girl who is from Avraham’s family and offers water both to him and his camels) that He Wishes Rivka to marry Eliezer. But why can they not agree (Davar Tov; [a good thing])? How can they be unable to say a Davar Tov in this matter?

2.  RaShI: “Davar Ra”—an answer in bad faith, making no sense and simply reflecting     disagreement.

            “Davar Tov”—an negative answer based upon logic and proper thinking rather than on   malice.

       RaShBaM: “Davar Ra”—an answer designed to undermine Rivka’s going.

              “Davar Tov”—an answer designed to support her going. In effect, it’s out of our    hands and we have nothing to add or subtract from the basic fact that she will    leave to marry Yitzchak.

Beit.

1.  The commentator assumes that idolaters would not speak in terms of the monotheistic God that Avraham and his servant Eliezer believed in. Consequently, saying that these events were orchestrated by HaShem does not seem to make sense coming from the mouths of the members of Avraham’s family that remained in Charan.

2.  R. Avraham ben HaRaMBaM posits that while Avraham made the leap to pure monotheism, the more sophisticated among the idolaters assumed a “middle position” whereby they were still polytheistic, but recognized a hierarchy among their various gods, with a supreme god at the top of the hierarchy, and to this god were they referring. A censored passage in RaMBaM’s Mishneh Tora, Hilchot Melachim refers to Christianity and Islam as means to the end of (Zecharia 14:9) “BaYom HaHu HaShem Echad U’Shemo Echad.” Perhaps R. Avraham was extrapolating a similar idea and attributing it to idolaters in Beraishit.

Gimel.

1.  Ostensibly, it appears that Rivka’s family members are asking her nothing more than whether she was interested in accompanying Eliezer, not whether she was going to do so no matter what they would want her to do. From where does RaShI derive that a “test of wills” was going on?

2.  Perhaps Divrei David bases his explanation for RaShI on the verb “VaYomru” (and they said) as opposed to “VaYishalu” (and they asked.) By turning their words into a statement, a rhetorical one at that, it implies that they were not prepared to give their consent, to which Rivka responds that it will not matter in the end, one way or the other. Such an interpretation would parallel what commentators have said about the verse associated with the Rasha (the evil one) of the “four sons” in the Haggada. In Shemot 12:26, the Tora states, “And when your children ‘say’ to you , ‘What is this service to you?’” in contrast to Shemot 13:14  and Devarim 6:20 where the verbs are “will ask you,” suggesting that the former instance is a challenge whereby the interrogator is not really interested in the answer, in contrast to the other two instances, where curiosity rather than antagonism is behind the question.

Daled.

1.  The Midrash is attempting to account for the piece of information in the verse that Yitzchak was returning from Be’er LeChai Ro’ih. Why is that at all important for the reader to know. The most important part of the story is the fact that he was out in the fields at the time when Eliezer and Rivka were approaching. Consequently the Midrash suggests that his return from this particular place had to do with a mission that he had undertaken, i.e., to bring Hagar to Avraham, now that Sara had died. The association with Hagar is made because this is the same place at which the miracle whereby Yishmael was saved from death by the angel after the boy and his mother had been summararily sent out into the desert by Avraham and Sara with virtually no supplies. The Midrash therefore assumes that Hagar had a particular fondness for this place and therefore took up residence near it. According to the Rabbis, who posit that Yitzchak was 37 at the time of the Akeida, and according to the Tora, if he was forty when he married Rivka, (this of course requires the assumption that Rivka was extremely precocious at the age of 3), then the miracle that was performed on behalf of Hagar and Yishmael had taken place @ 30 years before. It is possible that she had only recently relocated to Be’er LeChai Ro’ih, but how would Yitchak have known that? Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer 29 claims that Avraham made visits to Yishmael and immediately afterwards states that Avraham remarried Hagar:

אחר שלש שנים הלך אברהם לראות את ישמעאל בנו ונשבע לשרה כפעם ראשונה שאינו יורד מן הגמל במקום שישמעאל שרוי שם והגיע לשם בחצי היום ומצא שם אשתו של ישמעאל ואמ' לה היכן הוא ישמעאל אמרה לו הוא ואמו הלכו לרעות את הגמלים במדבר אמ' לה תני לי מעט לחם ומים כי עייפה נפשי מדרך המדבר והוציאה לחם ומים ונתנה לו עמד אברהם והיה מתפלל לפני הב"ה על בנו ונתמלא ביתו של ישמעאל מכל טוב ממין הברכות וכשבא ישמעאל הגידה לו את הדבר וידע ישמעאל שעד עכשו רחמי אביו עליו כרחם אב על בנים לאחר מיתתה של שרה חזר אברהם ולקח את גרושתו שנ' ויוסף אברהם ויקח אשה ומדקאמר ויוסף משמע שפעם ראשונה היתה אשתו ועוד לא הוסיף לבא עליה ושמה קטורה שהיתה מקוטרת מכל מיני בשמים ד"א קטורה שהיו נאים מעשיה כקטרת 

   It is certainly possible that Yitzchak knew of these excursions and this may have further convinced him that Avraham’s happiness following the death of Sara would be promoted were he to remarry his former wife, Hagar.

2.  In the Midrash Tanchuma, the first verse (Tehillim 102:1) establishes that “Sicha” could be Tefilla, but would allow for the interpretation that once a day would suffice. It is with the second verse (Ibid. 55:18) that it is established that prayer ought to take place three times per day, leading to the possibility that not only should there be prayer in the morning, as Avraham had already established in Beraishit 19:27 (if Avraham returns to the place where he has stood previously before HaShem, the implication is both that there is a Makom Kavua [an established place] in which he offers his regular prayers to HaShem), but during the afternoon and evening. This then further supports the interpretation that when Yitzchak is coming in from the field at “Eit Erev” it was after engaging in an afternoon prayer, which according to one view in the Talmud, is the basis for establishing Tefillat Mincha.

3.  Although Tehillim 55:18 is describing a prayer experience, the previous verses indicate that this prayer is for deliverance from enemies:

י  בַּלַּע ה', פַּלַּג לְשׁוֹנָם:    כִּי-רָאִיתִי חָמָס וְרִיב בָּעִיר.
יא  יוֹמָם וָלַיְלָה--יְסוֹבְבֻהָ עַל-חוֹמֹתֶיהָ; וְאָוֶן וְעָמָל בְּקִרְבָּהּ.
יב  הַוּוֹת בְּקִרְבָּהּ; וְלֹא-יָמִישׁ מֵרְחֹבָהּ, תֹּךְ וּמִרְמָה.
יג  כִּי לֹא-אוֹיֵב יְחָרְפֵנִי, וְאֶשָּׂא:
לֹא-מְשַׂנְאִי, עָלַי הִגְדִּיל; וְאֶסָּתֵר מִמֶּנּוּ.
יד  וְאַתָּה אֱנוֹשׁ כְּעֶרְכִּי; אַלּוּפִי, וּמְיֻדָּעִי.
טו  אֲשֶׁר יַחְדָּו, נַמְתִּיק סוֹד;  בְּבֵית אֱלֹקים, נְהַלֵּךְ בְּרָגֶשׁ.
טז  ישימות (יַשִּׁי מָוֶת), עָלֵימוֹ--יֵרְדוּ שְׁאוֹל חַיִּים: כִּי-רָעוֹת בִּמְגוּרָם בְּקִרְבָּם.
יז  אֲנִי, אֶל-אֱלֹקים אֶקְרָא; וַה', יוֹשִׁיעֵנִי.

   Tehillim 102:1 is describing a more generic prayer of someone in bad circumstances asking for assistance. While the immediate context is an Ani (a poor individual) every person could feel figuratively impoverished, even if he does not have any specific pressing material issues.

4.  Perhaps RaShI felt that Yitchak going out to the field indicates not that he wished to associate with acquaintances—couldn’t he have done that within the city where there was a greater population density?—but rather to be alone, to pray to God without disturbance.

Heh.

1.  The literal meaning of the verse seems to be the sight of Yitzchak so unnerved Rivka that she lost her balance and fell off her camel. What could have been so startling about Yitzchak’s appearance that would have engendered such a reaction?

2.  In all of these cases, RaShI understands the meaning that there was a bending towards the ground, without the object/person in question actually touching the ground. Therefore in this case, Rivka slid in the direction of the ground, but never actually reached it.

3.  In Tehillim 37:24, the simple meaning of the verse is that the individual actually falls all the way to the ground, and just that he will not be left there in that state. This would be in contrast to RaShI’s interpretation of Rivka just sliding in the direction of the ground, but never actually reaching it. On the other hand, the verses in Beraishit 24:14 as well as II Shmuel 22, the simple meaning is also an act of lowering, rather than allowing the entity in question to reach the ground.

4.  Both RaShI and Ibn Ezra agree that Rivka’s falling from the camel was not undignified. They disagree re whether she partially slipped off the animal, or she got down completely in accordance with her own will. 

5.  The claim that the rule “Ein Mukdam U’Meuchar BaTora” cannot be applied to verses within the same story seems to be contradicted by the conclusion that some commentators reach when a comparison is made of the real-time story of Eliezer’s discovery of Rivka and the version that he tells the family afterwards. Originally in Beraishit 24:22-23, the Tora states that even before he finds out who Rivka is, he already gives her jewelry, suggesting that he felt that she was the woman designated for Yitzchak. Yet in the later account, v. 47 states that Eliezer asked her about her family prior to his giving her the jewelry. RaShBaM on v. 22 states that even in the earlier account, despite it being written afterwards, Eliezer had in fact already ascertained that Rivka was from the proper family. Consequently, if in one place in the story, we can understand that the verses are to be understood in the past-perfect, it should not be remarkable that another aspect of the story be treated in a similar fashion.

6.  If her getting down from the camel was in accordance with her will, then why was the verb “VaTipol” (and she fell) used instead of “VaTered” (and she got down?)

Chayei Sara

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/306.html

Vayera Questions

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/279.html

Lech Lecha Answers

Lech Lecha 5724
Alef.

1. Avraham, who was at the time childless, was looking for an heir for not only his material possessions, but also his spiritual legacy. He might have thought that Lot, his closest male relative, would serve that purpose. Their parting ways effectively put an end to that possibility.

2.  The word “Aretz” appears seven times. (In v. 10, even though the word also appears, it is said in relation to the land of Egypt, as opposed to Canaan, i.e., the land of Israel, and therefore should not be considered with respect to a “guiding word” for the Parasha.) What is at stake is the inheritance of the land of Israel about which Lot demonstrates that he does not care. 

בראשית פרק יג

(ה) וגם ללוט ההלך את אברם היה צאן ובקר ואהלים:

(ו) ולא נשא אתם הארץ לשבת יחדו כי היה רכושם רב ולא יכלו לשבת יחדו:

(ז) ויהי ריב בין רעי מקנה אברם ובין רעי מקנה לוט והכנעני והפרזי אז ישב בארץ:

(ח) ויאמר אברם אל לוט אל נא תהי מריבה ביני וביניך ובין רעי ובין רעיך כי אנשים אחים אנחנו:

(ט) הלא כל הארץ לפניך הפרד נא מעלי אם השמאל ואימנה ואם הימין ואשמאילה:

(י) וישא לוט את עיניו וירא את כל ככר הירדן כי כלה משקה לפני שחת יקוק את סדם ואת עמרה כגן יקוק  כארץ מצרים באכה צער:

(יא) ויבחר לו לוט את כל ככר הירדן ויסע לוט מקדם ויפרדו איש מעל אחיו:

(יב) אברם ישב בארץ כנען ולוט ישב בערי הככר ויאהל עד סדם:

(יג) ואנשי סדם רעים וחטאים ליקוק מאד:

(יד) ויקוק אמר אל אברם אחרי הפרד לוט מעמו שא נא עיניך וראה מן המקום אשר אתה שם צפנה ונגבה  וקדמה וימה:

(טו) כי את כל הארץ אשר אתה ראה לך אתננה ולזרעך עד עולם:

(טז) ושמתי את זרעך כעפר הארץ אשר אם יוכל איש למנות את עפר הארץ גם זרעך ימנה:

(יז) קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה כי לך אתננה:

(יח) ויאהל אברם ויבא וישב באלני ממרא אשר בחברון ויבן שם מזבח ליקוק: פ

3. Although Avraham proceeds to return to the place where he had constructed his first altar to call upon the Name of HaShem (Beraishit 13:3-4), when Lot is mentioned, who also emerged from Egypt with great wealth, no mention is made of his involvement in going back to the altar. Whereas Avraham appears to wish to pick up where he originally left off spiritually, before the famine forced him to go to Egypt, Lot has no such interest, but rather is focused upon his possessions. This is what catalyzes the split between himself and his uncle (v. 7.) Ultimately Lot’s choosing Sodom and Amora because of their material attractions (v. 10) despite the well-known spiritual limitations of the Sodomites (v. 13) confirms that it was just as well that he separated from Avraham. Perhaps it could even be surmised that the entire incident of famine, followed by descent to Egypt, followed by a return to Canaan with great wealth was orchestrated to cause a split between Avraham and Lot, which then made possible God’s Telling Avraham subsequently (v. 14 ff.) that he and his offspring (as opposed to Lot and his offspring) would inherit Canaan.

Beit.

1. Siftei Chachamim suggests that the term “Mashkeh” implies that it is “irrigated,” i.e., people distribute water to the land. Why is that necessarily a benefit? Perhaps the people have to work very hard to bring water to the various parts of the land and that is hardly a selling point. Consequently, RaShI states that the land is full of streams, implying that it is easy to irrigate the land and this is why it is considered fertile and desirable. While the comparison to Egypt would therefore not be exact, since the latter is irrigated by the overflow of the Nile, rather than being criss-crossed by streams, nevertheless the two areas are being described as equally fertile to an exceptional degree.

2.  

בראשית פרק יג

(י) וישא לוט את עיניו וירא את כל ככר הירדן כי כלה משקה לפני שחת יקוק את סדם ואת עמרה כגן יקוק כארץ מצרים באכה צער:

For maximum clarity, the phrase “KeGan HaShem” should follow immediately after “Ki Kula Mashkeh,”  i.e., it is fertile in a manner that was comparable to the land of Egypt. The confusion revolves around the difference between the general “Kol Kikar HaYardein” (the entire Jordan Valley) and the more limited and specific “Et Sodom VeEt Amora.” Even if Hashem eventually destroys Sodom and Amora, the rest of the Jordan Valley remained intact.  V. 11 states that Lot in fact chose the entire Jordan Valley as a place to inherit, so we would have to conclude that he only chose to reside in Sodom and Amora, the largest municipalities in the area, but would seek to be someone who would benefit from the agricultural virtues of the entire area.

3.  The two terms, “Gan HaShem” (the Garden of God) and “Eretz Mitzrayim” (land of Egypt) are not synonymous. The former seems to be a reference to the Garden of Eden whereas the latter is obviously a different geographical area from which Avraham and Lot had just recently returned. If the goal is to state how fertile the area was, wouldn’t either one of these terms be sufficient? Consequently, each term is understood as reflecting a different attractive quality of Sodom and Amora, i.e., trees (the Garden of Eden is described as containing all sorts of fruit-bearing trees—[1:11,12]—including of course the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil as well as the Tree of Life), and grains (Egypt, part of the “breadbasket of civilization”). When people came to Egypt to escape famines, it was not to obtain fruit, but rather grain and flour, basic food stuffs. Usually different types of ground, climate, etc. are required for these different types of crops; yet Sodom and Amora’s fields could support both types of produce, making it exceptionally desireable.

4.  a) (13:11 the verse states that Lot travelled from the east, i.e., towards the west.)

         Siftei Chachamim #80

“It is difficult for RaShI because Beit El is in the north, as it was written above, (12:8-9 After Beit El, Avraham travelled southwards. Consequently to return there, he would have to go north.) Consequently it should have said that Lot travelled from the north (as opposed to ‘from the east.’)”

b)  The same Siftei Chachamim quotes the RE”M as follows:

“R. Eliyahu Mizrachi wrote, ‘It is surprising, that with respect to the borders of the land of Israel, it appears that the Jordan Valley is on the eastern side of the country while Beit El is  in the middle of the country. Consequently someone who travels from Beit El where Avraham resided to the Jordan Valley, would travel eastwards (as opposed to ‘from the east’) and this requires study.’

And it is possible to say that the Jordan Valley is this immense area that extends all the way to Jerusalem, which is far from Beit El and it is in the midst of the land of Israel, since the Jordan Valley was close to Sodom which is not that distant from Jerusalem.”

ישעיהו פרק יז

(יג) לאמים כשאון מים רבים ישאון וגער בו ונס ממרחק ורדף כמץ הרים לפני רוח וכגלגל לפני סופה:

     The preposition “Mem” does not necessarily mean “from”  but could also be understood from the context to represent “to”  as in the case of Yeshayahu 17:13 where the phrase connotes “they ran far away” (rather than “they ran from far away.)

c) 

בראשית פרק יא

(ב) ויהי בנסעם מקדם וימצאו בקעה בארץ שנער וישבו שם:

While in the case of Lot, one could say that since Avraham had established himself as a representative of HaShem, attempting to spread monotheism, when Lot wishes to be elsewhere he is either consciously or by default removing himself from a source of religious thought and devotion, the people coming to the land of Shinar were not deliberately reacting to some religious center from which they were choosing to distance themselves. Consequently, RaShI saw no need to apply the same Midrashic interpretation that he accepts in the case of Lot.

5. a)  

בראשית פרק יג

(יב) אברם ישב בארץ כנען ולוט ישב בערי הככר ויאהל עד סדם:

בראשית פרק יב

(ח) ויעתק משם ההרה מקדם לבית אל ויט אהלה בית אל מים והעי מקדם ויבן שם מזבח ליקוק  ויקרא בשם יקוק:

It would seem that two separate issues are being dealt with in these two places: Re 13:12, the question is why should an individual have multiple tents if he is going to be living in a single place? Answers RaShI: the tents are not for Lot, but rather for people working for him. Re 12:8, the problem is the verb “VeYa’atek”which usually does not apply to the movement of a person but rather the movement of some inanimate object. Consequently, RaShI defines the subject of the verb as not Avraham himself,  but rather his tent, which is born out later in the verse where it talks about him pitching “his tent.”

b)  The phrase “VaYe’ehal Ad Sodom” does not seem to address a single entity, but rather a number of them. If there was one tent, then the preposition should have been “B’” (in), not “Ad” (up to, until).

6.  a)+b)  RaShI is trying to explain why the Tora goes out of its way to make a comment about the inhabitants of Sodom. Either this was a reflection of Lot’s indifference to moral behavior, i.e., despite his knowing that the people who lived in these cities were despicable, it did not deter him in choosing to live there, or if we assume that Lot’s sole consideration about choosing a place to reside was the quality of the land rather than the nature of its inhabitants, yet once we mention Sodom, we are required to comment on the inhabitants based upon the verse in Mishlei 10:7.

   c) The verse in Mishlei is a pejorative evaluative comment about evildoers, rather than a directive that should affect one’s behavior when he is confronted by the mention of an evildoer. RaShI, however, takes the verse in Mishlei at face value, and interprets the mention of the quality of the inhabitants of Sodom as a response to the mere mention of Sodom and Amora in general, as directed by the verse in Mishlei.  

7.  a) 

בראשית פרק יג

(יד) ויקוק אמר אל אברם אחרי הפרד לוט מעמו שא נא עיניך וראה מן המקום אשר אתה שם צפנה ונגבה וקדמה וימה:

רש"י

(יד) אחרי הפרד לוט - כל זמן שהרשע עמו היה הדבור פורש ממנו:

בראשית פרק ד

 א) והאדם ידע את חוה אשתו ותהר ותלד את קין ותאמר קניתי איש את יקוק:

רש"י

(א) והאדם ידע - כבר קודם הענין של מעלה, קודם שחטא ונטרד מגן עדן, וכן ההריון והלידה, שאם כתב וידע אדם נשמע שלאחר שנטרד היו לו בנים:

 בראשית פרק כא

(א) ויקוק פקד את שרה כאשר אמר ויעש יקוק לשרה כאשר דבר:

רש"י

(א) וה' פקד את שרה וגו' - סמך פרשה זו לכאן ללמדך שכל המבקש רחמים על חבירו והוא צריך לאותו דבר הוא נענה תחילה, שנאמר (לעיל כ יז) ויתפלל וגו' וסמיך ליה וה' פקד את שרה שפקד כבר קודם שרפא את אבימלך:

The rule that RaShI establishes is that if the verb precedes the subject, then the event being described is taking place at this point. If, on the other hand, the subject precedes the verb, then the event already had taken place at a previous point. Consequently, HaShem Begins to Speak again to Avraham only after Lot leaves; in the cases of the birth of Kayin, the birth took place at an earlier point, while Adam and Chava were still in Gan Eden. Similarly in the case of Sara’s conception, it takes place prior to when it is actually recorded in the Tora.

b) 

בראשית פרק מט

(א) ויקרא יעקב אל בניו ויאמר האספו ואגידה לכם את אשר יקרא אתכם באחרית הימים: 

רש"י

(א) ואגידה לכם - בקש לגלות את הקץ ונסתלקה שכינה ממנו והתחיל אומר דברים אחרים:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת פסחים דף נו עמוד א

דאמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש: )בראשית מט( “ויקרא יעקב אל בניו ויאמר האספו ואגידה לכם.” ביקש יעקב לגלות לבניו קץ הימין, ונסתלקה ממנו שכינה. אמר: שמא חס ושלום יש במטתי פסול, כאברהם שיצא ממנו ישמעאל, ואבי יצחק שיצא ממנו עשו. אמרו לו בניו: שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד. אמרו: כשם שאין בלבך אלא אחד - כך אין בלבנו אלא אחד. באותה שעה פתח יעקב אבינו ואמר: ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד.

Gimel.

1. The phrase “VaYivchar Lo”  suggests that this choice would only be made by Lot, but by no one else.

2.  An objectively positive choice, as opposed to a subjective one that appeals to an particular individual’s foibles.

Daled.

1.  (Iyov 14:10) “But man dies and is ill…”

The order of the events appears reversed: Just as in Iyov 14:10, usually illness precedes death, so too in Beraishit 13:18, one comes to a place before one pitches a tent.

Apparently this is simply a poetic conceit with the ultimate result mentioned before the means by which this occurs, and since the reader will be able to figure out the context, it is not of great noteworthiness.

Heh.

1. The question on Beraishit 13:13 is why is “LaShem” after the Etnachta, which effectively separates it from the first part of the verse in which is described how the people of Sodom are evil. But they are not just evil; they are evil towards HaShem. But the Trup does not appear to support this. The rule is that the totality of the verse is made up of two portions, the first part which precedes the Etnachta, and the second part which completes the thought. The list of verses are other examples of this principle.

Lech Lecha Questions

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/214.html

Noach Answers

Noach 5725  Sections 1&2

Alef.

1.  According to the Midrash, על פני connotes “as a result of” in this case Haran died as a result of Terach’s actions.

2.  Perhaps RaShI felt the impetus to quote the Midrash because according to the simple meaning of the text, there is no apparent reason for the Tora informing us that Haran died in the presence of his father. It does not figure into the narrative in any manner, aside from the apparent tragedy of a father having to confront the death of his child. Since we knew nothing of Haran previously and we learn very little about Terach subsequently, RaShI deemed it necessary to illustrate some sort of cause-and-effect which might then account for why Terach moved the family out of Ur Kasdim (11:31.) Whereas if he felt responsible for his son’s death, it might have influenced him to relocate, simply because his son died in his presence would not provide an alternate rationale for the move.

3.  The Midrash illustrates that the position of the agnostic will not earn for Haran Divine Intervention when his life is in danger, as opposed to the believer, embodied in Avraham, that does gain such Divine Protection when thrown by Nimrod into the fiery furnace.

4.  The reference to RaMBaN in Gilayon Lech Lecha 5716:

ב.	"והיה ברכה"

פסוק ב'

"וְאֶעֶשְׂךָ לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל וַאֲבָרֶכְךָ וַאֲגַדְּלָה שְׁמֶךָ וֶהְיֵה בְּרָכָה"

רמב"ן:

ד"ה והיה ברכה: והנה זאת הפרשה לא ביארה כל העניין, כי מה טעם שיאמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא: עזוב ארצך ואיטיבה עמך טובה שלא הייתה כמוה מעולם, מבלי שיקדים שהיה אברהם עובד אלוקים או צדיק תמים, או שיאמר טעם לעזיבת הארץ, שיהיה בהליכתו אל ארץ אחרת קרבת אלוקים? ומנהג הכתוב לומר: "התהלך לפני ותשמע בקולי ואיטיבה עמך" – כאשר בדוד ובשלמה ובעניין התורה כולה: "אם בחקותי תלכו", "אם שמוע תשמע בקול ה' אלוקיך". וביצחק אמר: "בעבור אברהם עבדי" – אבל להבטיחו בעבור יציאת הארץ, אין בו טעם.
אבל הטעם מפני שעשו אנשי אור-כשדים עמו רעות רבות על אמונתו בהקדוש ברוך הוא, והוא ברח מהם ללכת ארצה כנען ונתעכב בחרן, אמר לו לעזוב גם אלו ולעשות כאשר חשב מתחילה, שתהיה עבודתו לו וקריאת בני אדם לשם ה' בארץ הנבחרת, ושם יגדל שמו ויתברכו בו הגויים ההם, לא כאשר עשו עמו באור כשדים, שהיו מבזין ומקללין אותו ושמו אותו בבור או בכבשן האש, ואמר לו שיברך מברכיו ואם יחיד יקללו יואר.
וזה טעם הפרשה, אבל התורה לא תרצה להאריך בדעות עובדי עבודה זרה, ולפרש העניין שהיה בינו ובין הכשדים באמונה, כאשר קיצרה בעניין דור אנוש וסברתם בעבודה זרה שחידשו.

     RaMBaN believes that Avraham’s leaving Ur Kaskim was not due to only Nimrod’s threat to his life, but rather repeated indignities levied against him for his monotheism by the residents of this city-state.

Beit.

1.  The term בן בנו is modifying “Lot”, not “Haran.”

2.  a.  The phrase ויצאו אתם (and they went out with them) is problematic because it is unclear who the antecedents of the verb and the direct object pronoun are. Furthermore, the original verb in the verse is singular—ויקח—while later in the verse there is a plural verb—ויצאו. How can the divergent person of these verbs be reconciled?

      b.  RaShI: the singular ויקח describes the action perpetrated by Terach vis-à-vis Avraham. Lot and Sara were secondary in importance, and therefore only went along with Avraham and Terach.

 Weakness: The syntax of the sentence states that Terach took out not only Avraham, but also Sara and Lot. If they are all subsumed under the original ויקח, then about whom is ויצאו אתם referring?

           RaMBaN: Although Terach was only interested in taking out Avraham, since Avraham was more important than Terach, Sara and Lot came along, following the path taken by their husband and uncle, rather than Terach. Therefore Terach does the initial taking out, but in the eyes of Sara and Lot, both Terach and Avraham went out, leading S. and L. to go with them.

 Weakness: If S. and L. were following Avraham’s lead, then the verse should have stated ויצאו אתו (they went out with him) rather than אתם (with them), since it was only Avraham whom they were following.

      c. 

בראשית פרק כד

(ד) כי אל ארצי ואל מולדתי תלך ולקחת אשה לבני ליצחק:

(י) ויקח העבד עשרה גמלים מגמלי אדניו וילך וכל טוב אדניו בידו ויקם וילך אל ארם נהרים אל עיר נחור:

The reference ויצאו אתם could be a reference to the other family members and people making up their household. Therefore along with the four, i.e., Terach, Avraham, Sara and Lot, there went everyone else as well. For this reason Aram Naharaim was known as Nachor’s land. Obviously, then, he did not remain in Ur Kasdim, and although he did not proceed all the way to Canaan, he travelled part of the way. 

Section 3

Background:

1. Terach is 70  when Avraham is born—Beraishit 11:26
2. Avraham is 75 when he leaves Charan to go to Canaan—Ibid. 12:4 à Terach is 145.
3. Terach is 205 when he dies—Ibid. 11:32 à Terach continues to live in Charan for 60 years following Avraham’s departure.
4. Is Avraham guilty of negligence towards his father?

      Considerations:

1. Respecting parents does not number among the Noachide Commandments—Sanhedrin 56a ff.
2. However the story of Dama ben Nesina (Kiddushin 31a) suggests that while not obligated, Kibud Av VaEim was practiced among non-Jews, perhaps as a Lifnim MiShurat HaDin principle. If so, shouldn’t Avraham have been concerned about doing likewise?
3. Avraham was to have fulfilled all of the Tora’s Commandments, despite his not having received Revelation—Mishna Kiddushin 4:14.
4. If Terach was an idolater, perhaps Avraham was not obligated to offer him respect? Yet the principle of Kiddush HaShem would seem to apply not just to other Jews, but to non-Jews as well, and perhaps, in particular! This would have appeared to have been Avraham’s “stock in trade.” See the end of my paper, “Abraham: Pioneer Religious Educator; Paradigm for Contemporary Teachers of Judaism” in Haskel Lookstein Jubilee Volume, Rav Chesed (Ktav, New Jersey, 2009). (Attached to this document.) If so, he was concerned about Kiddush HaShem in order to impress others, but not his own father?
5.   Rabbinic tradition claims that Terach repented at the end of his life—RaShI      on Beraishit 15:15. If #3 above is true, then at what point did Terach repent precipitating Avraham’s obligation to reassert itself, if it did?¹
6.   Is this  a case of a conflict between Kibud Av and Kavod HaMakom, whereby the latter wins out, as in RaShI on VaYikra 19:3? i.e., when it is possible to fulfill both of these values, then one should; however where a choice has to be made, as in e.g., Aseh Docheh Lo Ta’aseh (Yevamot 3b) or Kavod HaBriyot vs. Kavod HaMakom (Berachot 19b).

Answers:

1. Why is Terach’s death noted by the Tora 60 years prior to its taking place?
2. In light of Consideration #1 above, “Acher” cannot refer to Bnai Noach, but rather to descendents/students of Avraham. The expectation is that Avraham will impart his values and practices (see Consideration #3 above) to his family and students—see Beraishit 18:19. However, his “violation” of Kibud Av VaEim will possibly brand him a hypocrite when he encourages his descendents and students to act in this manner. If the “idolater” exemption is accepted, then this would not take place for several generations with respect to students. However, in terms of his own family, it would seem to immediately come into play. Two particular examples of early Biblical figures who are dunned for their apparent lack of Kibud Av VaEim are Yaakov, who prolongs his sojourn with Lavan in order to acquire wealth instead of returning to his parents, and ending up never seeing his mother Rivka again—see RaShI on 35:8; and Yosef who fails to inform Yaakov that he is alive, even once he no longer is enslaved and has assumed an important government position in Egypt—(see Sota 13a for a parallel indication that Yosef was not careful about Kibud Av.)
3. RaMBaN suggests that the Tora stating a father dying before it actually happens in order to go into detail regarding the lives of his offspring happens on a number of occasions, rendering the case of Terach as unexceptional.
4. a) Yered, father of Chanoch—

            5:18 Y. 162 when C. born.

            5:19 Y. lives additional 800 years.

            5:20 Y. lives 962 years total and dies..

            5:21  C. 65 when has first childà Y. 227

            5:22  C. lives another 300 yearsà Y. 527 at death of C.

      b) Lemech, father of Noach—

            5:28 L. 182 when N. born.

            5:30 L. lives additional 595 years.

            5:31 L. lives 777 years total and dies.

            5:32 N. 500 when sons bornà L. 682.

5+6.From 5:3-31, the pattern for each person is a) age when fathers first child, b) how many years afterwards does the individual continue to live, and c) the total number of years of the individual’s life, finalized by the observation that he died.

      From 10:1-32, the pattern is discontinued and only the names of the subsequent generations are mentioned.

  From 11:10-25 the pattern resumes, with the omission of the statement that the individuals die at the end of their lives.

  With respect to Terach, 11:32 not only states how long he lived, but also that he died, and where he died, i.e., Charan. Consequently the Midrash attempts to account for these divergences.

7.    It seems to me that the question of the Gur Aryeh is on RaMBaN, but not on the Midrash and RaShI. The latter two mention the metaphysical principle that evil-doers are considered “dead” already during their lifetimes. Consequently, technically, if Terach is “dead”, Avraham is not responsible to honor him in the same way as he would have to do vis-à-vis a person who is fully alive. Therefore, aside from the Marit Ayin consideration, Avraham is not in violation of Kibud Av VaEim by leaving his father 60 years early. RaMBaN does not mention this perspective and simply states that the text is constructed for those who will not look into the matter carefully. Consequently it would appear that he is open to Gur Aryeh’s critique.

8.   a)    Since in my view, Gur Aryeh’s question specifically applied to RaMBaN, then it is this difficulty that he is addressing. (The fundamental difference between his approach and that of the Midrash and RaShI is the question of who has broken with who? i.e., if we emphasis the Rishut of Terach, then it is Terach who is “dead” and no longer deserving of Avraham’s ministrations, whereas according to G.A. it is Avraham who is the “new creation”, in effect the Ger who is like Tinok SheNolad, and has no Yichus, no relationship to even his biological family.) According to G.A. 11:32 could be understood in the sense that vis-à-vis Avraham’s development as a monotheist, it was at that time that at least figuratively Terach died (the recourse to the original pattern, in contrast to 11:10-25 where “VaYamot” does not appear) because he did not share his son’s views. Therefore the text was entitled to state what it did.

       b)  Yevamot 48b; 62a. Ger SheNitgayer KeKatan SheNolad Dami.

       c)   G.A. is anticipating the disdain with which the approach of the Midrash might be met, i.e., there is an assumption that people will not carefully look into this matter and therefore a “cover-up” is being effected. Consequently, if someone does not understand the underlying concept, he is to blame rather than the Rabbis who composed the Midrash.

9.   As stated in 7. above, the concept of Resha’im being considered metaphorically dead during their lifetimes serves as the key to justifying what otherwise would appear to be simply misleading and potentially inspiring the ire reflecting in the G.A.’s question.

Noach Questions

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/149.html

Berashit answers

Beraishit 5726
Alef.

1.  In his interpretation of 1:26, RaShI suggests that man does have a “mold” that is unique to him, but a mold nevertheless. In v. 27, RaShI similarly states there is a “mold” for man per se, but also a very specific way of bringing him into existence, i.e., that God Uses “His Hands” when “Handling the mold” as opposed to activating the mold via a verbal Command, as in the case of other creatures. Perhaps RaShI interprets differently in each of these verses because whereas in v. 26, “KiDemuteinu” modifies “BeTzalmeinu” suggesting that there is both a form and that this form represents in some way God’s “Form”, v. 27 only uses the term “BeTzalmo” which is further clarified as “BeTzelem Elokim”. In order for the final phrase in the verse, “BeTzelem Elokim Bara Oto” to convey additional meaning beyond what has been already imparted in v. 26, something new has to be derived. The new information is that in addition to a mold for man, God Brings him into being in a unique manner, i.e., by Using “His Hands.”

2.  “B” in v. 26: in accordance with.

     “B” in v. 27: by means of (by means of His Being, directly rather than merely verbally, He Brought man into existence.)

3. When the craftsperson uses their hands, there is more personal involvement and investment in each product than when the objects are turned out mechanically via the use of a mold. There is also the possibility of unique individual characteristics being added by the craftsperson due to his personal involvement. If the products are molded on an assembly line, there is a greater expectation that each will be identical with the next.

4.   In Tehillim 139:5, the context is not the Creation of man, but rather God’s Involvement in his everyday actions and thoughts—e.g.,

תהלים פרק קלט

(ב) אתה ידעת שבתי וקומי בנתה לרעי מרחוק:

(ג) ארחי ורבעי זרית וכל דרכי הסכנתה:

(ד) כי אין מלה בלשוני הן יקוק ידעת כלה:

(ה) אחור וקדם צרתני ותשת עלי כפכה:

     Consequently, while if taken out of context, the phrase could contribute to RaShI’s conception of the specific nature by which God Created man, it would not make sense of RaShI to have made such a comment in his interpretation of the verse in Tehillim in a similar manner. 

     Another reason for RaShI not commenting in Tehillim per se is that the part of the hand that would be used for creating an object are the fingers rather than the palm. The palm is more likely to be used in the context of protecting, covering an object, which fits more consistently with the context of Tehillim 139.

5.   The difference between “Demut” and “Tzelem” would appear to be that whereas the former is something concrete and tangible, a concept that is very much part of the world perceived and inhabited by humans, the latter is much more esoteric and abstract when talking about something’s essence. (While the word “Tzelem” is associated with “Tzel” which connotes one’s shadow, it seems to suggest not simply an area of shade that is projected by an object vis-à-vis the overhead sun, but rather something that is similar to but only a secondary representation of the original entity’s essence. A contrast with Socrates’ Allegory of the Cave (http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/allegory.html ) comes to mind where most people can only see shadows of reality and it is the philosopher who breaks free and can see the actual three-dimensional object in all of its colorful fullness. Yet since God by definition has no physical form, even the “philosopher”—the closest thing in Jewish tradition is the Revelation experienced by Moshe—would be able to only see some sort of imprecise representation of God’s Essence, if even that. It is this abstraction of an Abstraction that “Tzelem”, as opposed to “Demut”, may be referring.) Consequently, whenever the text may be referring to physical form rather than inherent essence, RaShI throws in the word “Diyoken” or “Demut”.

Beit.

1.  The questions addressed by the commentaries in addition to the meaning of anthropomorphic representations of the Divine:

         a. What is added by “KiDemutainu” beyond “BeTzalmeinu”? (R. Saadia, Bechor Shor,    ShaDaL)

         b. What is the connotation of the “Beit” of “BeTzalmeinu”? (RaDaK, ShaDaL, Meshech    Chachma)

         c. What is implied by the verb “VaYibra” in contrast to “VaYitzer” and/or “VaYa’as”?    (RaDaK)

         d. Why does it seem that these verses deal with the creation of the Nefesh rather than    the body? (RaDaK)

         e. What is the unique meaning of “Tzelem” in contrast to “To’ar” and/or “Tavnit”    (ShaDaL)

         f. If Tzelem Elokim is defined as the ability to make free choices, how is this possible in    light of God’s Omniscience? (Meshech Chachma)

2.  All of the listed commentaries agree that “Tzelem Elokim” is a non-physical quality. However   the interpretations that they suggest vary, and include:

         a. The ability to rule, dominate (R. Saadia, Bechor Shor)

         b. Intelligence (RaDaK)

         c. A unique attribute of God, specifically that like God, man contains many different    powers and abilities rather than single ones like the rest of the Creation     (ShaDaL)

         d. Free choice (Meshech Chachma)

3.  RaDaK on “BeTzalmeinu”:

         a. By means of (Our Intelligence)

         b. In possession of (Our Intelligence)

      It would appear that RaDaK is agreeing with RaShI’s second interpretation (see Alef 2. above.)

4.   The relationship between the words “BeTzalmeinu” and “KiDemuteinu”:  

         a. R. Saadia

               “BeTzalmeinu”—the general framework;    “KiDemuteinu”—the specific quality,    i.e., the ability to exert authority over the rest of Creation. The relationship is    one of Kellal U’Perat (going from the general to the specific, and according to    the 13 hermeneutic principles of R. Yishmael, the Perat delimits the Kellal to the    more limited range of the specific,i.e., Ein BeChelal Elah Mah SheYeish

               BePherat .)

         b. ShaDaL

               In this instance the Kellal U’Perat is giving man some quality that resembles    God, that quality being a collection of many different powers and abilities,    rather than a concentration of very specific abilities and in limited number.  

         c. Meshech Chachma 

               Let us make man (“BeTzalmeinu) by contracting Our Omniscience, thereby    providing for the possibility of man being endowed (“KiDemuteinu”) with    unfettered free choice.

5.  The following verse:

תהלים פרק ח

(ז) תמשילהו במעשי ידיך כל שתה תחת רגליו:

      referring to man, would appear to emphasize the quality that R. Saadia and Bechor Shor highlighted, i.e., man’s ability to rule and control other parts of the Creation.

6.  The verse in Beraishit 9:

בראשית פרק ט

(ו) שפך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך כי בצלם אלקים עשה את האדם:

     would appear to support RaDaK who interprets “Tzelem Elokim” as the Nefesh. When this is connected with the verse:

דברים פרק יב

(כג) רק חזק לבלתי אכל הדם כי הדם הוא הנפש ולא תאכל הנפש עם הבשר:

then one can understand how the taking of human life is not only a matter of destroying the physical presence of the animate being, as in the case of an animal, where I can separate   the body from the blood, but also the destruction of the person’s soul, rendering taking human life so much more serious than taking animal life.