Parshat Nasso answers

Naso 5728.

Alef.

BaMidbar 5:5-10

And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto the children of Israel: When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men commit, to commit a trespass against the LORD, and that soul be guilty; then they shall confess their sin which they have done; and he shall make restitution for his guilt in full, and add unto it the fifth part thereof, and give it unto him in respect of whom he hath been guilty. But if the man have no kinsman to whom restitution may be made for the guilt, the restitution for guilt which is made shall be the LORD'S, even the priest's; besides the ram of the atonement, whereby atonement shall be made for him. And every heave-offering of all the holy things of the children of Israel, which they present unto the priest, shall be his. And every man's hallowed things shall be his: whatsoever any man giveth the priest, it shall be his. 

VaYikra 5:20-6

And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying: If any one sin, and commit a trespass against the LORD, and deal falsely with his neighbour in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbour; or have found that which was lost, and deal falsely therein, and swear to a lie; in any of all these that a man doeth, sinning therein; then it shall be, if he hath sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took by robbery, or the thing which he hath gotten by oppression, or the deposit which was deposited with him, or the lost thing which he found, or any thing about which he hath sworn falsely, he shall even restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more thereto; unto him to whom it appertaineth shall he give it, in the day of his being guilty. And he shall bring his forfeit unto the LORD, a ram without blemish out of the flock, according to thy valuation, for a guilt-offering, unto the priest. And the priest shall make atonement for him before the LORD, and he shall be forgiven, concerning whatsoever he doeth so as to be guilty thereby. 

1. The internal logic why if a person does not confess, then he is only obligated to restore what he took, but should he confess, then there is an additional fine for him to pay, i.e., a Chomesh, because in the first instance, the perpetrator is not really interested in any sort of atonement. The trial is simply to make sure that the victim receives his property back in full. The spiritual status of the thief is not our concern when it clearly is not his concern. On the other hand, when he confesses, indicating his remorse, commitment not to repeat the offense, etc., then we are not solely concerned with the restoration to the victim, but also the atonement process for the law breaker. Going the extra mile by paying a fine would be further indication of his interest in atonement.

2.  The indication that we are dealing with even the case of where the victim is a convert is the phrase, “But if the man have no kinsman to whom restitution may be made for the guilt.” The most likely scenario for such a case is where because a convert is viewed as “Tinok SheNolad” (a baby that has been just born), which in effect, cancels his previous relationships to parents, siblings and the like, it is highly likely that there will not be any heirs should he have died in the interim.

Beit.

1.  RaMBaM’s view as reflected in Hilchot Gezeila VeAveida, Chapt. 7, Halacha 8, is based upon the fact that in BaMidbar, the only time the text states that the perpetrator adds a “Fifth” is when it is also noted that he confesses: “…then they shall confess their sin which they have done; and he shall make restitution for his guilt in full, and add unto it the fifth part thereof, and give it unto him in respect of whom he hath been guilty.”

2.  Since in VaYikra the Tora states that a fifth is added even when there is no confession:

“then it shall be, if he hath sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took by robbery, or the thing which he hath gotten by oppression, or the deposit which was deposited with him, or the lost thing which he found, or any thing about which he hath sworn falsely, he shall even restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more thereto; unto him to whom it appertaineth shall he give it, in the day of his being guilty.”, it follows that the case in BaMidbar which discusses adding a fifth when there is confession can be understood to require an additional fifth to the one that would have been required even had there been no confession.

3.  Ibn Ezra is referring to RaMBaM as someone who rather than is concerned with the implications of the verses, establishes what the Halachic tradition is. Whereas Ibn Ezra feels constrained by the Peshat of the verses, leading to a “narrowness of mind”, RaMBaM accepts the various Derashot based upon hermeneutic principles and consequently ends up with a  broader perspective regarding the meaning of the Tora.

Gimel.

1.  The two views focus upon what is added by the word “VeAshem”. According to RaShI (expanded upon by Klee Yakar) the Tora is describing a person who has made an 180 turn and whereas before he had sinned, he now recognizes that what he had done was wrong and wishes to atone. RaMBaN understands “VeAshem” as the individual compounding his sin by not only stealing but then swearing falsely in order to avoid admitting that he had done something wrong.

2.  The advantage of RaShI’s approach is that it accounts for the very next phrase in the text:

              “a) to commit a trespass against the LORD, b) and that soul be guilty; c) then they shall confess their sin which they have done.” According to RaMBaN there is no word that constitutes a transition from the state of sinning to the state of repentance. However according to RaShI, the sinner has already turned with the word “VeAshem” (and he is guilty). Consequently it is highly expected that he would be confessing at the next instant.

3.  The first instance of “guilty” in v. 6 refers to the individual’s own status, i.e., how he sees himself in his own eyes. RaShI: he realizes that he is guilty; RaMBaN: he continues to act in a guilty manner by swearing falsely. In v. 7, the term “guilty” refers to the individual who has been victimized by the process, i.e.,” against whom he has acted in a guilty manner.”

4.  It would appear that VaYikra 5:5 would parallel RaShI since the verse follows the same structure in terms of the term Ye’esham is followed closely (albeit not immediately) by the act of confession. This would seem to allow for an interpretation of self-realization that a sin has been committed.

Daled.

Whereas the “Vav HaChibur” in v. 6 is dividing between the initial sin and the self-realization of having committed a transgression, the “Vav HaChibur” at the beginning of v. 7 would be a continuation of that self-realization process, i.e., confession that objectifies the inner sense of having done wrong. The second “Vav HaChibur” in v. 7 is a separate external action entailing returning the lost object. Whether or not the perpetrator regrets having committed his transgression, it will be required of him to make restitution. So that last section of the verse is set apart from the preceding section.

Heh.

The additional reason given by RaMBaM in the Guide for the Perplexed, Part III Chapt. 41 for the relative lesser punishment applied to a Gazlan than a Ganav, based upon the punishments of four times the principle for stealing a sheep and then either killing or selling it, as opposed to the punishment of five times the principle for stealing a cow and either killing or selling it, is due to the principle that the easier it is to commit the sin, the harsher the consequence. Since it is easier to catch a cow in order to steal it than to catch a sheep, the amount exacted is greater. By extension, the fact that the Ganav can more easily rationalize what he is doing in the sense of expecting to get away with it, we require him to pay double, while the Gazlan who openly takes something from someone by force is not necessarily taking the easier path, and therefore he is only liable to the principle and possibly an additional Chomesh.

Vav.

The term “VeShilem” that appears in VaYikra has the clear connotation of returning money. If the object is still intact and being returned, one could say that that is not a case of “VeShilem”, compensation, but rather simply returning the object itself. Consequently there is the possibility that Chomesh would have to be added only when money is being substituted for the object itself, but not when the object is actually restored. Consequently, in BaMidbar, when the term “VeHeishiv” (and he will cause to return) along with the payment of a Chomesh, it is reasonable to say that this is a case where the object itself is being returned and nevertheless a Chomesh is required. The logic behind the Hava Amina would maintain that it is worse when a person is given money instead of the object itself. While money is fungible, the owner will have to go through the trouble of acquiring a replacement for what was taken. Due to the additional trouble imposed upon the victim, perhaps we would require the perpetrator to pay more. Ka Mashma Lan (we learn otherwise) that whether the object itself is returned or money is given in its place, a Chomesh will still be necessary to be paid.

Zayin.

Bava Metzia 54a.

R. Yoshia: The Chomesh plus the principle results in five equal portions. Therefore the Chomesh is 25% of the principle and the sum total of them all together is 125%

R. Yonatan: The Chomesh is 1/5 or 20% of the principle. The resulting sum would be 120%.

The Sifra agrees with R. Yoshia because the text states, “…and add unto it the fifth part thereof…”, which suggests that the principle is kept whole, and if an additional part has to be added, it is the fifth after the fine has been added to the whole. In other words, if in the end I wish there to be five equal parts, I take one fourth of the principle and add it to the whole, resulting in 125%.

             

4

Parshat Nasso

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/39.html

Bamidbar Answers

BaMidbar 5731

Alef.

1.  According to RaMBaN, for the most part in Sefer BaMidbar, the Commandments are temporary rather than eternal, with the exception of details regarding sacrifices, whose topic was begun in VaYikra, and is completed in BaMidbar.

2.  According to RaMBaN, the first part of BaMidbar deals with how the Sinai experience was made portable in terms of the arrangement of the encampment, encircling the Mishkan and the various rules governing who can enter the holy precincts and in what state. The second part deals with certain temporary  Mitzvot as well as the completion of the listing of the components of the various sacrifices begun in VaYikra.

3.  Both RaMBaN and Beno Jakob present the idea of the Mishkan constituting a man-made, portable Mt. Sinai. As long as the people were encamped at the foot of Sinai, even the communications between HaShem and Moshe in the Ohel Moed was a continuation of the Sinai Revelation. One might have thought that once the encampment began to travel through the desert, away from Sinai, that the Revelatory experience was over. Consequently the two commentators emphasize that while the experience was changed, it nevertheless continued in terms of the structure of the encampment.

4.  In contrast to RaMBaN, Abrabanel in his introduction to BaMidbar emphasizes the events and troubles that dogs the path of the Jews as they travel through the desert, as well as the many Mitzvot, ones that are hardly temporary, that appear in the book. While some of these Commandments are in fact further clarifications of Sacrifices—Para Aduma, Minchat HaOla and Nesacheha, the Temidim, the Mosfei HaMoadot, and even to a certain extent Matanot Kehuna u’Levi—nevertheless, Abrabanel at least gives the impression that they should be viewed in their own rights, as opposed to constituting the completion of topics from VaYikra.

5.  Abarbanel emphasizes BaMidbar’s description of the behavior of Moshe and the people as they travelled through the desert. RaMBaN’s main emphasis is the shift from the geographical Sinai to the figurative one via the Mishkan and the encampment.

Beit.

1.

במדבר פרק א

(נב) וְחָנוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אִישׁ עַל מַחֲנֵהוּ וְאִישׁ עַל דִּגְלוֹ לְצִבְאֹתָם:

(נג) וְהַלְוִיִּם יַחֲנוּ סָבִיב לְמִשְׁכַּן הָעֵדֻת וְלֹא יִהְיֶה קֶצֶף עַל עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְשָׁמְרוּ הַלְוִיִּם אֶת מִשְׁמֶרֶת מִשְׁכַּן הָעֵדוּת:

(נד) וַיַּעֲשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְקֹוָק אֶת מֹשֶׁה כֵּן עָשׂוּ: פ

במדבר פרק ב

(א) וַיְדַבֵּר יְקֹוָק אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר:

(ב) אִישׁ עַל דִּגְלוֹ בְאֹתֹת לְבֵית אֲבֹתָם יַחֲנוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִנֶּגֶד סָבִיב לְאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד יַחֲנוּ:

(ג) וְהַחֹנִים קֵדְמָה מִזְרָחָה דֶּגֶל מַחֲנֵה יְהוּדָה לְצִבְאֹתָם וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי יְהוּדָה נַחְשׁוֹן בֶּן עַמִּינָדָב:

(ד) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם אַרְבָּעָה וְשִׁבְעִים אֶלֶף וְשֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת:

(ה) וְהַחֹנִים עָלָיו מַטֵּה יִשָּׂשכָר וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי יִשָּׂשכָר נְתַנְאֵל בֶּן צוּעָר:

(ו) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדָיו אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת:

(ז) מַטֵּה זְבוּלֻן וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי זְבוּלֻן אֱלִיאָב בֶּן חֵלֹן:

(ח) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדָיו שִׁבְעָה וַחֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת:

(ט) כָּל הַפְּקֻדִים לְמַחֲנֵה יְהוּדָה מְאַת אֶלֶף וּשְׁמֹנִים אֶלֶף וְשֵׁשֶׁת אֲלָפִים וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת לְצִבְאֹתָם רִאשֹׁנָה יִסָּעוּ: ס

(י) דֶּגֶל מַחֲנֵה רְאוּבֵן תֵּימָנָה לְצִבְאֹתָם וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי רְאוּבֵן אֱלִיצוּר בֶּן שְׁדֵיאוּר:

(יא) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדָיו שִׁשָּׁה וְאַרְבָּעִים אֶלֶף וַחֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת:

(יב) וְהַחוֹנִם עָלָיו מַטֵּה שִׁמְעוֹן וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁלֻמִיאֵל בֶּן צוּרִישַׁדָּי:

(יג) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם תִּשְׁעָה וַחֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת:

(יד) וּמַטֵּה גָּד וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי גָד אֶלְיָסָף בֶּן רְעוּאֵל:

(טו) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם חֲמִשָּׁה וְאַרְבָּעִים אֶלֶף וְשֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת וַחֲמִשִּׁים:

(טז) כָּל הַפְּקֻדִים לְמַחֲנֵה רְאוּבֵן מְאַת אֶלֶף וְאֶחָד וַחֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת וַחֲמִשִּׁים לְצִבְאֹתָם וּשְׁנִיִּם יִסָּעוּ: ס

(יז) וְנָסַע אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד מַחֲנֵה הַלְוִיִּם בְּתוֹךְ הַמַּחֲנֹת כַּאֲשֶׁר יַחֲנוּ כֵּן יִסָּעוּ אִישׁ עַל יָדוֹ לְדִגְלֵיהֶם: ס

(יח) דֶּגֶל מַחֲנֵה אֶפְרַיִם לְצִבְאֹתָם יָמָּה וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי אֶפְרַיִם אֱלִישָׁמָע בֶּן עַמִּיהוּד:

(יט) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם אַרְבָּעִים אֶלֶף וַחֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת:

(כ) וְעָלָיו מַטֵּה מְנַשֶּׁה וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי מְנַשֶּׁה גַּמְלִיאֵל בֶּן פְּדָהצוּר:

(כא) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם שְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשִׁים אֶלֶף וּמָאתָיִם:

(כב) וּמַטֵּה בִּנְיָמִן וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי בִנְיָמִן אֲבִידָן בֶּן גִּדְעֹנִי:

(כג) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם חֲמִשָּׁה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים אֶלֶף וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת:

(כד) כָּל הַפְּקֻדִים לְמַחֲנֵה אֶפְרַיִם מְאַת אֶלֶף וּשְׁמֹנַת אֲלָפִים וּמֵאָה לְצִבְאֹתָם וּשְׁלִשִׁים יִסָּעוּ: ס

(כה) דֶּגֶל מַחֲנֵה דָן צָפֹנָה לְצִבְאֹתָם וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי דָן אֲחִיעֶזֶר בֶּן עַמִּישַׁדָּי:

(כו) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם שְׁנַיִם וְשִׁשִּׁים אֶלֶף וּשְׁבַע מֵאוֹת:

(כז) וְהַחֹנִים עָלָיו מַטֵּה אָשֵׁר וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי אָשֵׁר פַּגְעִיאֵל בֶּן עָכְרָן:

(כח) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם אֶחָד וְאַרְבָּעִים אֶלֶף וַחֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת:

(כט) וּמַטֵּה נַפְתָּלִי וְנָשִׂיא לִבְנֵי נַפְתָּלִי אֲחִירַע בֶּן עֵינָן:

(ל) וּצְבָאוֹ וּפְקֻדֵיהֶם שְׁלֹשָׁה וַחֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת:

(לא) כָּל הַפְּקֻדִים לְמַחֲנֵה דָן מְאַת אֶלֶף וְשִׁבְעָה וַחֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף וְשֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת לָאַחֲרֹנָה יִסְעוּ לְדִגְלֵיהֶם: פ

(לב) אֵלֶּה פְּקוּדֵי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְבֵית אֲבֹתָם כָּל פְּקוּדֵי הַמַּחֲנֹת לְצִבְאֹתָם שֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת אֶלֶף וּשְׁלֹשֶׁת אֲלָפִים וַחֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת וַחֲמִשִּׁים:

(לג) וְהַלְוִיִּם לֹא הָתְפָּקְדוּ בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְקֹוָק אֶת מֹשֶׁה:

(לד) וַיַּעֲשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְקֹוָק אֶת מֹשֶׁה כֵּן חָנוּ לְדִגְלֵיהֶם וְכֵן נָסָעוּ אִישׁ לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָיו עַל בֵּית אֲבֹתָיו: פ

a) 1:52 And the children of Israel shall pitch their tents, every man with his own camp, and every man with his own standard, according to their hosts. It would appear that the second phrase is a restatement of the first—each person had his own special place. Furthermore, it would not make sense to assume that each member of each tribe had a personal flag, as would be implied by this verse if the word “degel” were to be defined as “flag”.

b) 2:2 The children of Israel shall pitch by their fathers' houses; every man with his own standard, according to the ensigns; a good way off shall they pitch round about the tent of meeting.  As ShaDaL states, the term “Otot” is to be understood as “ensigns”, in contrast to “standard” which must mean something else.

c) 2:10 On the south side shall be the standard of the camp of Reuben according to their hosts; the prince of the children of Reuben being Elizur the son of Shedeur, If “standard” means flag, what is the verse adding to our knowledge. But if “standard” means orderly arrangement, then we know that this is where the arrangement of the tribe of Reuven was located. The same is true for 2:18 and 25.

d)  2:17 Then the tent of meeting, with the camp of the Levites, shall set forward in the midst of the camps; as they encamp, so shall they set forward, every man in his place, by their standards. Once again, only if “standards” connotes the arrangement of the Levi’im, is there anything added by the end of this verse. The same is true for 2:31.

e) 2:34 Thus did the children of Israel: according to all that the LORD commanded Moses, so they pitched by their standards, and so they set forward, each one according to its families, and according to its fathers' houses. The implication of the verse is that the standards determined where they encamped, when in fact it was the opposite, i.e., once they encamped they would erect their flags. Consequently it makes more sense to say that “standard” means orderly arrangement.

2.  The difference between “Degel” and “Machaneh”, is that whereas the latter refers to all of the elements that are contained within the grouping of a particular tribe, the former refers to the specific way in which those elements are arranged.

3.  He hath brought me to the banqueting-house, and his banner over me is love.

שיר השירים פרק ב

(ד) הֱבִיאַנִי אֶל בֵּית הַיָּיִן וְדִגְלוֹ עָלַי אַהֲבָה:

In this case we are dealing with a single individual rather than a group that needs to be arranged in a particular manner. Consequently the word is understood to literally mean “flag”.

Gimel.

1.  According to the Midrash, the Jewish people themselves are banners proclaiming God as the Creator and Ruler over the earth. According to ShaDaL, in order that the people appear not as slaves fleeing their imprisonment, but rather as a formidable fighting force, they must march in orderly arrangements.

2.  Devarim 32:10 He Found him in a desert land, and in the waste, a howling wilderness; He Compassed him about, He Cared for him, He Kept him as the apple of His Eye.

              Just as the eye is very protected by the eye lid, the eye lashes, the reflex of closing and/or turning away the eye when threatened, so too HaShem wished to protect the Jewish people.

3.  According to Beno Jakob, just as the Mishkan was intended to allow HaShem’s Presence to be among the Jewish people, so too according to the Midrash, HaShem Wishes via the flags to demonstrate that this people is His.

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