parshat nitzavim

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Ki Tavo Answers

Ki Tavo 5728
Alef.

According to RaMBaN, Devarim 26:16 completes Moshe’s recapitulation and additions to the Mitzvot that he began in Devarim 1:5

(ה) בעבר הירדן בארץ מואב הואיל משה באר את התורה הזאת לאמר:

From this point on will be the denoument of the Sefer and Moshe’s life.

Beit.

1.The simple meaning of the verse implies that this day during the 40^th year of desert wanderings is when the Mitzvot were Commanded, when in fact they were Commanded at Sinai, at the beginning of the Exodus from Egypt.

2. The implication in the Abrabanel is that this is the first time that God has Commanded the people to abide by the Mitzvot. Yet we find many verses prior to this one, e.g., the well-known verses of the Shema—Devarim 6:5; 11:13, where God Commands adherence to the Mitzvot, even though acc. to this commentator, the explanations of these Commandments had as yet not been completed.

Gimel.

1. R. Yehuda HaLevi’s interpretation presumes that HaShem’s Being the God of the Children of Israel is predicated upon them doing things that earn then God’s Desire to be their God, and vice versa, i.e., HaShem must do things for Benai Yisrael to the point where they will propose to be His Treasured People. Yet, in terms of prior verses in the Tora, it would seem that the process is reversed in both cases, i.e., because God first Decides to be their God, He Imposes Mitzvot upon them—e.g., the case of Avraham,

בראשית פרק יז

(ז) והקמתי את בריתי ביני ובינך ובין זרעך אחריך לדרתם לברית עולם להיות לך לאלקים ולזרעך אחריך:

(ח) ונתתי לך ולזרעך אחריך את ארץ מגריך את כל ארץ כנען לאחזת עולם והייתי להם לאלקים:

    God States His Intention to be the God of Avraham and his descendents before very Mitzvot are Imposed. As for the people first doing things indicating their desire to be God’s Treasured People leading Him to agree, again that would seem to run counter to what is stated at Sinai prior to the Giving of the Ten Commandments:

שמות פרק יט

(ד) אתם ראיתם אשר עשיתי למצרים ואשא אתכם על כנפי נשרים ואבא אתכם אלי:

(ה) ועתה אם שמוע תשמעו בקלי ושמרתם את בריתי והייתם לי סגלה מכל העמים כי לי כל הארץ:

   If the people had already been earning God’s Admiration, why does this conditional agreement have to be proposed?

   Contextually, Devarim 26:16 appears to be conditional as well, i.e., “…and if you observe and do them (the Commandments) with all of your heart and all of your soul, only then (26:17-18) You have declared today to be to God His Treasured People, for Him to be for you a God and (for you) to walk in His Ways to observe His Statutes, His Mitzvot and His Mishpatim and to listen to His Voice, and HaShem will have Declared you to be to Him a Treasured People as He Said to you and to observe all of His Mishpatim.

2. One could understand RaShI without resorting to the approaches of Da’at Yisachar (to find other instances of the Hifil for Amira meaning “saying” is impossible, even though there are Hifil forms for Amira meaning to be glorified) and W. Heidenheim (who contends that RaShI himself never added the additional example, something that was emended by a subsequent commentator). RaShI is simply providing another example of the verb “A-M-R” in a causative form; however, the example that he brings from Tehillim is an example of the reflexive, as opposed to the Hifil which is the form used in Devarim. Consequently, even if another form of “A-M-R” is found, as long as it isn’t exactly the same form as in Devarim, it does not constitute a proper analogy. (It is also important to point out that the line in the Gilayon at the end of RaShI to the effect of how Yitamru is equivalent to He’Emart/He’emircha, is Nechama amendation, but does not appear in RaShI’s commentary itself.)

Daled.

The apparent difference between the two interpretations is whether the phrase “Lihyot Lecha L’Elokim” stands alone, or is one of a series of elements along with “LaLechet B’Derachav, VeLiShmor Chukav, etc.”Rosenzweig sees a literary parallelism between “Lihyot Lecha L’Elokim” on the one hand, and “Lihyot Lo Am Segula” on the other. Consequently the line dealing with fulfilling Commandments becomes ancillary as does “KaAsher Diber Lach.” Buber, on the other hand, sees the fulfillment of the Commandments part and parcel of “Lihyot Lecha L’Elokim.” Since they can’t be separated, the parallelism is also insconsistent. Furthermore, whereas “KaAsher Diber Lach” is simply an adverbial clause which does not add any particular extra understanding, “LaLechet B’Derachav…” is a clarification of what it means for HaShem to be the God of the Jewish People, and therefore it cannot be relegated to an inferior position. At the very least it is a Kellal U’Perat, i.e., the general concept followed by its specific articulation.

Heh.

1. Ohr HaChaim states that mentioning in v. 18, where what HaShem has Done for Israel, the observance by Israel of the Commandments, it would appear that Mitzva Compliance is a means by which Israel praises God, rather than the reverse.

2. In v. 17 it is understandable why observing the Mitzvot is mentioned, since by freely choosing to do so, the people were praising God and thereby demonstrating that they had accepted Him as their God. However, their observance of the Commandments did not precede God’s Declaring them a treasured people; it came afterwards. See Gimel 1 above.

3. The first explanation states that HaShem singled these later generations out in contrast to the founders by giving the former all of the Mitzvot, and thereby presenting them with the means to better and more completely purify themselves. Consequently not so much the observance but rather the giving of the quantity of Commandments is a reflection of God’s Esteem for the people.

    The second explanation states that simply giving the Commandments would not be a sign of Divine Endearment if people did not have either the ability or the opportunity to fulfill this large corpus of Mitzvot. Hence HaShem not only Gives the Commandments, but He also Provides Siyata D’Shmaya to enable the people to actually fulfill them.

4. Answers 1,2 and 4 focus on the virtues of the giving and fulfillment of the Commandments. Answer 3 focuses upon resolving the fear that with all of these additional Mitzvot, bad things could result—either by virtue of not fulfilling something that one is obligated to do, or directly as a result of fulfilling a Commandment as in the case of the boy falling off the tree after listening to his father to send away the mother bird in order to take the eggs of the baby birds from the nest (see Kiddushin 39b). Therefore the positive thing associated with the fulfillment of the Commandments is God’s implicit Guarantee that nothing bad will arise as a result of having these additional responsibilities.

Vav.

1. The syntactical difficulty in the verse appears to be the superfluity of v. 19. Aren’t the contents of v. 19 implied in the term “Am Segula” that appears in v. 18?

2. The commentator provides a new interpretation for “Am Kadosh.” When the Jews keep the Mitzvot, and then everything goes well for them, including their being on a higher level than others, there is no problem for them to be separate and unique. They would not be looking for acceptance from others since they are doing so well. But when they do not do the Mitzvot, which deprives them of their Am Segula benefits, then they become much more susceptible to assimilation and intermarriage, since at least some of them do not like their state of persecution, which in turn takes away from them their status of being separate and unique, an “Am Kadosh.”

parshat ki tavo

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Ki teze answers

Ki Tetze 5730
Alef.

22:13-21 The laws of Motzee Shem Ra (when a wife is accused by her husband of having misrepresented herself as a virgin.

       22-29 Instances of adultery and rape

23:1-9      Individuals disqualified from being potential marriage partners for other Jews. 

• Cases where sexual intimacy is prohibited, aside from the prohibitions concerning blood relatives and particular aberrations (found in VaYikra 18.) 

Beit.

1.    Devarim 2:28-29 (The request to Sichon, King of Cheshbon) “Food for money provide for me so that I will eat, and water for money give to me that I may drink, just let me pass through with my feet. As the Children of Eisav did for me who dwell in Sei’ir and the Moavim who dwell in Ahr, until I cross the Jordan to the land that the Lord, our God is Giving to us.

   à The Edomim (Children of Eisav) and the Moavim  sold food and drink to the Jews  and allowed them to pass through their lands.

   Devarim  23:5 (The reason why male Amonim and Moavim cannot marry into the Jewish people until ten generations have passed after initial conversion to Judaism) Because of the matter that they did not take the initiative to come out to you with bread and water on the way when you were going out from Egypt, that he hired against you Bilaam son of Be’or from Petor Aram Naharaim to curse you.

• The Moavim are described as not having offered any food or drink to the Jews.

Which account is to be believed, or how can these two accounts be reconciled?

2.      a) “Rabbim” (many)—although the Moavim did not come out to offer food and drink, the Jews did in the end purchase these things from them after requesting such items.

          b) Ibn Ezra—When in 2:29 reference is made to what the Moavim did do on behalf of the Jews, the reference is not to the offering of food and drink, but rather that the Jews were allowed to pass through the lands of Moav and Amon.

3.        a) RaMBaN rejects the first proposal because either  i) as long as food and drink was sold, there is no reason to be additionally critical re who initiated the transaction, or  Ii) If the Jews did not enter the land of the Moavim, then if sales of food and drink took place, the Moavim must have gone out to sell these things to them. And if this was so, and the Moavim are nevertheless restricted re marrying into the Jewish people for ten generations. why is a similar restriction not imposed on the Children of Eisav who did the same? Or vice versa, why are the Moavim punished for ten generations and the Edomim only for three?

           b) The Ibn Ezra’s interpretation is rejected by RaMBaM because, according to him, the Tora states explicitly that the Jews requested passage through Moav and were rejected in the same manner that their request to traverse Edom was rejected (BaMidbar 20:14-21). In fact, there is no mention of such an interchange regarding Moav in the Tora. Yiftach, in his attempt to dissuade the King of Amon not to attack, rejects the latter’s accusation that the Jews not only passed through the land of Moav, but also captured it, when he states, (Shoftim 11:17) “…and also to the King of Moav he (Moshe) sent (messengers requesting safe passage through the land) and he did not acquiesce….(Ibid. 18) “And he travelled in the desert and circuitously avoided the land of Edom and the land of Moav, and he came to the east of Moav and camped in Ever Arnon, never entering the boundaries of Moav because Arnon is the boundary of Moav.” Perhaps this is at least suggested in the list of journeys of the Jews in the desert in BaMidbar 33. In v. 44 the Tora states that the people encamped at Iyai HaAvarim, at the boundary of Moav. Only in v. 48 does the Tora mention that they now encamped at Arvot Moav. Assuming that the places mentioned in between, i.e., Divon Gad, Almon Divlatayma, and Harai HaAvarim were not located in Moav proper, then we are being given a description of how the people scrupulously avoided entering into the territory of the Moavim. Additionally, RaMBaN remarks, if the Jews had passed through the land of Moav, it would have been highly unlikely for the Moavim not to have sold food and drink to the Jews, because this was the standard practice when one nation’s forces passed through another nation’s territory.

4. RaMBaN suggests that since the ancestors of Amon and Moav (Lot and his daughters—Beraishit 19:30-38) were the direct beneficiaries of a) Avraham’s saving of at least Lot, if not his entire family, when the kings kidnapped him/them from Sodom and Amora (Ibid. 14:14-16) and b) it was only the merit of Avraham that caused Lot and his family to be saved from Sodom and Amora prior to the destruction of these cities,¹ their descendents should have felt a debt of gratitude towards Avraham’s descendents.² However, not only did these peoples not do anything to benefit the Children of Avraham, they tried to harm and destroy them. The Moavim hired Bilaam to curse them (BaMidbar 22:5 ff.) While Devarim 2:29 mentions both Edom and Moav as providing food and drink to the Jews, Amon is glaringly omitted. RaMBaN posits that once Edom and Moav became aware that the Jews could not trouble them and if they refused to allow the Jews to enter their lands, that this demand would be honored, then they went out to at least sell (give?)³ food and drink to the passersby. Amon, however, did not extend even this convenience/kindness. Consequently, when the reason for male Amonim not being able to marry into the Jewish people for ten generations is mentioned, (Devarim 23:4-5) Amon is mentioned before Moav.⁴

5.  As was stated above, while Devarim 2:29 mentions both Edom and Moav as providing food and drink to the Jews, Amon is glaringly omitted.

6.  One answer is as stated above in 4) and 5).

      RaShBaM offers a creative interpretation:

רשב"ם דברים פרק ב פסוק כט

(כט) והמואבים היושבים בער - אבל בשאר מואבים כת' בהן אשר לא קדמו אתכם בלחם ובמים. וכן [בני עשו] היושבים בשעיר, כמו שפירשתי למעלה אבל בני עשו הקרויים אדום יצאו לקראתכם בחרב ויט ישראל מעליו ויסובו את הר שעיר ימים רבים:

        i.e., that only some of the Edomim and only some of the Moavim offered food and drink, while the rest did not. Perhaps if this would include only a minority of the Moavim but a majority of the Edomim, the reason for why one group was not penalized in terms of marrying into the Jewish people while the other group was can be more easily understood.

Gimel.

Bilaam had a reputation of being a powerful spiritual force. And therefore not only the Moavim, but the Jews themselves, were concerned that anything he would say, would come true. God Could have Allowed Bilaam to say whatever he wished, including curses, and not Permitted the words to have taken affect. But the lag time until it would become apparent that this had happened would have provided ample opportunity for the Jews to be disconcerted in the meanwhile. Therefore, to spare the Jews consternation over whether they had indeed been really cursed or not, God Changed Bilaam’s words from the get go to be blessings. In this manner, those who were more sophisticated would realize all along that they had nothing to fear from this man, and those who were more simple-minded would be spared the anxiety of worrying whether to take his words seriously or not.

Daled.

1.    Sifrei is looking at the issue in general, i.e., the Mitzriyim were encountered chronologically before the others; the Edomim have the same restriction as the Mitzriyim, so they are mentioned next, with the Moavim and Amonim bringing up the rear. The severity of the restriction of the latter is then explained according to the Machti vs. Rotzeach construct.

       RaShI is commenting on the structure and sequence found in the Biblical text. When Amon and Moav are first discussed, I have nothing to which to compare the ten generation limitation. However, when afterwards the Mitzriyim and Edomim are only limited for three generations, and, by implication, all other nations can immediately marry into the Jewish people (with the exception of converted women marrying Kohanim) I realize that Amon and Moav are being punished more severely, leading me to consider why. Then the Machti/Rotzeach lesson is offered as a means of explaining the difference.

2.    According to logic, it would appear that someone who has tried to murder you should be treated more severely than someone who simply did not extend kindness to you or even tried to have you metaphysically cursed by someone who would be unable to do so. Therefore RaShI has to explain that the true heinousness of Amon and Moav is the plot to involve Benot Midian in order to corrupt the Jews (that some attribute to Bilaam—see RaShI on BaMidbar 25:1), since this deprives a person of the World to Come, rather than just removing him from this world.⁵

3. Sifrei on BaMidbar 25:1⁶ states that Amon and Moav constructed the places where the daughters of Moav seduced the Jews into transgressing idolatry. Perhaps the Sifrei assumes that if the same consequence is given to the converts of Moav and Amon, i.e., ten generations have to elapse before being allowed to marry into the Jewish people, the same sin must have been committed. This implies that the biological closeness of the originators of Amon and Moav—sisters and a father were their forebearers—continued on down through their descendents. Consequently, even if Balak, King of Moav is prominently mentioned as the instigator of hiring Bilaam, and Bilaam in turn is credited with the plot involving the daughters of Moav, Amon were heavily involved as well.

4.    RaShI perhaps was dispelling the possibility of concluding that since there were no redeeming factors comparable to those informing the Mitzriyim—provided sojourning space during famine—and  the Edomim—they’re descendents of blood relatives—then perhaps converts of other nations should be precluded forever from marrying into the Jewish people, קא משמע לן!

Heh.

       Ibn Kaspi brings up the possibility that a true Mitzri, before Sancherev came and made it impossible to absolutely identify such an individual (Berachot 28a), may nevertheless not be an immediate descendent of those who had actually offered sanctuary to the Jews when Yaakov brought his family down to Egypt because of the famine affecting Canaan, since this civilization in turn may have been conquered by someone else. Consequently, Jews perhaps no longer have an obligation to honor that kindness of long ago. קא משמע לן the Tora teaches that such kindnesses should be eternally honored, regardless of the details that may surround them. Perhaps acknowledging debts of gratitude is more for the acknowledger than the acknowledge

Vav.

        According to the first interpretation presented by R. Yosef Bechor Shor, the rule of three generations is independent of those who actually enslaved the Jews. As long as three generations have passed, even if there are still alive some of the Egyptian oppressors, Egyptian converts can already marry into the Jewish people. The second interpretation of the prohibition is not simply a technical, numerical one, but rather it is a function of the elimination of the wrongdoers—the ban is lifted only once all those who perpetrated transgressions against the Jews, i.e., who enslaved them or did not subsequently treat them with kindness, e.g., offering food and drink  are no longer alive. 

2.    Sancherev’s theory of maintaining his empire was according to a form of the principle, “Divide and Conquer.” See II Melachim 17:24 ff.  He believed that by allowing native people to remain in their homelands, this will lead to nationalism and revolts against the central authority. Therefore he routinely would transplant conquered nations to other sites within his empire. There is no reason to assume that in the biblical world, large numbers of these individuals would have the ability to repatriate themselves to their original homelands. Consequently, when encountering a person from the geographical area that was Egypt in the ancient world, it cannot be assumed that such an individual is a true descendent of the original Egyptians described in Shemot.

3.    The principle כל דפריש מרובא פריש assumes that even if there might be a possibility that a slight minority of individuals are true descendents of the original inhabitants, since the majority are hardly likely to be so, we assume that this individual derives from the majority, i.e., a non-Egyptian.

4.    R. Yehoshua in Berachot 28a essentially states that all laws that are functions of a particular nationality have been rendered moot once Sancherev embarked on his program of resettling native populations in other countries.

Ki teze questions

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answers to shoftim

Shoftim 5729
Alef.

1. Sefer HaChinuch: The Mitzva of Bal Tashchit in general reflects an aspiration to a disposition whereby all forms of destruction, nihilism, disruption are avoided at all costs. It is only evil-doers who view such actions as vandalism, wastefulness, etc. as pleasurable.

RaShBaM: If within the context of warfare, where there is an immediate need for raw materials to carry out the conflict, i.e., in this instance, wood for making implements whereby a city under siege could be conquered, nevertheless fruit trees which provide benefits beyond their wood are not to be used, all the more so when there is no need, beneficial elements within the environment must not be destroyed. (Would the implication be that they must also be protected? Tzorech Iyun.)

2a. R. Yosef Bechor Shor: The context of the prohibition not to destroy fruit trees is a war of conquest of the land of Israel, where Jews are destined to take up residence, according to the Divine Plan. Consequently, anything that will make the land ultimately uninhabitable for its eventual Jewish settlers is prohibited. Since food will be necessary, the short term destruction of fruit trees resulting in the long-term deficit in food is prohibited. In contrast, when predicting the destruction that will eventually come to the land of Moav (II Melachim 3:19) no such restriction is mentioned and in fact permission is granted to destroy all trees, fruit-bearing and otherwise.

HaKetav VeHaKabbala: The prohibition against destroying fruit trees is based upon the concept that aspects of the Creation should be allowed to fulfill their apparent existential purpose. Whereas non-fruit-bearing trees could be understood to exist for only their wood and therefore could be destroyed in order to obtain this raw material, fruit-bearing trees should be allowed to bear fruit throughout the life of the tree. Consequently, it should never be permitted to cut down a fruit-bearing tree. (The reference in II Melachim to “good trees” would then have to refer to healthy trees, but not ones that bear fruit.) (This is similar to the explanation for the prohibition against cooking the kid in the mother’s milk, i.e., the milk was intended to help the immature animal grow to maturity rather than preparing it for someone’s meal. It might, however, be contended that from the perspective of the hierarchy of Creation, with human beings standing at its pinnacle, the raison d’être of at least Kosher animals is for human consumption and perhaps this is the purpose of these animals’ Creation!)

2b. According to HaKetav VeHaKabbala, some things’ purpose in Creation could be for ultimate destruction, e.g., animals to be used for Korbanot¹ are slaughtered after all (before it was subsequently permitted to kill and consume animals for food, following the Flood. One could counter that eating animals is a concession of the post-Eden generations of humanity, and that ultimately, when every creature becomes a herbivore again during the Messianic era, that such a practice will cease. But then it could be contended that consuming plants is also essentially a destructive process. Should the food chain be considered constructive, from the point of view of the creatures gaining sustenance and thereby surviving, or destructive, in terms of those creatures or aspects of Creation that are being consumed? And when the frame of reference becomes the life cycles of these various creatures, whereby even the “consumers” eventually die and their raw materials are ultimately “recycled” into the natural order, is anything absolutely destructive? Can the constructive/destructive rubric be viewed as inherently relativistic and a function of point of view?)

     Sefer HaChinuch: It would appear that all forms of destruction, regardless of the ultimate purpose, are disagreeable to the Tzaddik. But then in light of the above discussion re HaKetav VeHaKabbala, how does the Tzaddik justify eating anything or using any raw materials that he finds in the world? Could a constructive purpose found for everything and anything in existence that would essentially justify mining it, killing it, processing it, harvesting it, etc.? 

Beit.

1. Mincha Belula: This commentator sees the prohibition in theological terms specifically in relationship to the military actions required to conquer the land of Israel. Since this is a Divinely Decreed campaign, then the people should have trust in God that they will be victorious, and therefore should not go to heroic lengths, e.g., the destruction of fruit trees, in order to conduct the war. The fact that God is Ordering the fruit trees to remain illustrates how eventually the Jews will inhabit this land and will obtain sustenance from these very trees.

ShaDaL: The prohibition against the destruction of fruit trees is at heart a demand for people to appreciate what the Creator has Provided for them within the world that they live. To take something from which they have benefited in the past and could continue to benefit from in the future, and destroy it, reflects a lack of gratitude that such a Creation was brought into existence.

2. If ShaDaL is correct, then why is it permitted to destroy non-fruit-bearing trees? They also provide benefits, e.g., shade, prevent soil erosion, shelter, CO₂ emissions, etc. Is there anything in the world from which we do not benefit, and if so, then isn’t the destruction of anything an act of ingratitude?
3. According to ShaDaL, if the problem with destroying fruit trees is a matter of ingratitude towards God, when God specifically Commands that fruit trees be destroyed as part of the destruction of Moav, His Commandment of destruction trumps considerations of preserving such trees. This would be parallel to Shaul’s reluctance to destroy all of Amalek including the animals. His claim that the animals would serve as sacrifices to God was empty when God obviously was not interested in sacrifices originating from such a source.

Gimel.

1.  Targum understands the phrase as a declarative statement, i.e., The tree of the field is not like a man, to come before you in the siege.

     RaShI understands the phrase as a rhetorical question, i.e., Perhaps like a person is the tree of the field to enter the siege from before you, and therefore be subjected to hardships of famine and lack of water?

   In each of the cases that Nechama cites in the Gilayon, RaShI preserves the rhetorical question in these verses, whereas the Targum renders them as declarative statements:

a. Beraishit 13:16

      Verse: אשר אם יוכל איש לספר את עפר הארץ

      Targum: it is impossible for a person to count…

b. Ibid. 18:25

      Verse: השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט

      Targum: the Judge of the entire earth surely must do justice…

c. Ibid. 27:36

      Verse: הכי קרא שמו (RaShI: לשון תימה...)

      Targum: truly is his name called…

d. Ibid. 49:9

      Verse: מי יקימנו

      Targum: there is no king that will be able to move him.²

2. Ibn Ezra challenges the approach presented by Targum in the sense that he does not see how stating that the fruit tree is not equivalent to a person under siege is a sufficient justification for not cutting down the tree, i.e., granted that the tree is not a combatant; nevertheless if I need the wood of the tree to conduct the battle, why is that not sufficient cause to cut it down?
3. Although Ibn Ezra states in his commentary to Devarim 20:19 that one cannot assume the word “Lo”, a negative when it is not explicitly stated, since such a word completely changes the sense of the verse from a positive to a negative statement, essentially its opposite, he nevertheless claims such an omission in Devarim 33:6 and Tehillim 9:19. However in both of these verses, when the principle of parallelism is followed, it becomes apparent why Ibn Ezra inserts the understanding of “Lo” within his interpretation. Devarim 33:6 “יחי ראובן ואל ימות...”; Tehillim 9:19 “כי לא לנצח ישכח אביון”, i.e., in both verses, the first portion has a negative term, that logically should be carried over to the second half of the verse, which is not the case in terms of Devarim 20:19.
4. Just as in Devarim 24:6, taking the millstones as collateral will undermine the means by which the indigent person stays alive, literally his livelihood, so too destroying the fruit trees will destroy the means by which human beings stay alive, i.e., eating the fruit of the trees. In both cases the phrase begins with the word “כי” which further suggests the similar interpretation of each phrase.
5. Perhaps Ibn Ezra would be relying upon Semichut HaParashiyot—in this case the juxtaposition of one verse next to the other, the verse that prohibits certain destruction next to the one that permits it. If in Devarim 20:20 we see what can be used for manufacturing weapons of war, then we know that the end of v. 19 is the reason for not destroying fruit trees, i.e., that it provides sustenance to man. 
6. RaShI: The fruit tree is the subject—it should not have to flee the soldiers of the besieging army because it is not their enemy.

Ibn Ezra: Man is the subject, i.e., he must not destroy that which provides him with life-giving sustenance.

7.  The end of v. 20 demonstrates that there are trees from which you can manufacture weapons of war, just not the wood of fruit trees. Consequently there must be something special about such trees, and the end of v. 19 explains why they must be spared destruction. While man is able to utilize all things in the world for his benefit, there is a prioritization of needs, and what serves as food trumps that which will be used for creating an implement of war.

parshat shoftim

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Answers to Re'eh

Re’eh 5718


Alef.

RaMBaM understands Devarim 16 as a BeDiAvad, i.e., the minimalist approach. Certainly when there will be an obligation for the poor individual to pay back what he receives from the person in better circumstances, the latter must enable the former economically. However, LeChatchila, appriori, it is even better to simply give the poor person an out-and-out grant, without any expectation of repayment. Consequently, this could be considered yet another example of Dibra Tora Neged Yetzer HaRa (the Tora is formulating its expectations in light of man’s baser instincts—e.g., Eishet Yefat To’ar, Go’el HaDam; or the Rav’s comment that Halacha is the “ground floor” rather than the “ceiling”—while HaShem Desires man to strive to be an ultimate Ba’al Chesed, He will “Settle” for him at least beginning by lending money to the poor.

Beit.

1. (Siftei Chachamim, siman Katan Reish) The implication of the word “Efes” in v. 4 is that simply, there will come a time when there no longer will be any poor people among the Jews. However, the “Rak” of v. 5 amends this statement by saying that it is conditional, i.e., only if there is constant lending from the rich to the poor will the abject poverty of the poor be mitigated, but not ever truly eliminated.

2.a+b. (Siftei Chachamim, siman Katan Shin) The word “Rak” is understood Rabbinically  as a “Mi’ut” (an exclusionary, delimiting word). Although “Kaful Lashon” (doubling language, in this case the doubling of the verb Smo’ah Tishma) is usually interpreted as a language of emphasis, or quantity of repetition (you have to listen over and over, even 100 times), since in this case, there is also the Mi’ut of “Rak”, RaShI applies the Mi’ut to the verb and divides the doubling into a cause-and-effect construction, i.e., if you listen even a little, you will be Listened to a great deal.

3. Usually, the promises of reward are within an agricultural context, i.e., it will rain, your crops will be abundant, your animals will reproduce, etc. The issue of wealth vs. poverty and the necessity for the wealthy to loan to the poor suggests a mercantile economy, something that will take place in an urban environment, i.e, Devarim 28:3 “Blessed are you in the city”, as opposed to (Ibid.) “And blessed are you in the field.”

4. Why if you will lend to others is this a manifestation of a Divine Blessing? Perhaps it’s part of a monetary system of borrowing and lending, with you having first borrowed, speculated on the interest and then turn around and lend to another. Such a system would make the lender dependent in turn upon those who lend to him, and therefore not necessarily an objective blessing. RaShI points out that the second clause, “and you will not borrow” suggests that you are not the middle man in this process, but rather it will proceed in a single direction, i.e., you will lend but never need to borrow in order to do so.

5. V. 6 is talking about lending between a Jew and a non-Jew. V. 8 is dealing with loans between Jews. The double language “VeHa’aveit Ta’avitenu” appears to be superfluous if the wealthy individual has already been Commanded to open his hand to the poor. Consequently the Rabbis, reflected in RaShI’s comment, imagine a scenario whereby the wealthy man offered a grant, was turned down due to the poor individual’s pride, and this is now followed up by a Command to offer the latter a loan to which he will perhaps be more amenable.  

Gimel.

1. RaShBaM feels that reading the verse according to the simple meaning, the heart is a “Beli’al” heart, and there will be some Davar with this heart. Consequently he reorders the words to connote that the heart is essentially neutral, and the evil matter (Davar Beli’al) is attempting to contaminate and corrupt it.

2. Before RaShBaM clarifies in the phrase beginning with “Kelomar” it appears that “Beli’al” is an adjective, modifying Davar. But in his clarification, he makes plain that it is a noun and that the two words are in the Semichut construct, comprising an adjectival prepositional phrase “Shel Resha” modifying the original noun “Davar”.  

Daled.

1. R. Oshtreich understands “Beli’al” as either connoting “without Divine Benefit”—from the language “Al”, i.e., above”—or “without benefit”—from the language “To’elet”. This is in contrast to RaShBaM who understands the word as representing evil, pure and simple.

2. In Devarim 15:9, “Beli’al” is defined as a case of “Ayin HaRa”, rather than doing something evil to another, simply looking upon him in an unkindly way and refusing to do him a favor. While this is also reprehensible, it does not smack of the truly negative evil of which RaShBaM speaks in this regard.

Heh.

    Apparently, while the evil of the eye has to do with assessing a situation and deciding whether or not to come to someone’s assistance, the evil heart is associated with the intent when one actually does something. Therefore there is a two-pronged critique of someone who is resentful about helping the poor: a) There are those who will simply disengage themselves from the process completely because their jaded eye does not permit them to undertake any assistance, and b) even those who do make funds available to the poor, they do so grudgingly and in a way that their resentment is apparent to the recipient. This too is to be avoided if one was to aspire to the true heights of Chesed. (Yet, it is preferred if someone does something SheLo LiShma than not at all since Lo LiShma could ultimately lead to LiShma.) 

   

Re'eh Questions

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