Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Parshat Bamidbar Answers
BaMidbar 5727
Alef.
In order for RaShBaM to demonstrate that the verb “בלע” could be understood as covering by human beings, he would need to provide a referent. However, the verses that he quotes refer to actions on the part of HaShem where things are destroyed. While RaShBaM argues that if Benai Kehat would see the components of the Mishkan in an uncovered state they would be destroyed, presumably by HaShem, the verse in question (4:20) has the verb “בלע” within the context of objects, not humans, being covered by human beings, rather than being destroyed by HaShem.
Beit.
Alef.
In order for RaShBaM to demonstrate that the verb “בלע” could be understood as covering by human beings, he would need to provide a referent. However, the verses that he quotes refer to actions on the part of HaShem where things are destroyed. While RaShBaM argues that if Benai Kehat would see the components of the Mishkan in an uncovered state they would be destroyed, presumably by HaShem, the verse in question (4:20) has the verb “בלע” within the context of objects, not humans, being covered by human beings, rather than being destroyed by HaShem.
Beit.
- 1. RaShI: “בלע” suggests placing the objects in question within their coverings.
- HaKetav VeHakabala: “בלע” implies how quickly they disappeared from view, i.e., “in the blink of an eye”, the amount of time that the eye is momentarily covered by the lid and then can once again see when the lid lifts.
- 2. “סירוס”, lit. “catration”, is the method of interpretation where the sequence of words in the verse is changed in order for it to make “more” sense. In this case, it would seem that RaShI reorders the verse in the following sequence:
- The verse would then read: “When covered, they (Bnai Kehat) would not see the holy things and die.
- Gimel.
- 1. R. S.R. Hirsch: The individuals tasked with carrying the holy things should not have a visual image of them, but rather focus upon their symbolism and conceptual meaning. This would be impossible if they actually see their physical appearance.
- Once man has a tangible image of something, it is difficult for him to then contemplate abstract concepts and meanings that might be associated with that entity. Perhaps this explains the manifold prohibitions against representing God in physical form. It also can explain why it is not appropriate to look at the Kohanim while they are engaged in Birkat Kohanim.
- Abrabanel: Human nature is such that the individual wishes to see things that are beyond his comprehension and sight. Objects that have been declared holy are certainly foci of human curiosity. In order to curb this tendency, the objects must be covered before those who are to carry them come into proximity with them.
- Holiness needs to be associated with a modicum of mystery. Man’s tendency it so attempt to debunk, penetrate through the veil of mystery, leading him to weaken his sense of sanctity as it relates to that which surrounds him. Even Moshe can only reach the 49th level of wisdom, or see through a lense that while clearer than the lenses through which others see, nevertheless is still an indirect vision.
- 2. I Shmuel 6:12-21
רד"ק
...והנכון מה שפירשנו שפתחו אותו וראו מה שבתוכו לפיכך אמר בארון ולא אמר ארון:
מצודת דוד
(יט) ויך - ה' הכה בהם על שפתחו הארון וראו בו בפנים ולזה הכה בעם שבעים איש מגדולי העיר והיו שקולים כחמשים אלף איש:
מלבי"ם
ויך באנשי בית שמש כי ראו בארון ה'. (ראיה שאחריו ב' מורה על השגתה והפלאה בדבר וההשכלה במהותו, כמו (שמות ב, יא) וירא בסבלותם, ובא לרוב על ענינים הגיונים, ואל אראה ברעתי (במדבר יא, טו), וראה בטוב ירושלים (תהלים קכח, ה), ור"ל שהביטו בו יותר מן הראוי ממיעוט היראה והכבוד).
- As the commentaries point out, the sin entailed not looking at the exterior of the Aron, but rather its internal contents. It would appear, however, that Bnai Kehat were not supposed to even see the external part of the Aron as well as the rest of the holy objects.
- 3.
שמואל א פרק ד
(א) ויהי דבר שמואל לכל ישראל ויצא ישראל לקראת פלשתים למלחמה ויחנו על האבן העזר ופלשתים חנו באפק:
(ב) ויערכו פלשתים לקראת ישראל ותטש המלחמה וינגף ישראל לפני פלשתים ויכו במערכה בשדה כארבעת אלפים איש:
(ג) ויבא העם אל המחנה ויאמרו זקני ישראל למה נגפנו יקוק היום לפני פלשתים נקחה אלינו משלה את ארון ברית יקוק ויבא בקרבנו וישענו מכף איבינו:
(ד) וישלח העם שלה וישאו משם את ארון ברית יקוק צבקות ישב הכרבים ושם שני בני עלי עם ארון ברית האלקים חפני ופינחס:
(ה) ויהי כבוא ארון ברית יקוק אל המחנה וירעו כל ישראל תרועה גדולה ותהם הארץ:
(ו) וישמעו פלשתים את קול התרועה ויאמרו מה קול התרועה הגדולה הזאת במחנה העברים וידעו כי ארון יקוק בא אל המחנה:
(ז) ויראו הפלשתים כי אמרו בא אלקים אל המחנה ויאמרו אוי לנו כי לא היתה כזאת אתמול שלשם:
(ח) אוי לנו מי יצילנו מיד האלקים האדירים האלה אלה הם האלקים המכים את מצרים בכל מכה במדבר:
(ט) התחזקו והיו לאנשים פלשתים פן תעבדו לעברים כאשר עבדו לכם והייתם לאנשים ונלחמתם:
(י) וילחמו פלשתים וינגף ישראל וינסו איש לאהליו ותהי המכה גדולה מאד ויפל מישראל שלשים אלף רגלי:
(יא) וארון אלקים נלקח ושני בני עלי מתו חפני ופינחס:
(יב) וירץ איש בנימן מהמערכה ויבא שלה ביום ההוא ומדיו קרעים ואדמה על ראשו:
(יג) ויבוא והנה עלי ישב על הכסא יך יד דרך מצפה כי היה לבו חרד על ארון האלקים והאיש בא להגיד בעיר ותזעק כל העיר:
(יד) וישמע עלי את קול הצעקה ויאמר מה קול ההמון הזה והאיש מהר ויבא ויגד לעלי:
(טו) ועלי בן תשעים ושמנה שנה ועיניו קמה ולא יכול לראות:
(טז) ויאמר האיש אל עלי אנכי הבא מן המערכה ואני מן המערכה נסתי היום ויאמר מה היה הדבר בני:
(יז) ויען המבשר ויאמר נס ישראל לפני פלשתים וגם מגפה גדולה היתה בעם וגם שני בניך מתו חפני ופינחס וארון האלקים נלקחה: פ
(יח) ויהי כהזכירו את ארון האלקים ויפל מעל הכסא אחרנית בעד יד השער ותשבר מפרקתו וימת כי זקן האיש וכבד והוא שפט את ישראל ארבעים שנה:
(יט) וכלתו אשת פינחס הרה ללת ותשמע את השמעה אל הלקח ארון האלקים ומת חמיה ואישה ותכרע ותלד כי נהפכו עליה צריה:
(כ) וכעת מותה ותדברנה הנצבות עליה אל תיראי כי בן ילדת ולא ענתה ולא שתה לבה:
(כא) ותקרא לנער אי כבוד לאמר גלה כבוד מישראל אל הלקח ארון האלקים ואל חמיה ואישה:
(כב) ותאמר גלה כבוד מישראל כי נלקח ארון האלקים: פ
שמואל א פרק ה
(א) ופלשתים לקחו את ארון האלקים ויבאהו מאבן העזר אשדודה:
(ב) ויקחו פלשתים את ארון האלקים ויביאו אתו בית דגון ויציגו אתו אצל דגון:
(ג) וישכמו אשדודים ממחרת והנה דגון נפל לפניו ארצה לפני ארון יקוק ויקחו את דגון וישבו אתו למקומו:
(ד) וישכמו בבקר ממחרת והנה דגון נפל לפניו ארצה לפני ארון יקוק וראש דגון ושתי כפות ידיו כרתות אל המפתן רק דגון נשאר עליו:
(ה) על כן לא ידרכו כהני דגון וכל הבאים בית דגון על מפתן דגון באשדוד עד היום הזה: ס
(ו) ותכבד יד יקוק אל האשדודים וישמם ויך אתם בעפלים בטחרים את אשדוד ואת גבוליה:
(ז) ויראו אנשי אשדוד כי כן ואמרו לא ישב ארון אלקי ישראל עמנו כי קשתה ידו עלינו ועל דגון אלקינו:
(ח) וישלחו ויאספו את כל סרני פלשתים אליהם ויאמרו מה נעשה לארון אלקי ישראל ויאמרו גת יסב ארון אלקי ישראל ויסבו את ארון אלקי ישראל: ס
(ט) ויהי אחרי הסבו אתו ותהי יד יקוק בעיר מהומה גדולה מאד ויך את אנשי העיר מקטן ועד גדול וישתרו להם עפלים טחרים:
(י) וישלחו את ארון האלקים עקרון ויהי כבוא ארון האלקים עקרון ויזעקו העקרנים לאמר הסבו אלי את ארון אלקי ישראל להמיתני ואת עמי:
(יא) וישלחו ויאספו את כל סרני פלשתים ויאמרו שלחו את ארון אלקי ישראל וישב למקמו ולא ימית אתי ואת עמי כי היתה מהומת מות בכל העיר כבדה מאד יד האלקים שם:
(יב) והאנשים אשר לא מתו הכו בעפלים בטחרים ותעל שועת העיר השמים:
שמואל א פרק ו
(א) ויהי ארון יקוק בשדה פלשתים שבעה חדשים:
(ב) ויקראו פלשתים לכהנים ולקסמים לאמר מה נעשה לארון יקוק הודענו במה נשלחנו למקומו:
(ג) ויאמרו אם משלחים את ארון אלקי ישראל אל תשלחו אתו ריקם כי השב תשיבו לו אשם אז תרפאו ונודע לכם למה לא תסור ידו מכם:
(ד) ויאמרו מה האשם אשר נשיב לו ויאמרו מספר סרני פלשתים חמשה עפלי טחרי זהב וחמשה עכברי זהב כי מגפה אחת לכלם ולסרניכם:
(ה) ועשיתם צלמי עפליכם טחריכם וצלמי עכבריכם המשחיתם את הארץ ונתתם לאלקי ישראל כבוד אולי יקל את ידו מעליכם ומעל אלקיכם ומעל ארצכם:
(ו) ולמה תכבדו את לבבכם כאשר כבדו מצרים ופרעה את לבם הלוא כאשר התעלל בהם וישלחום וילכו:
(ז) ועתה קחו ועשו עגלה חדשה אחת ושתי פרות עלות אשר לא עלה עליהם על ואסרתם את הפרות בעגלה והשיבתם בניהם מאחריהם הביתה:
(ח) ולקחתם את ארון יקוק ונתתם אתו אל העגלה ואת כלי הזהב אשר השבתם לו אשם תשימו בארגז מצדו ושלחתם אתו והלך:
(ט) וראיתם אם דרך גבולו יעלה בית שמש הוא עשה לנו את הרעה הגדולה הזאת ואם לא וידענו כי לא ידו נגעה בנו מקרה הוא היה לנו:
(י) ויעשו האנשים כן ויקחו שתי פרות עלות ויאסרום בעגלה ואת בניהם כלו בבית:
(יא) וישמו את ארון יקוק אל העגלה ואת הארגז ואת עכברי הזהב ואת צלמי טחריהם:
- Perhaps the people in Beit Shemesh assumed that the reason why the Philistines suffered so many plagues while the Aron was in their territory was because they were not Jews. Consequently, nothing would happen to them if they became intimately involved with this aspect of the Mishkan, even to the point of looking within it, as the Meforshim listed above infer from the preposition “ב”. However, the restrictions on even Bnai Kahat appearing in Parashat BaMidbar clearly suggest that the holy vessels are not for “popular consumption” and therefore, their exposure to the Aron led to a similar result as experienced by the Philistines.
Monday, May 23, 2011
Parshat Bechukotai
BeChukotai 5727
Alef.
Alef.
- 1. The individual who makes a vow to perform a Mitzva thinks that this action in itself is a Mitzva, much as one who constructs a private altar and sacrifices to God on it thinks that he too is engaged in a Mitzva performance. The same cannot be said when one vows regarding something that is optional. While it becomes a Mitzva not to violate a vow once it has been uttered, it is difficult to imagine how before the vow is made one thinks that he is engaged in a Mitzva performance.
- 2. If a person thinks that he has free choice and can use his human abilities in whatever way he pleases, then it is difficult to find fault with one who states a vow and fulfills it. However, if the power of speech is viewed as a special kindness Bestowed upon a person from HaShem, then it behooves the recipient to use that power carefully and responsibly. Consequently, to engage in frivolous verbal activity reflects a lack of appreciation for the origin and intention behind man being given this ability.
- 3. Since every Mitzva is considered as already having been sworn to uphold from the experience at Sinai where the people said, “We will do and we will hear/understand”, nothing is added when one vows to perform one of these Mitzvot. If anything, it suggests that had the individual not vowed, he would have been under no obligation to carry out the Mitzva, which is certainly not the case. Adding a vow to a Mitzva suggests that rather than performing it as fulfilling God’s Will, the Mitzva is actually a manifestation of man’s will, which could not be further from the case. The Mitzva in effect is spoiled in terms of its Kavana, much as a sacrifice is deemed disqualified when the Kohen thinks the wrong thoughts, rendering it Pigul.
- Beit.
- Abrabanel offers two explanations for the placing of the topic of vows of Erchin following the covenant as manifested in the Tochecha in BeChukotai:
- 1) The matter of Erchin are a type of donation to the Temple which while less holy than a sacrifice, nevertheless is associated with the Tabernacle and Temple. Consequently, before concluding the book of VaYikra which is the volume of the Tora that deals primarily with such matters, these were mentioned before the Sefer concludes.
- 2) In VaYikra 27:19, the Tora discusses what is to be done in terms of Erchin with regard to a field that has been dedicated to the Temple and will eventually return to the person after Yovel. So in effect, the laws of Yovel apply also to Erchin and that is why this topic was included before the Parasha and Sefer end.
- Gimel.
- 1. It would appear that RaShI is trying to account for the fact that the same value is placed upon a male, between the ages of twenty and sixty. It is hard to understand how those with less life experience or those with greater energy should be worth the same amount as those who are do not have such qualities. Consequently RaShI says that to try to understand this law via the frame of reference of “worth” is inappropriate. When one dedicates the monetary amount corresponding to a male between twenty and sixty, he has dedicated 50 silver Shekalim to the Temple, period. It is not an exercise in determining the specific value of a specific person.
- 2. א.
ויקרא פרק כז
(ח) ואם מך הוא מערכך והעמידו לפני הכהן והעריך אתו הכהן על פי אשר תשיג יד הנדר יעריכנו הכהן: ס
- The textual difficulty that RaShI is attempting to clarify is the ambiguity arising from the usage of the pronoun “הוא” and the contraction of as well as the full form of the possessive pronoun “אותו”. Since the object of “ערכך” is the individual who Is dedicating the money, while the objects of the evaluation are the various categories of people mentioned in the verses preceding this verse, one would think that the “הוא” at the beginning of v. 27 referred to the object of the valuation. But in fact it refers to the donor who can’t afford the amount that his dedication requires, and therefore the object of his dedication is given an individual evaluation by a Kohen in light of the donor’s financial ability to pay.
- ב. Ibn Ezra: a) "והעמידו הכהן לפני הכהן" = And the Kohen stood.
- b) And the Kohen made the donor stand in front of the evaluator.
- RaShI: c) And the Kohen made the individual who inspired the donation stand in front of the evaluator.
- ג. According to RaShI, the beginning of the verse “ואם מך הוא מערכך” fits best with RaShI’s interpretation of the continuation, “והעמידו לפני הכהן”, i.e., if the donor is too poor to afford the amount that his donation requires, he is made to stand before the Kohen.
- 3. א. The language of “סדר” is interpreted as referring to taking into consideration not only the ability of the donor to meet this particular obligation, but also to avoid depriving him of the basic necessities of life and work that he needs to continue to exist.
- ב. In order to combine these two elements pointed out by Ba’al Shem Olam re RaShI’s commentary, you would have to interpret as follows: And if he (the donor) is too poor to afford to pay the evaluation, and he (the donor) causes him (the object of the evaluation) to stand before the Kohen, and the Kohen evaluates him (the donor) in accordance with what the donor can afford, so will the Kohen evaluate him (the donor.)
- 4. If RaShI would not have mentioned that this applies to those who are coming to redeem the animal from Hekdesh, one might have thought that it applies even to the individual who originally made the donation. But in v.13, we learn that the person who was the donor would have to add a Chomesh in order to redeem what he has given to Hekdesh.
- 5. There’s no indication from the verses that deal with the redemption of the animal dedicated to Hekdesh who had to add the Chomesh were he to redeem it afterwards.
ויקרא פרק כז
(יא) ואם כל בהמה טמאה אשר לא יקריבו ממנה קרבן ליקוק והעמיד את הבהמה לפני הכהן:
(יב) והעריך הכהן אתה בין טוב ובין רע כערכך הכהן כן יהיה:
(יג) ואם גאל יגאלנה ויסף חמישתו על ערכך:
- It would be possible to think that anyone, whether the donor or anyone else, who wished to redeem the animal would have to add the Chomesh. Consequently, RaShI puts the verse in context by stating that just as in other instances where a Chomesh has to be added in order to effect redemption, it is only when the donor redeems that which he donated, does a Chomesh have to be added, the same applies to the case listed in these verses.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Parshat Behar Answers
Behar 5722
Alef.
Alef.
- It is possible that the Sabbatical year is comparable the weekly celebration of Shabbat. In both instances, the individual is called upon to acknowledge God’s Mastery and His Status of Creator of the universe, leading to the conclusion that when He Calls upon man to rest either from his weekly work for a single day, or from his work in the fields for an entire year, failure to comply with such a requirement strikes at the heart of the belief system underlying Judaism. Consequently just as the violation of Shabbat is considered a most serious breach resulting in serious consequences—death, Karet, etc.—so too the violation of the Sabbatical year will have its set of severe consequences.
- 1. From the Peshat point of view, the initial clause of the verse is providing the reason for the concluding clause, i.e., the non-Jewish individual who was living among you achieved a financial position whereby he could purchase a slave, in this case a Jewish one. If each element in the verse was talking about a different person, then there would be no logical sequence within the verse to speak of.
- 2. Although in the initial clause, a “Vav” separates the words “Geir” and “Toshav” possibly suggesting that they are referring to two different people, the concluding clause omits the “Vav” supporting the view that the words are referring to the same individual.
- 3. RaShI—“who is also”
- Siphra—“or”
- 4. RaShI’s commentary on Beraishit 23:4--
(ד) גר ותושב אנכי עמכם - גר מארץ אחרת ונתישבתי עמכם. ומדרש אגדה אם תרצו הריני גר, ואם לאו אהיה תושב ואטלנה מן הדין שאמר לי הקדוש ברוך הוא (לעיל יב ז) לזרעך אתן את הארץ הזאת:
has two parts, Peshat and Derash. According to the simple meaning, despite that RaShI defines the two elements, “Geir” and “Toshav” separately, they are still referring to the same person, i.e., one who is not native to this area, but who nevertheless is dwelling among this area’s inhabitants. According to the Derash, the two words serve as alternatives, i.e., “Geir”, a sojourner/foreigner, in contradistinction to “Toshav”, a resident/citizen. Since RaShI in VaYikra is interested in Peshat rather than Derash, the only relevant comparison would be between his commentary to VaYikra and the first of the two commentaries in Beraishit, and therefore it could be said that there is no contradiction between his two comments.Gimel.
1. RaShI—the Jew sold himself to either to the family of the sojourner (who are completely non-Jewish, devoid even of the seven Noachide Commandments) or to serve the idolatry which such a family worships.
RaMBaN—even the word “LeEiker” refers to a non-Jew and not to the religion of the non-Jew. Rather than describing two different things, as the Torat Kohanim which RaShI quotes does, RaMBaN sees the phrase as describing a single entity, the root of the Geir Toshav, his completely pagan family.
2. ChaZaL were attempting to account for the extra word “LeEiker”. Without the word I already have the case that the Jew has been acquired by the family of the Geir Toshav who are likely to be idolaters. Consequently the extra word takes the situation one step further, i.e., the idolatry itself.
3. The Tora states in v. 48 that the person who has sold himself even to idolaters/ the idolatry itself must be redeemed. One could argue that a Jew who has gone to such a length has deliberately removed himself from the Jewish people and perhaps there no longer is any responsibility for even his family to redeem him. (See Kiddushin 20b, quoted at the beginning of section Daled.) But if one assumes that to some degree this is the fault of the non-Jewish residents, that they were the ones who have influenced him to become so alienated, then this would justify efforts on the parts of the Jews to not only redeem him from servitude, but try to reconnect him to Jewish culture and observance, mitigating the non-Jewish influence that attracted him in the first place.
4. In v. 39-40, when the topic of the Eved Ivri was first introduced in this Parasha (it is also discussed at the beginning of Parashat Mishpatim in Sefer Shemot), the only release for such a servant is the advent of the Jubilee Year. However, with respect to this last case where the person has sold himself to complete non-Jews or even idolatry, in v. 48, there is a discussion of his redemption from servitude. RaShI comments on this verse that this must be done immediately because the longer the Jew remains in such a situation, the more likely that he will be lost to Jewish practice and the Jewish people forever.
Daled.
1. Lit. Throw a rock at the one who is fallen. I.e., Rather than worrying about redeeming such a person, one should in effect say “Good riddance” and forget about him, regarding him only with disdain.
2. The rest of this Jew’s family is referred to as “Echav” (his brothers.) Regardless of what he has done, he remains a member of the family.
תלמוד בבלי מסכת סנהדרין דף מד עמוד א
)יהושע ז'( “חטא ישראל”. אמר רבי אבא בר זבדא: אף על פי שחטא - ישראל הוא. אמר רבי אבא: היינו דאמרי אינשי אסא דקאי ביני חילפי אסא שמיה, ואסא קרו ליה.
3. a) Obviously, his redemption cannot precede his being sold, so what is v. 48 trying to say? Immediately after his sale, his redemption must take place.
b) If the Jubilee year will release him automatically, why must efforts be made to redeem him, particularly in light of his apostasy by having sold himself to such an improper master? Because by leaving him there for any significant length of time, he will be lost to the Jewish people for good due to the unmitigated influences that will be directed towards him.
Heh.
1. If the amount is the legally proper amount that takes into account how much the non-Jew originally paid for the Jew to come into his employ with the understanding that the arrangement would last only until the Jubilee Year, then it is a matter of fairness to give the non-Jew the outstanding amount of the debt owed to him, and the benefit of not only the Jewish servant, but the entire Jewish people, that we have treated fairly someone who was within our power to abuse monetarily, i.e., avoided a Chilul HaShem.
2. If the society was one that was controlled by non-Jewish law, then why would the court take into consideration the Tora’s definition of a Jew’s servitude lasting only until the Jubilee Year? This is a specifically Jewish concept and therefore we must be talking about a judicial system that takes the Tora as its touchstone.
3. The Jew who is sold to a non-Jew is more likely to be redeemed early than the Jew sold to a Jew. Since we do not have fears that the servant of another Jew will be corrupted religiously, while redeeming him is an option, it is not a necessity. You even have the scenario of such a servant opting to become a Nirtza when his original six year term is completed, and then awaiting the Jubilee Year for his release. On the other hand, while the Jewish slave is still in servitude to his non-Jewish master, aside from the potential that he will become enmeshed in non-Jewish practices leading to his assimilation into non-Jewish culture, there are no assurances that he will be treated within the confines of Jewish law that limit what his master can ask of him in terms of work, noted at the end of v. 46. Just as a Jewish master is allowed to subject his non-Jewish slave to very difficult work, why would we think that the opposite would not be true?
4. RaShI sees the Tora as defining the relationship between a Jewish slave and his master as something other than slavery, i.e., a work relationship. So it is not just how to calculate what the redemption price might be, but also the concept of the relationship, as one between employer and employee rather than master and slave. In Halachic terms there is a Kinyan Shanim but not a Kinyan Gufo.
Monday, May 9, 2011
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
parshat emor answers
Emor 5729
- Alef.
- 1. RaShI understands that the avoidance of Chilul is essentially passive. Consequently, not only must a person avoid Chilul, but he ought to proactively pursue the possibility of sanctifying HaShem as well. “VeLo Techallelu” alone would simply mean not to do anything that would give cause for people to disparage God and Judaism. However, to look for ways whereby onlookers will be impressed positively about God and Judaism is not inherent in the phrase “Velo Techallelu”.
- 2. Perhaps RaShI wishes to clarify what is defined as pure Kiddush HaShem devoid of self-interest as opposed to an act of martyrdom that has wound up within it considerations of how the individual will be miraculously saved. Sanctifying not only God’s Name, but God Himself (“VeNikdashti” as opposed to “VeNikadesh Et Shem HaShem” which would parallel what was stated vis-à-vis Chilul) suggests a Mesirat Nefesh LiShmah.
- 3. They clearly state that regardless of whether or not they will be miraculously saved, they will continue to believe in the Jewish God and not in any alternative.
דניאל פרק ג
(יז) הן איתי אלקנא די אנחנא פלחין יכל לשיזבותנא מן אתון נורא יקדתא ומן ידך מלכא ישיזב:
(יח) והן לא ידיע להוא לך מלכא די לאלהיך לאלהך לא איתינא איתנא פלחין ולצלם דהבא די הקימת לא נסגד: ס
- If our God whom we serve is able to deliver us, He will deliver us from the burning fiery furnace, and out of thy hand, O king. But if not, be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up.
- Beit.
- 1. The two approaches to Kiddush HaShem reflected in these sources are:
- a. Living a life in such a way that it brings credit to the belief system and religious practice.
- b. Being prepared to give up one’s life rather than violate a religious practice under certain conditions.
- 2. Summary of RaMBaM’s Mishneh Tora, Hilchot Yesodei HaTora 5:1-4,11:
1. אם עכו"ם מתכוון להנאת עצמו וכופה את היהודי לעבור, עובר חוץ מעל ש"ד, ג"ע, ע"ז.
2. " " " להעבירו על מצוות וכופה, א) אם בינו לבין עצמו יעבור על שאר המצוות כמו למעלה.
3. " " כופה בשעת השמד, יהרג ואל יעבור בכל מקרה.
4. אם הדין יעבור ואל יהרג, והוא נהרג, מתחייב בנפשו.
" " יהרג ואל יעבור, והוא נהרג, קידש את השם.
" " " " " " " בפני עשרה מישראל, קידש את השם ברבים.
" " " " " " עובר, חילל את השם, אבל אינו מקבל עונש ב"ד של מטה מפני שהי' אנוס.
" הי' יכול לברוח מן המצב הרע הזה ולא ברח, דבר זה של גנאי לגביו.
- In the first instance, the coercion stems from a selfishness and self-centeredness of the coercer, and is not necessarily a reflection of his attitude towards Judaism. In the second, the intention is not for personal benefit but rather to aggravate the Jew and at the same time to demonstrate the perpetrator’s disdain for Judaism. Since this is the only way to account for the perpetrator’s actions, God and the religion are under attack, and one is called upon to demonstrate his loyalty to the latter rather than give in to the demands of the former. When Judaism is under attack not only from isolated individuals, but by the society’s leadership, then it is irrelevant what the intent of a particular coercer might be. Since disrespect is being universally shown to the religion, its practitioners are called upon to demonstrate their deep-seated beliefs at all costs, even their lives.
- 3. Just as in the case of Pikuach Nefesh, the rationale is that it is better that one Shabbat be violated in order that the potential for the observance of many more Shabbatot in the future be maintained, similarly, if there is a way to allow for future observances of the Commandments, the present violation is trumped and ought to be ignored. Someone who prefers to die at this point is viewed as demonstrating a lack of spirituality in the sense of desiring to fulfill many more Mitzvot in the future.
Monday, May 2, 2011
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