answers to shoftim

Shoftim 5729
Alef.

1. Sefer HaChinuch: The Mitzva of Bal Tashchit in general reflects an aspiration to a disposition whereby all forms of destruction, nihilism, disruption are avoided at all costs. It is only evil-doers who view such actions as vandalism, wastefulness, etc. as pleasurable.

RaShBaM: If within the context of warfare, where there is an immediate need for raw materials to carry out the conflict, i.e., in this instance, wood for making implements whereby a city under siege could be conquered, nevertheless fruit trees which provide benefits beyond their wood are not to be used, all the more so when there is no need, beneficial elements within the environment must not be destroyed. (Would the implication be that they must also be protected? Tzorech Iyun.)

2a. R. Yosef Bechor Shor: The context of the prohibition not to destroy fruit trees is a war of conquest of the land of Israel, where Jews are destined to take up residence, according to the Divine Plan. Consequently, anything that will make the land ultimately uninhabitable for its eventual Jewish settlers is prohibited. Since food will be necessary, the short term destruction of fruit trees resulting in the long-term deficit in food is prohibited. In contrast, when predicting the destruction that will eventually come to the land of Moav (II Melachim 3:19) no such restriction is mentioned and in fact permission is granted to destroy all trees, fruit-bearing and otherwise.

HaKetav VeHaKabbala: The prohibition against destroying fruit trees is based upon the concept that aspects of the Creation should be allowed to fulfill their apparent existential purpose. Whereas non-fruit-bearing trees could be understood to exist for only their wood and therefore could be destroyed in order to obtain this raw material, fruit-bearing trees should be allowed to bear fruit throughout the life of the tree. Consequently, it should never be permitted to cut down a fruit-bearing tree. (The reference in II Melachim to “good trees” would then have to refer to healthy trees, but not ones that bear fruit.) (This is similar to the explanation for the prohibition against cooking the kid in the mother’s milk, i.e., the milk was intended to help the immature animal grow to maturity rather than preparing it for someone’s meal. It might, however, be contended that from the perspective of the hierarchy of Creation, with human beings standing at its pinnacle, the raison d’être of at least Kosher animals is for human consumption and perhaps this is the purpose of these animals’ Creation!)

2b. According to HaKetav VeHaKabbala, some things’ purpose in Creation could be for ultimate destruction, e.g., animals to be used for Korbanot¹ are slaughtered after all (before it was subsequently permitted to kill and consume animals for food, following the Flood. One could counter that eating animals is a concession of the post-Eden generations of humanity, and that ultimately, when every creature becomes a herbivore again during the Messianic era, that such a practice will cease. But then it could be contended that consuming plants is also essentially a destructive process. Should the food chain be considered constructive, from the point of view of the creatures gaining sustenance and thereby surviving, or destructive, in terms of those creatures or aspects of Creation that are being consumed? And when the frame of reference becomes the life cycles of these various creatures, whereby even the “consumers” eventually die and their raw materials are ultimately “recycled” into the natural order, is anything absolutely destructive? Can the constructive/destructive rubric be viewed as inherently relativistic and a function of point of view?)

     Sefer HaChinuch: It would appear that all forms of destruction, regardless of the ultimate purpose, are disagreeable to the Tzaddik. But then in light of the above discussion re HaKetav VeHaKabbala, how does the Tzaddik justify eating anything or using any raw materials that he finds in the world? Could a constructive purpose found for everything and anything in existence that would essentially justify mining it, killing it, processing it, harvesting it, etc.? 

Beit.

1. Mincha Belula: This commentator sees the prohibition in theological terms specifically in relationship to the military actions required to conquer the land of Israel. Since this is a Divinely Decreed campaign, then the people should have trust in God that they will be victorious, and therefore should not go to heroic lengths, e.g., the destruction of fruit trees, in order to conduct the war. The fact that God is Ordering the fruit trees to remain illustrates how eventually the Jews will inhabit this land and will obtain sustenance from these very trees.

ShaDaL: The prohibition against the destruction of fruit trees is at heart a demand for people to appreciate what the Creator has Provided for them within the world that they live. To take something from which they have benefited in the past and could continue to benefit from in the future, and destroy it, reflects a lack of gratitude that such a Creation was brought into existence.

2. If ShaDaL is correct, then why is it permitted to destroy non-fruit-bearing trees? They also provide benefits, e.g., shade, prevent soil erosion, shelter, CO₂ emissions, etc. Is there anything in the world from which we do not benefit, and if so, then isn’t the destruction of anything an act of ingratitude?
3. According to ShaDaL, if the problem with destroying fruit trees is a matter of ingratitude towards God, when God specifically Commands that fruit trees be destroyed as part of the destruction of Moav, His Commandment of destruction trumps considerations of preserving such trees. This would be parallel to Shaul’s reluctance to destroy all of Amalek including the animals. His claim that the animals would serve as sacrifices to God was empty when God obviously was not interested in sacrifices originating from such a source.

Gimel.

1.  Targum understands the phrase as a declarative statement, i.e., The tree of the field is not like a man, to come before you in the siege.

     RaShI understands the phrase as a rhetorical question, i.e., Perhaps like a person is the tree of the field to enter the siege from before you, and therefore be subjected to hardships of famine and lack of water?

   In each of the cases that Nechama cites in the Gilayon, RaShI preserves the rhetorical question in these verses, whereas the Targum renders them as declarative statements:

a. Beraishit 13:16

      Verse: אשר אם יוכל איש לספר את עפר הארץ

      Targum: it is impossible for a person to count…

b. Ibid. 18:25

      Verse: השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט

      Targum: the Judge of the entire earth surely must do justice…

c. Ibid. 27:36

      Verse: הכי קרא שמו (RaShI: לשון תימה...)

      Targum: truly is his name called…

d. Ibid. 49:9

      Verse: מי יקימנו

      Targum: there is no king that will be able to move him.²

2. Ibn Ezra challenges the approach presented by Targum in the sense that he does not see how stating that the fruit tree is not equivalent to a person under siege is a sufficient justification for not cutting down the tree, i.e., granted that the tree is not a combatant; nevertheless if I need the wood of the tree to conduct the battle, why is that not sufficient cause to cut it down?
3. Although Ibn Ezra states in his commentary to Devarim 20:19 that one cannot assume the word “Lo”, a negative when it is not explicitly stated, since such a word completely changes the sense of the verse from a positive to a negative statement, essentially its opposite, he nevertheless claims such an omission in Devarim 33:6 and Tehillim 9:19. However in both of these verses, when the principle of parallelism is followed, it becomes apparent why Ibn Ezra inserts the understanding of “Lo” within his interpretation. Devarim 33:6 “יחי ראובן ואל ימות...”; Tehillim 9:19 “כי לא לנצח ישכח אביון”, i.e., in both verses, the first portion has a negative term, that logically should be carried over to the second half of the verse, which is not the case in terms of Devarim 20:19.
4. Just as in Devarim 24:6, taking the millstones as collateral will undermine the means by which the indigent person stays alive, literally his livelihood, so too destroying the fruit trees will destroy the means by which human beings stay alive, i.e., eating the fruit of the trees. In both cases the phrase begins with the word “כי” which further suggests the similar interpretation of each phrase.
5. Perhaps Ibn Ezra would be relying upon Semichut HaParashiyot—in this case the juxtaposition of one verse next to the other, the verse that prohibits certain destruction next to the one that permits it. If in Devarim 20:20 we see what can be used for manufacturing weapons of war, then we know that the end of v. 19 is the reason for not destroying fruit trees, i.e., that it provides sustenance to man. 
6. RaShI: The fruit tree is the subject—it should not have to flee the soldiers of the besieging army because it is not their enemy.

Ibn Ezra: Man is the subject, i.e., he must not destroy that which provides him with life-giving sustenance.

7.  The end of v. 20 demonstrates that there are trees from which you can manufacture weapons of war, just not the wood of fruit trees. Consequently there must be something special about such trees, and the end of v. 19 explains why they must be spared destruction. While man is able to utilize all things in the world for his benefit, there is a prioritization of needs, and what serves as food trumps that which will be used for creating an implement of war.