Nitzavim answers

Nitzavim 5721
Alef.

1. The reflexive verb form for B-R-Ch is difficult to understand. Usually the Bless-er, and the Bless-ee are two different entities. It is difficult to understand how they can be one and the same. Consequently, the first Dibur HaMatchil is devoted to simply explaining what such a self-blessing could mean, whereas the second is establishing that in fact this is a case of the reflexive and not something else.

2.  The earlier examples of B-R-Ch in the reflexive form involve someone seeing someone else whom he thinks has done well, and wishing similar things for his own offspring. However in the case at hand, the individual is not trying to apply to himself what is transpiring for someone else; rather he is wishing that dire predictions for someone who is doing what he is doing, i.e., worshiping a different deity, will not apply to him. Consequently, the case has to be newly defined by RaShI. 

3.  R. Wolf Heidenheim compares our verse 29:18 with an earlier verse in the Tochecha 28:68, claiming that the reflexive in these two instances indicates an interior feeling that will either be or not be borne out in terms of external reality. In the earlier case, the captive Jews will hope to be purchased by someone who will enslave them, but apparently treat them better than they are being treated while up for sale in the slave market. Similarly, the individual who is worshipping other gods internally hopes that nothing bad will happen to him, but whether or not this will be the case obviously remains to be seen. (However the reflexive forms for shaving and praying that RaShI cites in his commentary on 29:18 do not represent cases of this commentator’s rule. Both examples are fully external, with the reflexive connoting that rather than the subject doing these acts to some other object, he is doing them to himself, i.e., shaving himself, “judging”¹ himself.

4.  Siftei Chachamim #80 notes that even when someone thinks that a certain curse will not apply to him, that doesn’t necessarily entail a “blessing.” Rather it’s simply a matter of not being included in the object of the curse. Consequently, RaShI explains that believing that all will be well with himself in effect is wishing himself something positive in addition to being spared that which is negative, i.e., a blessing of peace and wellbeing.

Beit.

The prooftext from BaMidbar demonstrates via parallelism that Sh-R-R connotes “seeing.” However, why should what one’s heart “sees” be considered a sin? Consequently RaShI adds the word “La’Asot” to clarify that what the heart “sees” is in effect what it “wishes to do,” in this case continue to worship other gods, which of course is a serious transgression. 

Gimel.

1. The three interpretations that are presented by Ibn Ezra all define “Rava” as referring to a Tzaddik, whereas according to RaShBaM, “Rava” also refers to a sinner, one that is more reprehensible than the type of sinner suggested by “Tzeme’ah.”

2. Ibn Ezra objects to R. Yona’s interpretation that the reason why the evildoer takes the position that he does is because it appears that sinners and the righteous all eventually suffer the same fate, i.e., death, leading to the conclusion that there is no difference between them and no need to strive to do good,² by drawing attention to the phrase in Devarim 29:18 “Shalom Yihyeh Li”, i.e., “nothing will happen to me.” According to R. Yona, the theological justification for transgression on the part of the sinner is not that the same thing will happen to both the righteous and the evildoer, but rather that there will be no accountability for the evildoer independent of whatever might or might not happen to the Tzaddik. 

3.  According to R. Yehuda HaLevi, the phrase “למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה” explains what the evildoer is trying to accomplish with his self-blessing, i.e., to negate the implications of the words of the righteous who claim that there is accountability for transgressions.

     According to R. Yona, the phrase “למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה” reflects the thinking that led to the evildoer thinking as he does, i.e., since he has not seen a distinction between how the righteous and the evil end up, therefore he does not feel that there is any point in not sinning since in his mind there are no negative consequences for doing so.

     According to Ibn Ezra, the phrase “למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה” is part of the evildoer’s self-justification, i.e., I have a right to say that nothing will happen to me because since the majority of people are not doing what I am doing, I will be included with them when they are rewarded for doing the right thing, and will not suffer any individual consequences as the result of my sinning.

4.  It would appear that RaShBaM is understanding “ספות” in the same manner as R. Yehuda HaLevi and R. Yona, i.e., a language of “being cut off. “ Consequently, he interprets that thinking that nothing will happen as a consequence of his sinning will lead to his destruction, whether the sin is due to spiteful behavior, or actions brought on by passionate temptations.

Daled.

1.  R. Yitzchak Arama understands “שלום” external conditions of persecution, starvation, physical deprivation.

   R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg (HaKetav VeHaKabbala) interprets “שלום” as an internal state of mind, looking for a diminution, if not elimination, of cognitive dissonance that comes about when one has to comply with a Commandment regarding which he does not understand the reason.

2.  R. Yitzchak Arama—a) Punishments will only be meted out to those who first accept the Tora and its Covenant and then violate it. If I never accept the Covenant, then I should be immune from the consequences of violating it. b) Furthermore, if I dwell among people who both accepted and now comply with the Covenant, then I will benefit from the Divine Protection that will be Afforded them.

     R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg—An internal “war” takes place when I try to comply with Mitzvot that I don’t understand. In order to achieve a modicum of peace within myself, I will only fulfill those Commandments that I understand, ignoring those that are alien to my sensibilities.

3.  R. Yitzchak Arama—“כי” would be interpreted “despite”, i.e., although I will not comply with the Covenant, nevertheless all will be well with me since I will benefit from the treatment of the general community.

   R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg--“כי” would be interpreted “when”, i.e., on condition that I only fulfill those Mitzvot that make sense to me, I will finally achieve a modicum of inner peace.

   Ibn Ezra—“כי” would be interpreted in the same manner that R. Yitzchak Arama explains the word.

4.  It would seem to me that the interpretation of Ibn Ezra and R. Yitzchak Arama make more sense in terms of context. The individual realizes that he is not complying with the expectations of the Tora. So he has to rationalize why despite the fact that he is following his heart rather than the dictates of the Tora, all will still be well with him.

5.  The weakness of R. Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenberg’s interpretation is that since the context is a person who is worshipping idolatry (see 29:17), why is such worship more logical and understandable than following the guidelines of the Tora. If we were discussing certain Chukim, e.g., the classical cases of Sha’atnez, Para Aduma and Kashrut are always referenced when looking for examples of Mitzvot that are difficult to fathom, then we could understand why a distinction might be made between Chukim and Mishpatim in some people’s minds. But Avoda Zora is as much of a Chok as Jewish Chukim. Consequently, the argument that there are logical objections causing internal tension if idolatry were not worshipped, does not seem to make sense within the context of the verses of this section of the Tora. Nevertheless, his insight about the mentality of someone who chooses not to observe Mitzvot is compelling and relevant, particularly in a time of Hester Panim when it is not so obvious that there is clear reward and punishment resulting from compliance or non-compliance with the Commandments of the Tora.