Ki Tetze Answers

Ki Tetze 5728

Alef.

1. If the loss that the returner would incur in terms of lost wages outweighs the value of the lost object that is being returned, this is an additional reason why the returner does not have to engage in returning the object.

2. The Mitzva of Te’ina (helping someone load up their animal)[1] is expressed in similar language where the לא at the beginning of the verse could be thought to apply to the second verb mentioned later:

דברים פרק כב

(ד) לֹא תִרְאֶה אֶת חֲמוֹר אָחִיךָ אוֹ שׁוֹרוֹ נֹפְלִים בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ מֵהֶם הָקֵם תָּקִים עִמּוֹ:

 

“Thou shalt not see thy brother's ass or his ox fallen down by the way, and hide thyself from them; thou shalt surely help him to lift them up again.”

3. It seems to me that the fact that the word “והתעלמת” is eight words away from the other verb that the term “לא” is limiting, that RaShI felt impelled that there has to be another explanation aside from applying the “לא” equally to both verbs.

דברים פרק כב

(א) לֹא תִרְאֶה אֶת שׁוֹר אָחִיךָ אוֹ אֶת שֵׂיוֹ נִדָּחִים וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ מֵהֶם הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֵם לְאָחִיךָ:

Beit.

1. RaShI is expected to interpret the Peshat. However, he seems to get away from the Peshat with regard to the phrase “עד דרוש אחיך אותו”. The simple meaning would appear to be “until your brother, the individual who lost the object, comes looking for it,” i.e., the lost object. RaShi interprets the phrase as reflecting the finder of the object having to get references for the one seeking it in order to determine his legitimate right to the object in question.

2.  According to Mizrachi, RaShI interpreted as he did because of the superfluity of “אותו”. Without the addition of that word, the phrase in question would have been in order to indicate that the object is not returned until it is sought after. But with the addition of “אותו” at the end of the verse, and the identity between “אותו” and “אחיך”, Mizrachi thinks that RaShI concluded that the finder has to determine whether in fact the person asking for the object is really “his brother”, the original loser of the object rather than some impersonator who is simply trying to illegally enrich himself.

3.  The resemblance between Shemot 2:6 and Devarim 22:2—

שמות פרק ב

(ו) וַתִּפְתַּח וַתִּרְאֵהוּ אֶת הַיֶּלֶד וְהִנֵּה נַעַר בֹּכֶה וַתַּחְמֹל עָלָיו וַתֹּאמֶר מִיַּלְדֵי הָעִבְרִים זֶה:

דברים פרק כב

(ב) וְאִם לֹא קָרוֹב אָחִיךָ אֵלֶיךָ וְלֹא יְדַעְתּוֹ וַאֲסַפְתּוֹ אֶל תּוֹךְ בֵּיתֶךָ וְהָיָה עִמְּךָ עַד דְּרֹשׁ אָחִיךָ אֹתוֹ וַהֲשֵׁבֹתוֹ לוֹ:

              is constituted in the fact that in both cases there is a combination between a noun and a pronoun, with one modifying the other.

4. Gur Aryeh argues that the difference in sequence between the two verses precludes making a true identity between them in terms of this structure. When a pronoun is followed by a noun, as in the case of Shemot, then I can say that the noun clarifies the pronoun. But when the noun procedes the pronoun, it is unclear what is being clarified beyond what has already been made clear by the noun.

5.  Divrei David did not understand how RaShI could write “דרשהו” when the text did not state this. Consequently Gur Aryeh explains that RaShI was not suggesting that the word “דרש” was to be interpreted this way, but rather the meaning of “אותו” was as if the Tora had written “דרשהו”, i.e., find out if in fact the person who purports to be seeking the return of his own lost object, is in fact such a person, rather than an impersonator of the loser of the object.

6.  Ba’al HaTurim interprets as follows:

עד דרוש אחיך אותו. פי' שידרוש האות שלו שיתן לו סימן בו. וזהו שאמרו רז"ל (בבא מציעא כז, ב) דורשהו אם הוא רמאי אם לאו, מאי לאו בסימנים:

Therefore RaShI could be saying that as a result of “אותו” which is a reference to the lost object rather than the claimant, and the sense is whether the object that is being claimed really fits the profile of the object that was found. Consequently, the one seeking to obtain it, is he really talking about “it” and you will know if he is for real or not by the accuracy of the Simanim that he describes regarding the object.

Gimel.

Regarding the phrase “והשבתו לו”, since the previous word is “אותו”, it would appear that the pronoun at the end of “והשבתו” is superfluous. Consequently RaShI learns that the finder does not have an obligation to support maintaining the object in his home if the object requires investment to the point where the object’s owner will have to compensate the finder for the expenditures that he incurred maintaining it. If it is something that is costly to maintain, then the finder is to sell it and return the value that was realized. Otherwise, the owner of the object will be required to give something back to the finder, which impugns the sense of the phrase, “and he will return it to him”, i.e., intact, alone, without any other responsibilities or obligations.

Daled.

1.  Siftei Chachamim interprets the second time that RaShI seemingly states the same thing:

(ד) הוצרך לפרש זה אע"ג שכבר פירש זה לעיל (פסוק א) מפני שחזר לפרשו על פי מה שאמרו רבותינו ז"ל פעמים שאתה מתעלם שנראה כאילו הוא מסופק בפירושו לכך אמר כאן שאי אפשר לפרש לא תוכל להתעלם אלא שלא וכו'. (קיצור מזרחי):

In other words, had the initial instance in 22:1 been interpreted according to the simple meaning, i.e., that you should not pretend not to see the lost object, then there would not have been a need to interpret the second phrase “לא תוכל להתעלם”. But once the first instance was interpreted according to the Rabbis, i.e., that sometimes there are contexts in which a person is exempt from dealing with a lost object that he happens to see—a Kohen who sees something in a cemetery, a scholar who sees something that would be undignified for him to deal with, a person who would lose an inordinate amount of income were he to stop what he was doing and return the object—I become unsure whether or not the second instance is to be taken literally or not. Consequently this has to be pointed out, i.e., that whereas in the first instance there is room for the Rabbis to interpret that sometimes one would be exempt from the responsibility, when the verb is presented in a negative form, i.e., “you are unable to hide”, there is no way out and the connotation is that in the overwhelming majority of cases one must become involved in the return of the lost object.

2.  The Tora’s usage of the term “תוכל” in the second instance implies greater effort than the first time when all that is stated is “והתעלמת”. In the first case, the effort on the part of the finder can be extremely minor, i.e., closing one’s eyes or averting one’s gaze. But in the second case, “you are unable to hide yourself”, the implication is even were a person to do more in order to not be held accountable for ignoring the object, i.e., he takes a different route, he literally covers the object so that he could not see it even if he wished to, it would do no good. His responsibility would remain intact.

Heh.

1.  The two references to the usage of "תוכל" elsewhere:

(דברים יז:טו) שׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְדֹוָד אֱלֹקיךָ בּוֹ מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ לֹא תוּכַל לָתֵת עָלֶיךָ אִישׁ נָכְרִי אֲשֶׁר לֹא אָחִיךָ הוּא:

אבן עזרא-- לא תוכל - מדרך האמת לא אחיך שאיננו ממשפחת ישראל, ולא אדומי אע"פ שכתוב בו "אחיך"...

(שם כא:טז) וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו אֵת אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה לוֹ לֹא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר אֶת בֶּן הָאֲהוּבָה עַל פְּנֵי בֶן הַשְּׂנוּאָה הַבְּכֹר:

אב"ע--וטעם לא יוכל. כחבריו:

According to Ibn Ezra, the term “תוכל” connotes you have no permission to do these three things, i.e., appoint a king who is not literally from the Jewish people, declaring the child of the beloved wife the first born even though in fact that first born is the child of the less-loved wife, and pretending to not see the lost object so that you will not be responsible to return it.

According to Mincha Belula, at least in the instance of the lost object, it becomes a matter of “fooling the people but not fooling God”, i.e. ,even if you could try to make it look as if you did not see the lost object, in fact God will Know whether you did or not and hold you accordingly accountable. (It is reminiscent of two Mishnayot in Avot:

משנה מסכת אבות פרק ב משנה א

רבי אומר...והסתכל בשלשה דברים ואי אתה בא לידי עבירה דע מה למעלה ממך עין רואה ואוזן שומעת וכל מעשיך בספר נכתבין:

משנה מסכת אבות פרק ג משנה טז

הוא (ר"ע) היה אומר הכל נתון בערבון ומצודה פרוסה על כל החיים החנות פתוחה והחנוני מקיף והפנקס פתוח והיד כותבת וכל הרוצה ללות יבא וילוה והגבאים מחזירים תדיר בכל יום ונפרעין מן האדם מדעתו ושלא מדעתו ויש להם על מה שיסמוכו והדין דין אמת והכל מתוקן לסעודה:)

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[1] The Mitzva of Perika (helping to unload another’s animal; Shemot 23:5), is cast in the positive and therefore is not a good illustration for what the Be’er Yitzchak points out, although ChaZaL’s interpretations of the verse allowing for certain exceptions parallel their interpretation for the verse in Devarim.

שמות פרק כג

(ה) כִּי תִרְאֶה חֲמוֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ רֹבֵץ תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ וְחָדַלְתָּ (במקום "לא תחדל") מֵעֲזֹב לוֹ עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב עִמּוֹ: ס

If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden, thou shall (it should have said “thou shalt not forbear to pass by him) forbear to pass by him; thou shalt surely release it with him.

Ki Tetze

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/53.html

Shoftim answers

Shoftim 5722
Devarim 16:19
Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.

Alef.

1. Whereas the common approach to this verse is to assume that the judges are being addressed, as RaShI comments:

רש"י דברים פרק טז פסוק יט

(יט) לא תטה משפט - כמשמעו:

ולא תכיר פנים - אף בשעת הטענות. אזהרה לדיין שלא יהא רך לזה וקשה לזה, אחד עומד ואחד יושב. לפי שכשרואה שהדיין מכבד את חבירו מסתתמין טענותיו:

ולא תקח שחד - אפילו לשפוט צדק:

כי השחד יעור - משקבל שחד ממנו אי אפשר שלא יטה את לבו אצלו להפוך בזכותו:

דברי צדיקים - דברים המצודקים, משפטי אמת:

R. Yoseph Bechor Shor interprets that not only the judges, but the general Jewish community is also being addressed in the verse. Not only must the judges fairly reach their decision, but the community has then to carry out the judicial decision.

2.  When you look at the context in which this verse appears, you see that it is not the judges who are being addressed in v. 18 and 20, the “bookends” of v. 19, but rather the community.

דברים פרק טז

(יח) שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים תִּתֶּן לְךָ בְּכָל שְׁעָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם מִשְׁפַּט צֶדֶק:

The people have to appoint judges wherever they live in the land of Israel.

(יט) לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט לֹא תַכִּיר פָּנִים וְלֹא תִקַּח שֹׁחַד כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם:

(כ) צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף לְמַעַן תִּחְיֶה וְיָרַשְׁתָּ אֶת הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ: ס

The people have to pursue justice and seek out the best Beit Din, as well as apply the findings of that Beit Din.

Beit.

1.  The only difference between the Mechilta and the Gemora that is apparent to me is whereas the Midrash Halacha presents the second portion of the verse as a fact, i.e., by taking Shochad, your judgment is impaired, the Gemora explains how this take place. Since taking the bribe defines the judge as an extension of the litigant who has given him a gift, it no longer is a matter of judging someone else, but rather judging oneself. And since a person does not naturally assign blame to himself, it will be virtually impossible for the judge to be objective in his decision-making.

2.  Usually, the Tora does not give a rationale for why a Mitzva, particularly a negative Commandment, should be observed. Furthermore, it would seem that the impropriety of accepting a gift from a litigant should be obvious. The fact that the Tora made a point both in Shemot and in Devarim to justify not taking a bribe, i.e., that it becomes impossible for the judge to retain his objectivity, demonstrates how far one might go in rationalizing why he will continue to judge fairly even after accepting a gift from a litigant.

Gimel.

Since the verse states, “וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם”, it suggests that the person judging sees himself as a righteous individual despite having received a gift. This would only be the case if he believed that he was capable of judging righteously regardless of the gift that he accepted.

Daled.

דברים טז:יט לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט לֹא תַכִּיר פָּנִים וְלֹא תִקַּח שֹׁחַד כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם:

שמות כג:ח וְשֹׁחַד לֹא תִקָּח כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר פִּקְחִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִים:

1.  It seems to me that the difference in RaShI’s interpretation revolves around the two words “חכמים” and “פקחים”. Whereas a חכם is intellectually sharp, a פקח is analytically sharp. While the former can end up drawing wrong conclusions from the material that he has at his fingertips, in order for the latter to stumble, he literally has to forget what he knows, and to this end a bribe literally “blinds” him to what he has known well in the past.

2.  RaShI’s comment on Devarim suggests that the recipient of the bribe will engage in justification and rationalization to find a means by which the person from whom he has received a gift will emerge from the trial victorious. His comment on Shemot implies that he will be unable to think straight at all and his intellectual abilities will forsake him.

Heh.

1.  Mechilta: the laws given at Sinai

      RaShI: the ability of the judge to judge righteously going forward.

2.  The verse in Yeshayahu illustrates that sometimes what appears to be a Semichut structure is actually an adjective modifying a noun:

ישעיהו פרק יז (י) כִּי שָׁכַחַתְּ אֱלֹקי יִשְׁעֵךְ וְצוּר מָעֻזֵּךְ לֹא זָכָרְתְּ, עַל כֵּן תִּטְּעִי נִטְעֵי נַעֲמָנִים וּזְמֹרַת זָר תִּזְרָעֶנּוּ:

    For thou hast forgotten the God of thy salvation, and thou hast not been mindful of the Rock of thy stronghold; therefore thou didst plant plants of pleasantness (or pleasant plants?) , and didst set it with slips of a stranger (or strange slips?).

3.  If the text refers to the words as “דברי צדיקים” , then by definition they cannot be מעוותים, or twisted. “Twisted words” implies that from the second they are uttered, they are improper. “סילוף דברי צדיקים” suggests that the righteous words exist but for some reason are not subsequently articulated or accessed.

4.  Gur Aryeh on Devarim 16:19

ויש לומר, כי צריכי תרווייהו; "כי יעור עיני חכמים" על שאינו רואה זכות שכנגדו. כגון ראובן תבע את שמעון, וקבל שוחד משמעון, ויש לפניו סברא לזכות את שמעון, אף על גב דסברא אמיתית היא, מכל מקום יש סברא גם כן - שהיא דוחה אותה סברא - דמצי ראובן לטעון, וכאשר מקבל שוחד - "יעור עיני חכמים", דאינו רואה זכות של ראובן כלל. ובזה שייך "השוחד יעור עיני חכמים", שהרי לא ידע שום דבר מאותו סברא, והיה נעלם ממנו:

משל זה, ראובן תבע שמעון 'מנה אתה חייב לי שהודית לי', והדיין מקבל שוחד מן ראובן, הוא פוסק חייב לשלם, שהרי הודה. ומה ששמעון מצי טעין 'שלא להשביע עצמי הודיתי' נעלם, זהו "השוחד יעור עיני פקחים", שהרי נעלם ממנו זכותו. ואם שמעון השיב בעצמו 'שלא להשביע עצמי הודיתי', והדיין קבל שוחד, הרי אומר שאין טענת להשביע היא טענה, זה הוא "מסלף דברי צדיקים", שהרי ידע זכותו, רק שצדד סברא משובשת לדעתו, שאומר שאין זה טענה. וזהו "ויסלף דברים המוצדקים", דיש לפניו זכות ראובן, ובשביל שקבל שוחד מסלף הדברים:

“"כי יעור עיני חכמים—the judge does not see the argument that would vindicate the one from whom he has not received the gift.

"מסלף דברי צדיקים"—even if the judge sees the argument, he does not think that it is valid.

Vav.

1.  R. Avraham ben HaRaMBaM:

         “הצדיק”—the innocent person who has not given a bribe to the judge.

         “הסילוף”—thinking that the innocent person’s claims are false.

Ibn Ezra:

   “הצדיק”—the judge

“הסילוף”—the finding on the part of the judge what the giver of the bribe desires the outcome to be.

2.  Neither R. Avraham ben HaRaMBaM or Ibn Ezra agree with RaShI.

   RaShI:

   “הצדיק”—HaShem, Whose Words are contained in the Tora.

   “הסילוף”—a misrepresentation of the Tora law.

3.  In the הוה אמינא of Gur Aryeh, he presents a view that parallels that of Ibn Ezra.

4.  The verse states: “כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם:”. One might wonder, if this individual has accepted a bribe, how can the judge then be still called a “צדיק”? Ibn Ezra explains that as a צדיק, he deeply desires to say the right thing. However, the bribe is preventing him from doing so. Instead of transforming him into a רשע who can’t say the right thing even if he wanted to, he is a crippled צדיק, forced by the bribe to say the wrong thing.

5.  Onkelos is like RaShI (see ה).

   Yonatan ben Uziel is like Mechilta (see ה).

6.  The end of the verse contains synonymous phrases: RaShI (a) will not search for reasons to exonerate the litigant who did not give bribe; (b) will not say the right thing in decision.

   The end of the verse contains complementary phrases: Gur Aryeh (a) will not recognize the reasons to exonerate the litigant who failed to give bribe; (b) any reason to exonerate the litigant who did not give the bribe will be discounted.

Shoftim Qs

http://www.nechama.org.il/pages/433.html

Re'eh answers



Re’eh 5728

Alef.

Hoshea 2:1

“Yet the number of the children of Israel shall be as the sand of the sea, which cannot be measured nor numbered; and it shall come to pass that, instead of that which was said unto them: 'Ye are not My people', it shall be said unto them: 'Ye are the children of the living God.'”

R. Meir’s view is: the fact that there is a “Hava Amina” (the possibility) to say about the Jewish people that they are not the children of God suggests that they have not complied with God’s Will. Nevertheless the verse says that they will still be referred to as the children of God, despite what they might be doing to disprove that relationship. R. Yehuda had previously stated that if they do not act like God’s children, then they shouldn’t be considered as such.

Beit.

1.  The question is the Tora appears to give two separate reasons for why a Jew should not tear his flesh as an indication of mourning: a) you are children of HaShem; b) you are a holy nation.

              Ibn Ezra: Verse 2 in which is mentioned that the Jews are holy is not an additional reason for the contents of verse 1 where the prohibition against cutting one’s flesh during mourning is discussed, but rather an introduction to what follows:

                            Devarim 14:3

                            “Thou shalt not eat any abominable thing.”

              Why must you follow the laws of Kashrut? Because you are holy.

              RaMBaN: While the reason for not cutting one’s flesh as a sign of mourning is due to being children of HaShem, the fact that you are a holy nation assumes that the soul lives on after the death of the body  and therefore the loss of a person is not so devastating that it would require extreme mourning.

              Ohr HaChayim: The concept that the death of a person is not such a major loss is because it’s as if a child is summoned home by his father (children of HaShem), suggesting like RaMBaN, that the Jewish people are holy to the extent that their souls will return to their original source.

2.  According to RaMBaN, the soul is eternal but we do not know where it will ultimately reside. Being the children of God is the reason not to cut one’s skin, but it does not shed light on where the soul ends up.

According to Ohr HaChayim, because we are the children of God, that means that the soul will return to its Father, i.e., HaShem.

3.  The context of the verse in II Shmuel is the banishment of Avshalom, David’s son for arranging the killing of Amnon. RaMBaN is utilizing the verse as if it is discussing the eternity of the soul that is not “banished” but is reunited with its origin, HaShem.

4.  Whereas the other commentators take the idea that the Jews are the children of God as a simple given, independent of anything that they might do, R. Hoffmann says that the status of being children of God compels the Jews to act in certain ways vis-à-vis their mourning practices and what they eat.

5.  Instead of assuming that idolatrous beliefs assume that only through pain will the gods answer requests sent their way, the actions of these priests could be interpreted as reflecting their irrational passion during the course of their religious rituals. Instead of deliberately inflicting pain upon themselves, perhaps they just were completely not thinking of themselves at all and were trying to arouse themselves to greater and greater devotion.

Gimel.

R. Yosef Bechor Shor, instead of focusing upon the afterlife and the eternity of the soul, suggests that a tactic that could mitigate excessive sadness at the loss of a loved one, particularly a parent, is by recognizing that one will always have one Parent in Heaven. This is reminiscent of the statement in Kiddushin to the effect that a person has three entities responsible for bringing him into existence—one’s father, one’s mother and HaShem. In this commentator’s approach, HaShem’s Parenthood is not just figurative but even literal in the sense that a person is never truly an orphan.

Daled.

1.  RaShI states that they did not engage in these idolatrous mourning practices because the Tora prohibits them to Jews.

              RaDaK interprets that perhaps the Jews were prepared to do these things just as the emulated non-Jews in other areas that they shouldn’t have, but the text says that they wouldn’t not have time to do so.

2.  E.g., Yirmiyahu Chapt. 44:

v. 3 “because of their wickedness which they have committed to provoke Me, in that they went to offer, and to serve other gods, whom they knew not, neither they, nor ye, nor your fathers.”

v. 8 “in that ye provoke Me with the works of your hands, offering unto other gods in the land of Egypt, whither ye are gone to sojourn; that ye may be cut off, and that ye may be a curse and a reproach among all the nations of the earth?”

v. 15 “Then all the men who knew that their wives offered unto other gods, and all the women that stood by, a great assembly, even all the people that dwelt in the land of Egypt, in Pathros, answered Jeremiah, saying:”

v. 17-19 “But we will certainly perform every word that is gone forth out of our mouth, to offer unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink-offerings unto her, as we have done, we and our fathers, our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem; for then had we plenty of food, and were well, and saw no evil. But since we let off to offer to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink-offerings unto her, we have wanted all things, and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine. And is it we that offer to the queen of heaven, and pour out drink-offerings unto her? did we make her cakes in her image, and pour out drink-offerings unto her, without our husbands?'”

3.  According to RaDaK, the Navi is not teaching Halacha at this point, but rather describing what will take place among the people. Even those who would be inclined to mourn in this extreme manner  despite the prohibition in the Tora, they will not have the time to do so.\

Heh.

The basis of the Derasha would appear to be the need to be consistent and whole rather than divided and segmented. The extreme act of mourning indicates that something has been ripped away, leaving the individual psychically less than whole, symbolized by the tears in his skin (the ritual of Kriyat HaBegadim achieves the same result at least symbolically without assaulting one’s body which is viewed as possessing holiness). So too when there are multiple Batei Din in a city each deciding for itself, the body Israel is torn and wholeness and unity are absent from the community. While the individual ends up with more choices, the community is rent asunder. (This is the undertext for those who wish that the Sanhedrin be restored. From the perspective of centralization and consistency, this would be a benefit. But if the individual wishes to have a modicum of autonomy and choice re the manner in which he worships HaShem, a singular way of doing things will not necessarily satisfy such a desire.)

Commentaries discussing the relationship between the prohibition against cutting one’s flesh within the context of mourning and setting up divisive groups:

תורה תמימה דברים פרק יד פסוק א

לא תתגדדו - תניא, לא תתגודדו - לא תעשו אגודות אגודות, כגון ב"ד אחד בעיר אחת, פלגא מורים כדברי בית שמאי ופלגא כדברי בית הללד) [יבמות י"ד א']:

תורה תמימה הערות דברים פרק יד הערה ד

ד) אף על פי שבדרשה הקודמת כבר דריש הלשון לא תתגודדו מלשון חבורה אך כאן דריש מדכתיב זה הלשון בהתפעל ומצינו בלשון זה שני המובנים, כמו (מ"א י"ח) “ויתגודדו כמשפטם בחרבות”, וגם (ירמיה ה:ז) “ובית זונה יתגודדו”,Wherefore should I pardon thee? The children have forsaken Me, and sworn by no-gods; and when I had fed them to the full, they committed adultery, and assembled themselves in troops at the harlots' houses.  ובמיכה ד:יד “עתה תתגודדי בת גדוד” Now shalt thou gather thyself in troops, O daughter of troops; they have laid siege against us; they smite the judge of Israel with a rod upon the cheek. ולכן דרשינן שני הענינים. ויש לכוון כונה זו בפלפול הגמרא בזה, אלא שבאו שם הדברים בסגנון אחר. והנה בדרשה הקודמת מבואר דלא תתגודדו הוא החובל בעצמו מחמת צערו על המת, יעו"ש. וקיי"ל דלוקין עליו, והכ"מ פ' י"ב הי"ד מעבודת כוכבים הקשה האיך לוקין על זה והא הוי לאו שבכללות שכולל גם לאו דלא תעשו אגודות, כמבואר בדרשה שלפנינו, יעו"ש. ותמה אני שלא הביא מש"כ הרמב"ם בסה"מ מל"ת מ"ה דעיקר קרא אתא לענין שריטה וחבורה, והדרשה לא תעשו אגודות אגודות היא רק ע"ד רמז ואסמכתא, יעו"ש, וא"כ פשוט הדבר דלא שייך לומר שהוא לאו שבכללות מחמת זה, וע"ע באות הבא:

העמק דבר

...שנית לא תעשו אגודות אגודות. ואינו אסמכתא כמבואר בסוגיא דאמר ר"ל לר' יוחנן איקרי כאן לא תתגודדו לא תעשו אגודות וכו' הרי דמקשה בפשיטות וכ"כ הרמב"ם הל' עבודת כוכבים פי"ב ובכלל אזהרה זו שלא יהא שני ב"ד בעיר אחת כו' מעתה הקדישם הכתוב טעם בנים אתם לה' לאזהרה שלא תעשו אגודות אגודות. כיון שאתם בנים לה' ע"כ אין ראוי שיתראה שנפרדים אתם במנהגים השייך לתורתו דטבע הבנים להיות הולכים בדרך אחד. מיהו בשני ב"ד או בשתי עיירות אין ניכר פרידתן כ"כ. וכן שנוי מנהג מה שאינו שייך לתורת ה' אין בזה אזהרה:

גור אריה

ואם תאמר, מאי ענין זה לזה - שלא יעשו אגודות, ולא יתגודדו. ולא תמצא בתורה כך, שני דברים דלא שייכי בהדדי. ויראה שאין זה קשיא, דודאי שייכי שפיר יחד, שכמו שהגדידה מחלק גוף האדם - עד שאין בשרו אחד ושוה, כך כשנחלק הבית דין שהוא בעיר אחת, חציים מורים כבית הלל, וחציים כבית שמאי, כאילו גופו של אדם מחולק. והוציאו רז"ל מדרש זה כפי חכמתם וכפי הבנתם מלשון "תתגודדו", דלא הוי למכתב בזה הלשון, כדלעיל, אלא לכך כתב "לא תתגודדו", מפני שבא להזהיר גם כן על זה הענין:

והקשה הרמב"ן, מה שפירש רש"י הטעם שאמר שאתם בנים לה' אלהיכם - לא תתגודדו כדי שתראו נאה, אם כן אפילו שלא על מת יהיה אסור. ונראה לומר, שהתורה לא דברה רק מה שדרך לעשות, והוא נקרא מעשה, ולפיכך אסרה תורה. אבל שלא על מת, שאין דרך לעשות, והעושה אותו בטל דעתו, לא הזהירה עליו. כך יש לפרש לפירוש רש"י (כ"ה ברא"ם):

אבל נראה כי האיסור הוא מפני כי ישראל הם מציאות אמיתי, שהרי הם עלולים מן השם יתברך, ונקראים בשביל כך "בנים" למקום, שהם נמצאים מאתו בעצם ובראשונה. ודבר זה אין כאן מקום להאריך, כי נתבאר במקום אחר. ולפיכך אמר שלא יתגודדו על מת לעשות השחתה בהם, כי השחתה [הוא] לדבר שאין לו מציאות אמיתי, אבל לישראל - שהם נקראים בנים - לא שייך זה:

ועוד יש לך להבין, שהשם יתברך הוא אחד (לעיל ו, ד), ומפני שהוא אחד אין מדותיו דין גמור, שהרי יש בו רחמים ודין. ואם היה מדותיו דין גמור, היה חס ושלום השם יתברך נוטה לגמרי למדה אחת, ואינו כלול מרחמים ודין, ואם כן יש כאן שניות. וזה שמשחית נפשו על מת מפני [ש]השם עושה בו דין ועושה השחתה לגמרי, וכאילו כל מדותיו הוא דין גמור, ואין כאן רחמים, ולפיכך הוא משחית נפשו לגמרי על זה. לכך היה דרכם של בעלי עובדי עבודה זרה שהיו מתגודדים בחרבות, שהיו סבורים להוציא מחשבתם, שהיו אומרים שהעבודה זרה אין בו אחדות, והיא נוטה לדין גמור. וכאשר יתגודדו בחרבות לעשות בהם דין גמור, אז יוציאו מחשבתם לפועל. אבל אם עשה שלא על מת פטור, שהרי לא נעשה דין בו - שיאמר שכל מעשיו דין גמור. ומזה הטעם אסרה תורה בית דין בעיר אחת - פלג מורים כבית שמאי ופלג כבית הלל, שהרי "המשפט לאלהים" (לעיל א, יז), ונראה כאן חס ושלום שניות, ולכך צריך שיהיה הבית דין אינו מחולק. וזהו שאמר הכתוב "בנים אתם לה' אלהיכם", ואם יהיה בכם שום שניות וחילוק, כאילו היה חס ושלום בו, כי העלול מורה על העלה:

ופירוש הראשון יותר פשוט, כי מפני שהם בנים אל השם יתברך, מציאותם מציאות אמיתי, לכך אין השחתה בהם. וזהו גם כן טעם שלא יהיה הבית דין מחולק, כי כל חילוק הוא השחתה, וישראל - במה שהם בנים אל השם יתברך - אין ראוי זה בהם. ופירוש פשוט מאוד הוא דבר זה:

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