Answers to Mishpatim (update may follow RE: last section)

Mishpatim 5715

שמות פרק כג

א) לא תשא שמע שוא אל תשת ידך עם רשע להית עד חמס: ס

ב) לא תהיה אחרי רבים לרעת ולא תענה על רב לנטת אחרי רבים להטת:

ג) ודל לא תהדר בריבו: ס

ד) כי תפגע שור איבך או חמרו תעה השב תשיבנו לו: ס

ה) כי תראה חמור שנאך רבץ תחת משאו וחדלת מעזב לו עזב תעזב עמו: ס

ו) לא תטה משפט אבינך בריבו:

ז) מדבר שקר תרחק ונקי וצדיק אל תהרג כי לא אצדיק רשע:

ח) ושחד לא תקח כי השחד יעור פקחים ויסלף דברי צדיקים:

Alef.

1. In Shemot 23, v. 1-3 deal with judging fairly. V. 4-5 deal with assisting another vis-à-vis his property. V. 6-8 return to the theme of judging fairly. Why was there a discontinuity in the topic? More specifically, the matter of treating a poor person fairly seems to be redundantly treated both in v. 3 and v. 6. 
2. ShaDaL contrasts v. 3 in which the verb “H-D-R”, which carries with it a positive connotation, “exalt, ennoble” suggests that you might be overly considerate of the poor person, therefore “love is undermining the judge’s objectivity”, with v. 6 where the more neutral verb “T-T-H”, “turn, tilt” appears. From the context of verses 7-8 where lack of objectivity leads to false judicial decisions, it would seem that in this case the poor person is being treated with negative prejudice.
3. Kassuto suggests that this instance of “Evyon” should be interpreted differently than usual because of the addition of the personal possessive pronoun at the end of the word. If the state of poverty is an objective state, how can a poor person be more “your” poor person than anyone else’s? Consequently he interprets the word as referring to someone with whom you yourself (the judge) has a dispute. The proper course of action would be for the judge in such a circumstance to disqualify himself.
4. Perhaps the regular meaning could be retained if the case is understood as one referring to where the judge caused the individual due to some other trial decision or personal interaction to become impoverished. Whether this would prejudice the judge positively or negatively is not as much the issue as is the fact that the individual does not stand to be judged fairly by this judge.

Beit.

1. The difference would appear to be at what point does the individual become obligated in either returning the lost animal or assisting in unloading the overly-loaded animal. The verb “P-G-A” suggests physical contact, in contrast to merely seeing the animal, i.e., until you touch the animal, the obligation does not take effect; the verb “R-A-H” obviously defines the obligation at a much earlier point, i.e., as soon as one notices the lost animal.
2. From a practical point of view, the amount of time that is required to perform the return of a lost object, particularly a living thing, will be much greater than helping to unload an animal. Would the Tora unduly force a person to give up such a large portion of his time in the former? A  second consideration is that whereas in the case of the lost animal, the owner would probably not know that an opportunity to return the animal had been deliberately ignored by this other person, the situation of an animal needing to be unloaded would involve a blatant display of lack of concern for both the animal and its owner when a person blithely walks by after having seen what is taking place. However, in both cases, were someone to take up the responsibility to either return the animal or assist in its unloading, positive social consequences could ensue as per the following Midrash:

מדרש אגדה (בובר) שמות פרק כג

[ה] כי תראה חמור שונאך.

זה שאמר הכתוב "דרכי' דרכי נועם וכל נתיבותי' שלום" (משלי ג' י"ז),

כי כשיראה האויב כי באת ועזרת לו, יאמר בלבו אני אמרתי כי זה אויבי,

חס וחלילה, אם היה אויבי לא היה עוזר לי, אבל הוא אוהבי ואני אויבו בחנם, אלך ואפייסנו,

הולך אליו ועושה שלום על כן אמר "וכל נתיבותיה שלום":¹ 

Beit ‘. (In a footnote, Nechama references another worksheet wherein she expanded further on the terminology used in these two verses:)

 משפטים תש"ד

ג. לזהותם של "אויבך" ו"שונאך"

פסוקים ד'-ה'

 ד) כי תפגע שור איבך או חמרו תעה השב תשיבנו לו: ס

 ה) כי תראה חמור שנאך רבץ תחת משאו וחדלת מעזב לו עזב תעזב עמו: ס 

מכילתא דרבי ישמעאל משפטים - מסכתא דכספא פרשה כ

שור אויבך.

זהו גוי עובד אלילים, דברי רבי יאשיה, וכן מצינו שעובדי אלילים קרויים אויבים לישראל בכל מקום, שנאמר (דברים כג י) כי תצא מחנה על אויביך, (שם /דברים/ כא י) כי תצא למלחמה על אויביך.

 - רבי אליעזר אומר, בגר שחזר לסורו הכתוב מדבר.

- רבי יצחק אומר, בישראל משומד הכתוב מדבר.

- [ר' נתן אומר, בישראל עצמו הכתוב מדבר,] אלא מה תלמוד לומר אויבך, אלא אם הכה את בנך, או שעשה עמך מריבה, נעשה אויב לשעה. 

1. במה מתקשים כל התנאים הנ"ל?
2. במה שונה עמדת ר' נתן באופן עקרוני מדעת שאר התנאים?

השווה את דברי הרמב"ם הל' רוצח יג:יד 

השונא שנאמר בתורה הוא מישראל, לא מאומות העולם, והיאך יהיה לישראל שונא מישראל והכתוב אומר )ויקרא י"ט י"ז( לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך, אמרו חכמים כגון שראהו לבדו שעבר עבירה והתרה בו ולא חזר הרי זה מצוה לשנאו עד שיעשה תשובה ויחזור מרשעו, ואע"פ שעדיין לא עשה תשובה, אם מצאו נבהל במשאו מצוה לפרוק ולטעון עמו ולא יניחנו נוטה למות שמא ישתהה בשביל ממונו ויבא לידי סכנה, והתורה הקפידה על נפשות ישראל בין רשעים בין צדיקים מאחר שהם נלוים אל ה' ומאמינים בעיקר הדת, שנאמר )יחזקאל ל"ג י"א( אמור אליהם חי אני נאם ה' אלקים אם אחפוץ במות הרשע כי אם בשוב רשע מדרכו וחיה.

1. The Tora prohibits such feelings towards others:

ויקרא פרק יט

יז) לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך ולא תשא עליו חטא:

דברים פרק יט

    (יא) וכי יהיה איש שנא לרעהו וארב לו וקם עליו והכהו נפש ומת ונס אל אחת הערים האל: (his hatred resulted in murder)

דברים פרק כב

(יג) כי יקח איש אשה ובא אליה ושנאה:(the hatred leads to divorce)

במדבר פרק לה

 (כב) ואם בפתע בלא איבה הדפו או השליך עליו כל כלי בלא צדיה:

(כג) או בכל אבן אשר ימות בה בלא ראות ויפל עליו וימת והוא לא אויב לו ולא מבקש רעתו:(definition of an enemy is one who wishes ill on another)                                                                                                                                                                                                            

If so, then how can the Tora assume that this is what a passer-by will feel towards the owner of the lost animal or the overly-burdened animal?

2. R. Natan is prepared to take the position that one Jew can hate another under certain conditions, i.e., that he has physically or legally attacked you. But even under such circumstances, one is not to bear a grudge in perpetuity, and can only consider the other an object of hatred or an enemy temporarily. By implication, the other Tannaim who define the case as involving either pagan non-Jews (I am following RaMBaM’s and Meiri’s position²) or a Jew who has left the religious fold, would seem to assume the view that no matter what personal animosity might exist between two Jews, it is improper for one to consider the other his enemy even temporarily!
3. In  this Halacha, RaMBaM not only rejects the interpretation of the first three Tannaim, he broadens R. Natan’s approach. The references in Shemot 23:4-5 are to sinning Jews. Not only does he not take the position that by definition there should be enmity between Jews and non-Jews, but even with regard to Jews themselves, just because you have an altercation with another Jew should not change your basic emotional approach to him; it is only when that Jew is in violation of a law for which he has received rebuke but nevertheless continues to transgress, such a person should be “hated” until he repents. (Is this an objective state of affairs, i.e., sinners should be hated and one should have nothing to do with them perhaps because they might negatively impact upon the behavior of others, or will the individual seeing he is “hated” be given incentive to repent, a result of a mini-Cherem?) And yet, if his (as opposed to his animal’s) life is in danger—the assumption is that if he unloads the animal by himself, the strain might be too much and he endangers himself), then one is supposed to help him since God Wishes evil-doers to live, for only in this way do they retain the potential to repent.

Gimel.

1. The example that ShaDaL gives for an earlier instance where the same word is used in the same verse, with different meanings, is Shemot 22:4. In this verse, the verb “B-E-R” first means “destroys” and then means “eats”.

RaShI states that according to the Midrash Halacha, even in the second half of the verse, where “A-Z-V” appears to mean “assist” (as opposed to the first instance of the verb which contextually means to abandon), the possibility of the first meaning remains in the sense that in certain circumstances, i.e., the individual passing by has to maintain his dignity or a case of where the animal belongs to a non-Jew, but the load belongs to a Jew (the implication is that the Jew is not beholden to protect the property of a non-Jew, and therefore even if the animal is in danger, he is permitted to forego becoming involved; naturally this does not take into consideration the “Kiddush HaShem” potential were he to help out.)

2. (Wait for Ariel Wyler’s response.)

Daled.

1. Whereas the verse in Shemot could refer to either unloading or loading—the animal crouching could be due to his inability to stand up or because he is so loaded down—the verse in Devarim appears to be specifically referring to loading—if you are to assist helping the animal stand up, that could hardly mean to help unload him. Unloading would best be done by first having the animal to crouch on the ground so that the load is more accessible. And if Devarim is about loading, then by the process of elimination Shemot is about unloading.
2. In the case of unloading, in addition to assisting the owner, you are also helping the animal, a consideration that you would be obligated to engage in regardless of who owned the beast. Consequently, one should not engage in a Mitzva only when he is compensated. On the other hand, helping the animal stand up is only beneficial for the owner, something that is considered an act of Chesed, but is not in itself obligatory—the animal would probably be better off without the load—and therefore the helper can be compensated for his time and effort.
3. 
   

רמב"ם הלכות רוצח ושמירת הנפש פרק יג הלכה יג

 הפוגע בשנים אחד רובץ תחת משאו ואחד פרק מעליו ולא מצא מי שיטעון עמו, מצוה לפרוק בתחילה

משום צער בעלי חיים ואחר כך טוען, במה דברים אמורים בשהיו שניהם שונאים או אוהבים, אבל אם היה אחד שונא ואחד אוהב מצוה לטעון עם השונא תחילה כדי לכוף את יצרו הרע.

1. The precedence is given to unloading because of the discomfort of the animal.
2. RaMBaM reflects the perspective that he enunciates at the end of Hilchot Temura:

רמב"ם הלכות תמורה פרק ד

...וכל אלו הדברים כדי לכוף את יצרו ולתקן דעותיו, ורוב דיני התורה אינן אלא עצות מרחוק מגדול העצה לתקן הדעות וליישר כל המעשים, וכן הוא אומר הלא כתבתי לך שלישים במועצות ודעת, להודיעך קושט אמרי אמת להשיב אמרים אמת לשולחך.

Consequently, in addition to the need to perform the Mitzvot themselves, if there is the potential for the Mitzva action to in addition to fulfilling God’s Will, also impact upon an individual’s character, self-discipline and maturity, the Mitzva should be applied to achieve such ends.

Heh.

1. The term “Imo” suggests that if the owner of the animal is present, in order for the passer-by to be obligated, the owner must participate as well, rather than taking the position that since the passer-by is obligated, he can do the whole thing by himself.
2. If the owner and the passer-by work out an arrangement by which instead of working, the owner compensates the passer-by and this is agreeable to the latter, then it is an acceptable arrangement. However, if the owner wishes to exploit the passer-by, not only not compensating him, but also not helping him, we don’t wish the Mitzva to be a reason by which an observant individual is victimized by a cynical owner. (It is more difficult to justify why one should load the animal if the owner is not there. How does one know that that is the intention of the owner? Just because the Derasha in the Tora is “HaKeim Takim”—in all situations, including when the owner is absent [doubling the verb is often interpreted as a Ribui {inclusionary interpretation} including that which is not readily apparent] nevertheless in this situation, inserting oneself without knowing the owner’s intention could not only be counterproductive, but even hurtful!)