Shoftim answers

Shoftim 5722
Devarim 16:19
Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.

Alef.

1. Whereas the common approach to this verse is to assume that the judges are being addressed, as RaShI comments:

רש"י דברים פרק טז פסוק יט

(יט) לא תטה משפט - כמשמעו:

ולא תכיר פנים - אף בשעת הטענות. אזהרה לדיין שלא יהא רך לזה וקשה לזה, אחד עומד ואחד יושב. לפי שכשרואה שהדיין מכבד את חבירו מסתתמין טענותיו:

ולא תקח שחד - אפילו לשפוט צדק:

כי השחד יעור - משקבל שחד ממנו אי אפשר שלא יטה את לבו אצלו להפוך בזכותו:

דברי צדיקים - דברים המצודקים, משפטי אמת:

R. Yoseph Bechor Shor interprets that not only the judges, but the general Jewish community is also being addressed in the verse. Not only must the judges fairly reach their decision, but the community has then to carry out the judicial decision.

2.  When you look at the context in which this verse appears, you see that it is not the judges who are being addressed in v. 18 and 20, the “bookends” of v. 19, but rather the community.

דברים פרק טז

(יח) שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים תִּתֶּן לְךָ בְּכָל שְׁעָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם מִשְׁפַּט צֶדֶק:

The people have to appoint judges wherever they live in the land of Israel.

(יט) לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט לֹא תַכִּיר פָּנִים וְלֹא תִקַּח שֹׁחַד כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם:

(כ) צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף לְמַעַן תִּחְיֶה וְיָרַשְׁתָּ אֶת הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ: ס

The people have to pursue justice and seek out the best Beit Din, as well as apply the findings of that Beit Din.

Beit.

1.  The only difference between the Mechilta and the Gemora that is apparent to me is whereas the Midrash Halacha presents the second portion of the verse as a fact, i.e., by taking Shochad, your judgment is impaired, the Gemora explains how this take place. Since taking the bribe defines the judge as an extension of the litigant who has given him a gift, it no longer is a matter of judging someone else, but rather judging oneself. And since a person does not naturally assign blame to himself, it will be virtually impossible for the judge to be objective in his decision-making.

2.  Usually, the Tora does not give a rationale for why a Mitzva, particularly a negative Commandment, should be observed. Furthermore, it would seem that the impropriety of accepting a gift from a litigant should be obvious. The fact that the Tora made a point both in Shemot and in Devarim to justify not taking a bribe, i.e., that it becomes impossible for the judge to retain his objectivity, demonstrates how far one might go in rationalizing why he will continue to judge fairly even after accepting a gift from a litigant.

Gimel.

Since the verse states, “וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם”, it suggests that the person judging sees himself as a righteous individual despite having received a gift. This would only be the case if he believed that he was capable of judging righteously regardless of the gift that he accepted.

Daled.

דברים טז:יט לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט לֹא תַכִּיר פָּנִים וְלֹא תִקַּח שֹׁחַד כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם:

שמות כג:ח וְשֹׁחַד לֹא תִקָּח כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר פִּקְחִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִים:

1.  It seems to me that the difference in RaShI’s interpretation revolves around the two words “חכמים” and “פקחים”. Whereas a חכם is intellectually sharp, a פקח is analytically sharp. While the former can end up drawing wrong conclusions from the material that he has at his fingertips, in order for the latter to stumble, he literally has to forget what he knows, and to this end a bribe literally “blinds” him to what he has known well in the past.

2.  RaShI’s comment on Devarim suggests that the recipient of the bribe will engage in justification and rationalization to find a means by which the person from whom he has received a gift will emerge from the trial victorious. His comment on Shemot implies that he will be unable to think straight at all and his intellectual abilities will forsake him.

Heh.

1.  Mechilta: the laws given at Sinai

      RaShI: the ability of the judge to judge righteously going forward.

2.  The verse in Yeshayahu illustrates that sometimes what appears to be a Semichut structure is actually an adjective modifying a noun:

ישעיהו פרק יז (י) כִּי שָׁכַחַתְּ אֱלֹקי יִשְׁעֵךְ וְצוּר מָעֻזֵּךְ לֹא זָכָרְתְּ, עַל כֵּן תִּטְּעִי נִטְעֵי נַעֲמָנִים וּזְמֹרַת זָר תִּזְרָעֶנּוּ:

    For thou hast forgotten the God of thy salvation, and thou hast not been mindful of the Rock of thy stronghold; therefore thou didst plant plants of pleasantness (or pleasant plants?) , and didst set it with slips of a stranger (or strange slips?).

3.  If the text refers to the words as “דברי צדיקים” , then by definition they cannot be מעוותים, or twisted. “Twisted words” implies that from the second they are uttered, they are improper. “סילוף דברי צדיקים” suggests that the righteous words exist but for some reason are not subsequently articulated or accessed.

4.  Gur Aryeh on Devarim 16:19

ויש לומר, כי צריכי תרווייהו; "כי יעור עיני חכמים" על שאינו רואה זכות שכנגדו. כגון ראובן תבע את שמעון, וקבל שוחד משמעון, ויש לפניו סברא לזכות את שמעון, אף על גב דסברא אמיתית היא, מכל מקום יש סברא גם כן - שהיא דוחה אותה סברא - דמצי ראובן לטעון, וכאשר מקבל שוחד - "יעור עיני חכמים", דאינו רואה זכות של ראובן כלל. ובזה שייך "השוחד יעור עיני חכמים", שהרי לא ידע שום דבר מאותו סברא, והיה נעלם ממנו:

משל זה, ראובן תבע שמעון 'מנה אתה חייב לי שהודית לי', והדיין מקבל שוחד מן ראובן, הוא פוסק חייב לשלם, שהרי הודה. ומה ששמעון מצי טעין 'שלא להשביע עצמי הודיתי' נעלם, זהו "השוחד יעור עיני פקחים", שהרי נעלם ממנו זכותו. ואם שמעון השיב בעצמו 'שלא להשביע עצמי הודיתי', והדיין קבל שוחד, הרי אומר שאין טענת להשביע היא טענה, זה הוא "מסלף דברי צדיקים", שהרי ידע זכותו, רק שצדד סברא משובשת לדעתו, שאומר שאין זה טענה. וזהו "ויסלף דברים המוצדקים", דיש לפניו זכות ראובן, ובשביל שקבל שוחד מסלף הדברים:

“"כי יעור עיני חכמים—the judge does not see the argument that would vindicate the one from whom he has not received the gift.

"מסלף דברי צדיקים"—even if the judge sees the argument, he does not think that it is valid.

Vav.

1.  R. Avraham ben HaRaMBaM:

         “הצדיק”—the innocent person who has not given a bribe to the judge.

         “הסילוף”—thinking that the innocent person’s claims are false.

Ibn Ezra:

   “הצדיק”—the judge

“הסילוף”—the finding on the part of the judge what the giver of the bribe desires the outcome to be.

2.  Neither R. Avraham ben HaRaMBaM or Ibn Ezra agree with RaShI.

   RaShI:

   “הצדיק”—HaShem, Whose Words are contained in the Tora.

   “הסילוף”—a misrepresentation of the Tora law.

3.  In the הוה אמינא of Gur Aryeh, he presents a view that parallels that of Ibn Ezra.

4.  The verse states: “כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם:”. One might wonder, if this individual has accepted a bribe, how can the judge then be still called a “צדיק”? Ibn Ezra explains that as a צדיק, he deeply desires to say the right thing. However, the bribe is preventing him from doing so. Instead of transforming him into a רשע who can’t say the right thing even if he wanted to, he is a crippled צדיק, forced by the bribe to say the wrong thing.

5.  Onkelos is like RaShI (see ה).

   Yonatan ben Uziel is like Mechilta (see ה).

6.  The end of the verse contains synonymous phrases: RaShI (a) will not search for reasons to exonerate the litigant who did not give bribe; (b) will not say the right thing in decision.

   The end of the verse contains complementary phrases: Gur Aryeh (a) will not recognize the reasons to exonerate the litigant who failed to give bribe; (b) any reason to exonerate the litigant who did not give the bribe will be discounted.