Kedoshim Answers



Acharai-Kedoshim 5720

Alef.

1.       The  problem that everyone deals with is how is it possible for a person to treat another person in the exact way that he feels like treating himself.  We are “hard-wired” to give ourselves preferential treatment.

Wiesel mentions two additional difficulties: a) How can the Tora Command that someone experiences a particular emotion? We might be in control of our actions, but not our emotions. b) If the expectation is that we should literally love a person just as ourselves, then we should also share in another’s personal problems. This in turn would make our lives extremely miserable since there are always people suffering somewhere, and we would never be free of these concerns.

2.       RaMBaN—One is expected to wish that good things happen to the next person, but not to the same extent as they should happen to oneself.

Sephorno—The verse is demanding empathy, i.e., even if you are different from the next person, you should place yourself in his place and imagine what someone in such a situation would require to make himself happy and fulfilled.

Wiesel—The verse  is demanding that you understand that the next person shares an extraordinary quality with you, i.e., Tzelem Elokim. Such a realization will lead you to treat him in a special manner.

R. Moshe ben Menachem—As long as there isn’t an intrinsic moral clash or disconnect between one person and the next in terms of treating him well, then the next person is deserving of equal treatment with oneself. (One example of such a clash is when there is only enough water for one of two people—the case of R. Akiva and Ben Petora in Bava Batra.) Furthermore, a person can control the emotions that he feels towards another and should do so in this case.

Buber—The next person is like you in terms of being in need of love. You should recognize this based upon your own needs and address his.

3.   Wiesel argues that if the intention of the biblical text was to actually convey the idea that one must love the next person as he literally loves himself, a specific idiom should have been employed, i.e., אהבת נפש which literally translates into “the love of one’s soul.” The fact that such an idiom was not employed suggests that the love that the Tora wishes to be extended falls short of the literal love of oneself.

        Furthermore, from the Ta’amim, since LeRe’acha is essentially separated from the word following it, “Kamocha”, this is another indication that the intent of the Tora is not for a person to literally love the next person as much as he loves himself.

יח ... וְאָֽהַבְתָּ֥ לְרֵֽעֲךָ֖ כָּמ֑וֹךָ אֲנִ֖י ה'׃

4.   R. Moshe Ben-Menachem, who claims that a person can control his emotions and thereby comply with the Mitzvot of the Tora, cites Ibn Ezra on Shemot 20:14, where he says that someone who is intelligent will realize what is impossible for him to acquire or achieve and therefore will not engage in envy to resent those who have such things. He is resigned to whatever HaShem has Decided is his lot.

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6.  VaYikra 19:34 “The stranger that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as the home-born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.”

     The rationale why you should have compassion for the sojourning stranger is because once you were in the same “boat”, so too, if you know how much in need of love from another you are, you should appreciate what is expected of you by another.

Beit.

1.  RaShBaM: VaYikra 19:18 applies only to virtuous people but not to evildoers.

NeTzIV: The directive applies even to another human being who might have done you harm, in light of the beginning of the verse, “Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.”

RaMBaN: Another individual who could potentially be viewed as a competitor.

Sephorno: A person who in fact is different from you, but whom you empathize with and imagine yourself in his place.

Wiesel: Another human being who is created in God’s Image.

R. Moshe ben-Menachem: Another whom you may not love to the same degree as you love yourself, but you love him nevertheless with a love that is reserved for humans.

Buber: Another person who needs love just as you do.

2. 

שמות פרק יא

(ב) דַּבֶּר נָא בְּאָזְנֵי הָעָם וְיִשְׁאֲלוּ אִישׁ מֵאֵת רֵעֵהוּ וְאִשָּׁה מֵאֵת רְעוּתָהּ כְּלֵי כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי זָהָב:

Shemot 11:2

     “Speak now in the ears of the people, and let them ask every man of his neighbour, and every woman of her neighbour, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold.”

RaMBaN, Sephorno, R. Moshe ben-Menachem, Buber, and NeTzIV all could include this verse within their defintions of “Re’ah.” RaShBaM, however, who defines “Re’ah” as a function of the individual’s moral standing, in light of the treatment meted out by the Egyptians to the Jews, would not be able to refer to the Egyptians as “Re’ah”.

שמות פרק כ

(יג) לֹא תִּרְצָח ס לֹא תִּנְאָף ס לֹא תִּגְנֹב ס לֹא תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁקֶר: ס

(יד) לֹא תַחְמֹד בֵּית רֵעֶךָ ס לֹא תַחְמֹד אֵשֶׁת רֵעֶךָ וְעַבְדּוֹ וַאֲמָתוֹ וְשׁוֹרוֹ וַחֲמֹרוֹ וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר לְרֵעֶךָ: פ

Ibid. 20:13-4

“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour's. And all the people perceived the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the voice of the horn, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it, they trembled, and stood afar off. “

In this second example, RaMBaN, Sephorno, Buber, RaShBaM and NeTzIV all could include this verse within their defintions of “Re’ah.” Particularly R. Menachem ben-Meir who assumes that one can intellectually control one’s emotions, he would be able to take these verses quite literally.

3.  If one was to insist that the rule of loving one’s neighbor only applied to other Jews, as might be implied by the parallel phrase in the first portion of the verse, this obviously transforms the rule from a universal one to a very particularistic one. Most of the commentators that have been cited in this Gilayon do not assume such an approach, although one could possibly make the case that NeTzIV’s understanding is based upon such an assumption (one part of the body punishing the other part—is the body comprised of all of mankind or only the Jewish people? Certainly Areivut [Kol Yisrael Areivim Zeh LaZeh] is assumed to apply only to the Jewish people, as in Tosafot Kiddushin 70b d.h. Kashim Geirim.)

ויקרא פרק יט

(יח) לֹא תִקֹּם וְלֹא תִטֹּר אֶת בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְקֹוָק:

 

While this may be the case in this particular verse, in light of other verses in which the term “Reiacha” appears and there is no indication that it is limited to Jews, this would suggest that the insistence upon the limitation of the parallelism in 19:18 is not compelling. Particularly according to R. Menachm ben-Meir’s formulation of the universality of Tzelem Elokim as being the basis for loving your neighbor as yourself, it would appear that this applies to all people.

4.  It seems to me that NeTzIV is paving new territory, because he is claiming that the next person is actually an extension of you. Consequently the reason why others had difficulities, i.e,. how can you love someone else the way you love yourself, becomes moot since the next person is yourself! While NeTzIV concedes that your life does take precedence, in all other matters, the next person should be viewed as an extension of yourself.

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